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Abstract  
The Effects of Anticipation of Motivationally Salient Outcomes 
on Attentional Bias 
By 
Paweł Sebstian Jędras 
Attentional bias for substance-related cues could be a contributing factor in 
addiction and obesity. Current theoretical models implicate that attentional bias is  
a dynamic phenomenon that fluctuates over time within individuals; fluctuations in 
attentional bias may depend on the perceived availability of the substance such that 
attentional bias could be elevated when an imminent opportunity to consume  
the substance is anticipated. The goal of this PhD thesis was to investigate the effects 
of anticipation of substance-related motivationally salient outcomes (i.e., gain and 
loss of those substances) on attentional bias for substance-related cues as well as 
other types of motivationally salient cues. The first four empirical studies used eye 
tracking methods to measure attentional bias; findings demonstrate that attentional 
bias for substance-related (alcohol and chocolate) cues is sensitive to anticipation of 
gain and loss of those substances. Importantly, these effects appear to be outcome-
specific because anticipation of alcohol gain and loss influences attentional bias for 
alcohol but not chocolate pictures, and vice versa. These findings may also be 
dependent on the extent of participants’ control over gain and loss outcomes during 
the task. The next empirical study used electroencaphalography (EEG) to measure 
attentional bias but this study revealed no effects of gain or loss anticipation on 
attentional bias. The final two studies explored if the effects of anticipated gain and 
loss of chocolate might also affect attentional biases for emotional stimuli (facial 
expressions), again using eye tracking methods. Findings from these studies 
demonstrate that anticipation of chocolate-related gains and losses influences 
attentional biases for facial expressions in a congruent manner: anticipation of 
chocolate gain increases attentional bias for happy faces, whereas anticipation of loss 
increases attentional bias for sad faces. These findings point to a broader role for 
anticipation of gain and loss in emotional regulation. The theoretical and applied 
implications of these findings for addiction, obesity and emotional disorders,  
in particular the role of attentional bias in those disorders, is discussed.
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CHAPTER 1 -  GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 2 
 
The first section of the introduction provides a definition of attentional bias, 
and briefly reviews available methods of its measurement. Subsequently, theoretical 
accounts of attentional bias are introduced and their predictions and limitations are 
evaluated in the context of available empirical evidence. This section emphasises 
the dynamic nature of attentional bias and its relationship with motivational states 
and goal relevance, concluding that changes in substance availability could be 
a contributing factor in the fluctuations of attentional bias. The second section 
demonstrates how substance availability could influence craving, attentional bias 
and substance use, even when availability is only anticipated. The evidence for the 
role of substance anticipation will be reviewed for both drugs (including alcohol) 
and food. The third section provides a different perspective on attentional bias and 
anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes. This section demonstrates how 
anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes such as reward or loss can influence 
the attentional processing of positively and negatively valenced information. 
The final section outlines the goals and aims of this thesis. Parts of this chapter were 
published as Jędras, Jones, and Field (2013).  
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1.1. Attentional Bias 
1.1.1. Alcohol misuse, obesity and attentional bias 
Alcohol misuse and obesity are a major public health problem. Although the 
age-standardised rate of alcohol-related deaths in the UK has decreased from 15.8 
deaths per 100,000 people in 2008 to 14.3 per 100,000 in 2014, this rate is still 
considerably higher than 9.1 deaths per 100,000 recorded in 1994 (Office for 
National Statistics, 2016). It is predicted that by 2050, 60% of male and 50% of 
female UK population could become obese (Butland et al., 2007). The costs of 
alcohol harm to the society in the UK, were estimated at £21 billion a year while  
the costs to the National Health Service (NHS) were approximately £3.5 billion per 
year (Public Health England, 2014). Whereas the indirect costs of overweight and 
obesity in 2007 ranged between £2.6 billion and £15.8 billion, and the costs to the 
NHS were estimated at £4.2 billion (Morgan & Dent, 2010). The wide availability of 
alcohol and unhealthy food could be a contributing factor that drives alcohol misuse 
and obesity respectively (Rice & Drummond, 2012; Swinburn & Egger, 2002). 
Research suggests that substance use disorders tend to be associated with attentional 
preference for substance-related cues (Field & Cox, 2008), which could jeopardise 
attempts to maintain healthy life style in the environment where rewards such as 
alcohol and food are widely available. However, the relationship between attentional 
bias for substance-related cues and substance use is not clear (Field et al., 2016). 
Therefore, a better understanding of psychological mechanisms underlying alcohol 
misuse and obesity could be crucial for the development of effective treatment 
methods and policies. 
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1.1.2. Definition and methods of measurement 
This section provides a definition of Attentional Bias (AB) as well as a brief 
overview of the research methods involved in AB. The methods of measurement in 
research on AB and motivated behaviour can be classified as indirect and direct. 
Indirect measures of AB infer bias through the analysis of response times.  
In comparison to indirect measures of AB, the direct measures allow for parallel and 
continuous recording of physiological and behavioural changes which occur during 
attentional processing of stimuli. The purpose of this overview is to introduce 
examples of the most popular methods of assessment of AB, highlighting their 
limitations and their psychometric properties. 
Definition: AB is a tendency to prioritise the attentional processing of 
motivationally relevant cues over other information. Both appetitive cues  
(e.g., cues related to rewarding stimuli such as sex, food or drugs) and aversive cues 
(e.g., cues that signal danger such as threatening facial expressions) are able to 
capture and hold selective attention. 
1.1.3. Indirect methods of AB inference 
One of the most popular and widely used assessments of AB involves  
the measurement of the Stroop (1935) effect. The addiction Stroop task incorporates 
presentation of substance-related (e.g., beer, cocktails, etc.) and matched emotionally 
neutral words (e.g., water, lemonade, etc.). During the task, participants are required 
to quickly and accurately identify the colours of presented words while disregarding 
their semantic meaning. It is argued that in comparison to non-users, substance users 
automatically process the semantic content of substance-related words.  
These automatic processes could interfere with colour naming performance and 
hence cause greater response times. Therefore, the difference in mean colour naming 
reaction times between substance-related and neutral words is considered the index 
of AB. The main limitation of an addiction or a food Stroop effect is the speculative 
nature of its source. Both appetitive and aversive words are capable of eliciting the 
Stroop effect. The valence of substance-related words may depend on  
the individual evaluation of stimuli (Yiend, 2010) which could be affected by 
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substance use history. Hence, both positive and negative or even ambivalent 
evaluations could potentially evoke comparable Stroop effects. 
Another group of indirect methods of assessment of AB involves a variety of 
cueing tasks. The dot-probe task is one of the most commonly used cuing tasks, 
which was originally developed by MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986). In a typical 
dot-probe task participants are presented with pairs of pictures comprising of salient 
and neutral stimuli (e.g., a glass of beer vs. a glass of water) simultaneously 
displayed on the left and the right side of a computer screen. A picture pair is 
presented for a predefined amount of time, and afterwards a probe (e.g., a small dot) 
is displayed in place of one of the pictures. As reported by Field, Munafo, and 
Franken (2009) shorter presentation times (50 – 200 ms) are used to investigate the 
initial orientation but longer ones (500 ms or longer) are necessary to infer the biases 
in the maintenance of attention. Participants are requested to quickly and accurately 
indicate the location of the probe by pressing a keyboard button corresponding with 
the probe’s location (left or right side). AB is inferred from the difference between 
mean reaction times to probes that replaced neutral pictures and mean reaction times 
to probes which replaced salient pictures. Therefore, the dot-probe task indicates to 
which neutral or substance-related cues, participants’ attention was allocated before 
the stimulus was replaced by the probe. In comparison to the Stroop task,  
this method allows measuring AB towards and away from the salient stimuli (Yiend, 
2010). Hence, it might be more suitable for capturing differences in attentional 
processing of positively and negatively valenced stimuli. AB towards stimuli is 
deduced from shorter reaction times to probes replacing the task-relevant pictures, 
and AB away from stimuli is associated with shorter reaction times to probes 
replacing neutral pictures. Despite this advantage over the Stroop task, it should be 
emphasised that problems with the internal and test-retest reliability of the dot-probe 
task have been reported (addiction research: Ataya et al. (2012); anxiety research: 
Schmukle (2005); see also Christiansen, Mansfield, Duckworth, Field, and Jones 
(2015)). 
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1.1.4. Direct methods of AB measurement 
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a physiological measure widely utilised in 
the research on attentional processing of motivationally salient stimuli. EEG allows 
for the recording of electrophysiological neural changes related to unison activation 
of a group of neurones (Nunez & Srinivasan, 2006). During a typical EEG session, 
electrodes are placed on the scalp and event-related potentials (ERP) capturing  
a neural activity time-locked to a stimulus presentation are recorded. A capture of 
attention by motivationally relevant stimuli is argued to be reflected by P300 and the 
slow potential (SP, > 800 ms) components (Schupp et al., 2004). Therefore,  
the enhanced amplitude of these components observed during the presentation of 
motivationally salient stimuli in comparison to neutral stimuli is considered to be the 
index of biased cognitive processing (Littel, Euser, Munafo, & Franken, 2012).  
Unfortunately, the aforementioned components indicating AB can be triggered by 
both appetitive and aversive stimuli (Briggs & Martin, 2009; Littel et al., 2012; 
Polich, 2007). This introduces similar problems with the interpretation of results as 
in the case of the Stroop task (Yiend, 2010). 
Currently, the assessment of eye movement with an eye tracker could serve 
as a gold standard for the research of AB. Eye-tracking is a direct method of 
measuring AB which allows for the continuous recording of eye movements as 
a probe of attention, which is a solution to the problems associated with indirect 
methods of assessment (Christiansen et al., 2015). Eye-tracking measurement of AB 
is generally used in the context of a visual probe task. AB scores are calculated by 
subtracting mean gaze dwell times on neutral pictures from the mean gaze dwell 
times on motivationally salient pictures. The movements allow for capturing AB 
towards and away from motivationally salient stimuli. Due to the constant recording 
of eye movements, more complex patterns of attentional processing like initial bias 
toward and subsequent bias away from a stimulus, can be registered.  
Therefore, this method allows for capturing patterns of AB which might be specific 
for the ambivalent evaluation of stimuli (Yiend, 2010). 
 7 
 
1.1.5. Summary – measurement methods 
One of the important aspects of research is the utilisation of research methods 
which aim at providing most unequivocal results. Eye-tracking fulfils these criteria 
better than the previously discussed methods, hence eye tracking is indicated as  
the primary tool in AB studies. When new aspects of attention are explored,  
eye-tracking studies are useful in defining research direction, particularly when 
supplemented with other direct or indirect measurements of AB. 
1.1.6. AB in healthy functioning and in appetitive and aversive disorders 
Motivationally salient (appetitive and aversive) environmental cues are able 
to capture and hold attention. For example, people who use addictive substances 
(including alcohol) have an AB for substance-related cues (Field & Cox, 2008), 
whereas AB for food cues appears to be present in everybody to some degree 
(Werthmann, Jansen, & Roefs, 2015). In the case of aversive motivation,  
AB for threat-related cues is present in anxiety disorders and individuals in the state 
of anxiety (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
Therefore, AB can be present in the non-clinical population as well as disorders 
characterised by either enhanced appetitive or aversive motivation. This section will 
provide a theoretical explanation of the development of AB for rewarding stimuli 
like drugs and food, as well as a brief discussion of the implications and limitations 
of the theoretical model. 
1.1.7. The role of incentive sensitization theory in the development of AB 
Incentive-sensitization theory (IST) presented in the influential publication 
by Robinson and Berridge (1993) provides an explanation for the development of 
AB in substance use disorders. IST was proposed to explain the development of 
addiction from the perspective of neuroadaptations in the mesolimbic dopamine 
system (especially nucleus accumbens) which is involved in the attribution of 
incentive salience to reward and reward-related cues. Repeated use of potentially 
addictive drugs enhancing dopaminergic activity could cause hypersensitisation of 
dopaminergic pathways, leading to abnormal levels of incentive salience being 
attributed to substance-related cues (Koob & Volkow, 2010). It is proposed that 
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these changes are mediated via associative learning processes. After repeated 
pairings of drug-induced dopamine releases with substance-related environmental 
cues (e.g., an ashtray, a pack of cigarettes, etc.), the mere presence of the cues 
associated with substance availability could evoke a conditioned increase in 
dopamine release (Volkow et al., 2006). This indicates that mechanisms underlying 
craving may involve an element of anticipation of a further drug reward (Goldstein 
& Volkow, 2002), and it demonstrates that substance-related cues can acquire  
a powerful motivational value. It was proposed that it is this acquired incentive value 
that attracts attention, causing the experience of craving, and hence leads to drug-
seeking behaviour (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). 
There are similarities between drug and food reinforcers. Both drugs and 
food exert their reinforcing effects via an increase in the activity of dopaminergic 
pathways, and both drug abuse/addiction and obesity are associated with  
the overvaluation of the reinforcer (Volkow, Wang, Fowler, & Telang, 2008). 
Berridge, Robinson, and Aldridge (2009) suggested that a similar process could be 
involved in salience attribution and subsequent patterns of motivated behaviours for 
other types of reward apart from addictive drugs. This explains the understandable 
interest in the application of addiction theories for appetite research (Berridge, 2009; 
Havermans, 2013). Assuming that IST could explain patterns of behaviour 
responsible for obesity or at least its specific types, it could be expected that food-
related cues should be capable of eliciting comparable motivational states and attract 
selective attention like addictive substances (Nijs & Franken, 2012). 
The key concepts of IST implicate that both subjective experiences of 
craving and AB in response to reward-related cues are triggered by the incentive 
salience. Other theoretical models like the cognitive psychopharmacological model 
(CPM) proposed by Franken (2003) or the elaborated intrusion (EI) theory of desire 
introduced by Kavanagh, Andrade, and May (2005) further indicate that craving and 
AB are closely related expressions of the underlying appetitive motivational states. 
CPM posits that AB is a cognitive expression of a sensitised dopaminergic system; 
substance-related cues first evoke conditioned increase in dopamine and hence 
capture selective attention, and subsequently AB triggers craving. Once activated, 
craving further enhances AB, therefore operating in a reinforcing loop.  
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EI makes comparable predictions to CPM regarding the interaction of AB with 
craving. However, in contrast to CPM which defines craving as an emotion,  
EI provides a description of cognitive processes associated with the activation of 
craving (Kavanagh et al., 2005). EI suggests that AB for substance-related cues may 
trigger substance-related intrusive thoughts. Craving develops when these initial 
thoughts are elaborated upon within the working memory, through search of 
substance-related representations when accompanied by emotional states focused on 
the ability to satisfy substance-related desires. These consciously controlled 
elaborations may increase the salience of substance-related cues facilitating  
further attentional search. Hence, increasing AB and in turn facilitating intrusive 
thoughts and therefore reinforcing the entire process. Overall, these models 
demonstrate that AB is important because it may facilitate detection of substance-
related cues. Once those cues are detected, AB may interact with craving.  
This may trigger drug-related expectancies and intrusive thoughts, and due to  
a limited capacity of attention affect processing of competing cues (Franken, 2003; 
Kavanagh et al., 2005). This suggests that reciprocal excitation between craving and 
AB could facilitate substance use behaviour. 
1.1.8. AB predictions, limitations and the implications for research direction 
The theories discussed in the previous section suggest some interesting 
predictions. It could be expected that due to an extensive history of substance use, 
AB should be more pronounced in addicted or obese individuals when compared to 
the healthy population. Finally, if AB has a causal role in addiction and obesity,  
then it should be a predictor of treatment success i.e., reduction or cessation of drug 
use, and the likelihood of relapse to drug use after treatment (addiction) or changes 
in body weight (obesity). 
A recent critical review of AB theories in addiction and obesity addressed 
these predictions, exposing the limitations in the current understanding of AB’s role 
in motivated behaviour (Field et al., 2016). Overall, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: A variety of measurement methods including Stroop task, dot probe task, 
ERP measurements and eye-tracking provided solid empirical support for  
the presence or enhanced levels of AB in drug users when compared to non-users 
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(Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006; Field & Cox, 2008; Field, Marhe, & Franken, 2014; 
Littel et al., 2012). While addiction research provided rather unambiguous evidence 
for AB in substance users, research on AB in obesity provided mixed and 
inconclusive results, with studies reporting positive, negative and no association 
between AB and obesity. The opposite was implicated for the predictive value of AB 
in reward-seeking behaviour. AB appears to be a better predictor of food 
consumption than drug use or relapse (Field et al., 2016). Therefore, not all of  
the theoretical predictions are supported and the understanding of AB in substance 
seeking behaviour is limited. 
What seems to be a significant hint for the current research are the results of 
a recent study investigating fluctuations of AB (Marhe, Waters, van de Wetering, & 
Franken, 2013). The observation of Stroop task performance recorded a few times  
a day over a period of one week in a group of heroin-dependent patients undergoing 
detoxification, revealed a peak Stroop interference before relapse. Although these 
findings await replication, they are of particular importance for the understanding of 
the predictive role of AB in substance use. The intra-individual temporal fluctuations 
of AB could be more important for the prediction of subsequent drug use or eating 
behaviour than overall intergroup differences in AB. 
1.1.9. AB and appetitive motivation 
The relationship between motivational states and AB proposed by some of 
the theoretical models (Field & Cox, 2008; Franken, 2003; Kavanagh et al., 2005)  
is generally supported by the empirical evidence. AB for substance-related cues is 
associated with the strength of substance, including alcohol, craving (Field et al., 
2009; Rose, Brown, Field, & Hogarth, 2013) and AB for food cues was shown to be 
positively correlated with hunger (Werthmann et al., 2015). The relationship 
between AB and craving was supported by studies which experimentally 
manipulated drug deprivation or food fasting (e.g., Field, Mogg, & Bradley, 2004; 
Lavy & Van den Hout, 1993), induced negative mood (e.g., Bradley, Garner, 
Hudson, & Mogg, 2007; Hepworth, Mogg, Brignell, & Bradley, 2010) or measured 
craving and AB in response to food or drug related cues (e.g., Field, Rush, Cole, & 
Goudie, 2007; Smeets, Roefs, & Jansen, 2009). These results indicate an association 
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between changes in AB and the fluctuations of motivational states, highlighting  
the dynamic nature of AB. 
1.1.10. AB, aversive motivation and evaluative processes 
Similarly to appetitive motivation, aversive motivation is also capable of 
affecting AB. For example, the induction of negative mood can lead to an increase in 
AB for negatively valenced cues (e.g., Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; Mogg, Kentish, 
& Bradley, 1993). Aversive disorders are characterised by AB for negative 
information. AB for threat-related information is a robust phenomenon well 
documented across all types of anxiety disorders such as generalised anxiety 
disorder, social phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, specific phobia, panic disorder 
and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Similarly, empirical 
evidence suggests that depressive disorder is associated with AB for depression-
relevant cues (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 
2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007). Both anxiety and depressive disorder are 
associated with mood congruent but qualitatively different negativity biases  
i.e., vigilance towards threat in anxiety, and AB for dysphoric cues and stimuli 
connoting sadness in depression (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Hankin, Gibb, Abela, 
& Flory, 2010). The different patterns of AB between anxiety and depression 
disorders suggest that self-relevance of cues could be one of the factors mediating 
AB. This is consistent with the theoretical models of aversive disorders that indicate 
that AB may be mediated via evaluative processes involved in the assessment of 
relevance (see Cisler & Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010). The current perspective on 
mental health disorders indicates that normal and abnormal cognitive processes do 
not establish two independent entities. Therefore, the level of flexibility at which 
attention operates could vary on a continuum between normal and abnormal 
cognition. In the general population activation of selective attention may depend on 
cues reaching a certain level of intensity (i.e., arousal - see Anderson, 2005).  
In the clinical population, this threshold level could be lower, leading to a wider 
range of negative information being evaluated as relevant and hence explaining 
greater AB (Yiend, 2010). 
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Taking into account the current evidence for AB in aversive disorders,  
it could be expected that AB for food-related cues should also be present in eating 
disorders where food could be evaluated as a threat. The results of a recent review of 
studies measuring AB in eating disorders indicated AB away from positive eating 
stimuli i.e., healthy food, and AB toward negative eating stimuli i.e., ‘junk’ food 
(Aspen, Darcy, & Lock, 2013). Therefore, it is possible that aversive motivation 
could be a moderator of AB in eating disorders, and certain types of food which 
could be evaluated as threatening can evoke AB. Although this concept was 
acknowledged, it must be treated with caution due to the a scarcity of available 
studies (Werthmann et al., 2015). 
1.1.11. AB and goal relevance 
The previous sections illustrated that both appetitive and aversive motivation 
can have an impact on AB. The roles of evaluation and relevance in AB are strongly 
implicated by theoretical models of aversive motivation. Similarly, relevance may 
also be a contributing factor in AB for positively valenced cues. For example when 
cues (e.g., food) are relevant to a specific concern (e.g., hunger) (see Pool, Brosch, 
Delplanque, & Sander, 2016). This is consistent with the argument that relevant 
stimuli, both positively and negatively, can capture selective attention (e.g., Broeren 
& Lester, 2013; Muller, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2015; Van Dessel & Vogt, 2012; 
Wentura, Muller, & Rothermund, 2014). The moderating role of relevance in 
substance related AB can be demonstrated when substances become objects of 
contradictory goals (Field et al., 2016). Individuals attempting to control their 
substance use may perceive substance-related cues as a threat to the current goal of 
behaviour change (i.e., selection of healthier alternatives, reduction or cessation of 
intake) and therefore these cues could evoke concerns about failing. Yet they may 
still be attracted by the goal of pursuing reward by substance use (Field et al., 2016). 
While the initial AB for substance-related cues found in individuals trying to control 
their substance use (Field, Mogg, Mann, Bennett, & Bradley, 2013; Lee, Cho, & 
Lee, 2014) could reflect the ambivalent motivational states, the subsequent AB away 
from the cues could be a consequence of the state of ‘worry’ where individuals 
overcome AB (see Koole, 2009). Overall, this evidence shows that goal relevance 
may moderate AB. 
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1.1.12. Summary and research directions 
Motivationally salient (appetitive and aversive) environmental cues are able 
to capture and hold the attention (Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Field & 
Cox, 2008; Werthmann et al., 2015). IST provides an explanation for  
the development of AB in substance use disorders (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). 
It was proposed that comparable mechanisms could be involved in the development 
of AB and food cravings (Berridge, 2009; Havermans, 2013).  
Although, initial research aimed to explain substance use behaviour in terms of 
intergroup differences, comparing AB in non-users/non-problematic users vs. 
substance users/addicts, these attempts provided a limited understanding of the role 
of AB in the explanation of behaviour (Field et al., 2016). AB is a dynamic 
phenomenon which may reflect changes in the underlying motivational states like 
craving or hunger (Field et al., 2009; Rose et al., 2013; Werthmann et al., 2015). 
Temporal changes in AB appear to be a promising predictor of variability in 
substance use behaviour (Marhe et al., 2013). It is reasonable to posit that 
motivational states may affect perceived relevance of substance-related cues and vice 
versa – reflecting the reciprocal relationship between motivation and AB proposed 
by some of the theoretical accounts (Field et al., 2016). Positive, negative and 
ambivalent cues may receive selective attention due to their relevance to a goal of 
motivated behaviour. One of the factors which may determine substance relevance is 
current availability. Therefore, changes in substance availability could be  
a contributing factor in temporal changes of AB.  
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1.2. Substance availability 
1.2.1. Introduction 
Substance availability could be a contributing factor in substance-related 
problems (Gruenewald, 2011; Polivy, Herman, & Coelho, 2008).  
Living in an environment where alcohol and calorie-dense foods are widely 
available, can make the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle difficult (Bechara, 2005; 
Jansen, Houben, & Roefs, 2015; Papachristou, Nederkoorn, Corstjens, & Jansen, 
2012; Wiers et al., 2007). This section will explore the results of naturalistic and 
laboratory studies on the effects of substance availability on motivation and 
substance use behaviour. Subsequently, the potential mechanisms responsible for  
the development and impact of availability on cue reactivity will be introduced and 
explained. Finally, the results of studies focused on the impact of availability on AB 
will be reviewed. 
1.2.2. Drug availability and craving 
Substance availability can affect motivational states which in turn can 
facilitate substance use. A naturalistic study conducted by Dar, Stronguin, Marouani, 
Krupsky, and Frenk (2005), investigated the effects of habitual abstinence on 
cigarette craving in a population of Orthodox Jewish smokers. Unavailability of 
smoking during the Sabbath (when Orthodox Jews are forbidden by faith to smoke) 
was accompanied by relatively lower craving experience in comparison to both  
a regular workday when they could smoke as usual and on a forced abstinence 
workday. However, there was no difference in craving levels between the regular 
workdays and the forced abstinence workdays. On one hand these findings may 
suggest that habitual abstinence from substance use for religious reasons could affect 
the perceived availability on those days, resulting in lower craving levels.  
On the other hand, the lack of difference in craving between regular workdays and 
forced abstinence workdays implicates that the reason behind substance 
unavailability could contribute to craving experience. 
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Alternatively, Dar et al. (2005) suggested that since the Sabbath is a day 
dedicated to rest, hypothetically lower levels of stress on that day could have 
contributed to the lower craving levels (see review Kassel, Stroud, & Paronis, 2003). 
In a follow-up study, Dar, Rosen-Korakin, Shapira, Gottlieb, and Frenk (2010) 
investigated the impact of smoking availability on craving in flight attendants. 
Craving was assessed during a 2-way short flight (each leg ranging from three to five 
and a half hours) and a one-way long flight (ranging from eight to thirteen hours). 
The results demonstrate that the strengths of craving were gradually increasing, 
during both short and long duration flights, to peak when landing approached.  
At the end of the first leg of the short flight (when an opportunity to smoke arose) 
cigarette craving was higher than at the equivalent point of the long flight 
(comparable nicotine deprivation) but comparable to craving strength assessed at  
the end of the long flight. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret these results in 
terms of the impact of proximity to the opportunity to smoke, rather than nicotine 
deprivation associated with flight duration. This demonstrates that craving can be 
moderated by the anticipation of substance availability, and these effects can be seen 
when nicotine deprivation is controlled. 
The presented naturalistic studies implicate that temporal changes in 
substance availability may affect substance-related motivational states (Dar et al., 
2010; Dar et al., 2005). Appetitive motivation (i.e., substance craving) can be 
triggered when drugs are expected to be available for consumption and attenuated 
when substance use is not allowed/ available. In line with these results, laboratory 
research provided empirical support for the impact of perceived drug availability on 
the strength of subjective craving. Research demonstrated that the strength of 
subjective craving in response to drug cue exposure was more pronounced in 
participants who expected to be able to subsequently consume the substance.  
Some of these studies captured the enhancing impact of substance availability on 
craving even among participants who were not exposed to substance-related cues  
(e.g., Carter & Tiffany, 2001; Dols, van den Hout, Kindt, & Willems, 2002; Dols, 
Willems, van den Hout, & Bittoun, 2000; Droungas, Ehrman, Childress, & O'Brien, 
1995; Hayashi, Ko, Strafella, & Dagher, 2013; Juliano & Brandon, 1998; Thewissen, 
Snijders, Havermans, van den Hout, & Jansen, 2006; Thewissen, van den Hout, 
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Havermans, & Jansen, 2005; Thewissen, van der Meijden, Havermans, van den 
Hout, & Jansen, 2008; see review Wertz & Sayette, 2001b). The majority of these 
studies were conducted with cigarette smokers, although one study demonstrated 
comparable findings in cocaine dependent individuals. Yamamoto, Karlsgodt, Rott, 
Lukas, and Elman (2007) manipulated beliefs about chances of cocaine 
administration. Although all participants received a dose of cocaine, one group 
believed that there was only a 33% chance of receiving the drug, whereas the second 
group was informed they would certainly receive the drug. In comparison to  
the uncertainty condition, participants who were certain of receiving cocaine 
reported significantly higher levels of craving immediately before drug 
administration. The current studies demonstrate that anticipation of drug availability 
is a sufficient condition for increasing the levels of subjective craving. 
Research on alcohol availability provided a less clear pattern of results.  
Two studies reported no effect of alcohol availability on subjective craving in 
response to alcohol cues (Davidson, Tiffany, Johnston, Flury, & Li, 2003; Kruse et 
al., 2012). Conversely, Papachristou et al. (2012) reported greater craving levels in 
participants who expected to consume alcohol during a study in comparison to those 
who did not. On the contrary, MacKillop and Lisman (2005) showed that alcohol 
unavailability can actually increase cue-induced craving in participants who were 
explicitly informed they were not able to consume alcohol at the later stage of  
a study in comparison to those who were expecting to have an opportunity to 
consume alcohol (see also Mackillop & Lisman, 2007). The presented impact of 
unavailability information is consistent with Tiffany’s (1990) theoretical model of 
addictive behaviour. Tiffany (1990) proposed that once drug use progresses to 
addiction, self-administration of drugs becomes a habitual automated process which 
can be triggered in the absence of strong cravings. The experience of craving 
emerges when the automatic process of drug administration is interrupted or ceased 
because of drug unavailability. 
There are two possible explanations for the discrepancy between tobacco and 
alcohol findings. Firstly, the anticipation of tobacco and alcohol may have  
a differential effect on drug craving. Secondly, it is possible that apart from  
the presented effects of drug availability on craving, drug unavailability could 
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increase craving via a different mechanism, in which frustration, negative mood or 
the perspective of withdrawal symptom could contribute to craving-related 
experience. 
1.2.3. Food availability, eating behaviour and craving 
With respect to the drug availability studies discussed in the previous section, 
appetite research indicates that food availability can influence eating behaviour. 
Early research on external responsiveness to salient food cues (i.e., nuts) and eating 
behaviour demonstrated that imminent food accessibility had an impact on food 
consumption of obese individuals (Costanzo & Woody, 1979; McArthur & Burstein, 
1975; Schachter & Friedman, 1974). For example, in the study conducted by 
Costanzo and Woody (1979) normal weight and obese participants were assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions which could be interpreted in terms of 
availability. In the imminent availability group, participants were provided with  
a bowl of unshelled peanuts ready for consumption. The other group received a bowl 
of shelled peanuts – this can be considered as delayed availability condition.  
Overall, the results of the study demonstrate the main effect of availability,  
as participants who were provided with shelled peanuts consumed more peanuts than 
those who had to shell peanuts. The further analysis revealed that peanut availability 
had only significant impact on consumption in obese participants. This indicates that 
imminent food availability may facilitate eating behaviour in obese individuals. 
It is reasonable to argue that the levels of convenience and visibility could 
contribute to the experience of perceived food availability. Studies showed that 
increased food (e.g., chocolate) visibility and accessibility/distance can facilitate 
consumption (Maas, de Ridder, de Vet, & de Wit, 2012; Painter, Wansink, & 
Hieggelke, 2002; Wansink, Painter, & Lee, 2006). For example, increasing snack 
availability via placing them near the working area in which participants spend most 
of their time (e.g., the top of an office desks), can lead to greater food consumption 
in comparison to more obscured (e.g., placing a snack in a drawer) or more remote 
locations (e.g., placing a snack on a shelf away from the desk) (Painter et al., 2002). 
It appears that the effects of availability are most pronounced when food is placed 
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within participants’ reach (Maas et al., 2012), i.e., when snacks are available for 
imminent consumption. 
A recent study demonstrated that substance unavailability may decrease 
activation of neural circuits associated with craving (Frankort et al., 2014).  
Thirty-minute exposure to chocolate, without an ability to consume, elevated  
the levels of subjective craving relative to a control group which was exposed to 
neutral cues. This change was accompanied by an increased activation of the brain 
reward regions. After 60 minutes of exposure, the subjective ratings of craving began 
to drop, although they were not extinguished. Interestingly, at this point, the levels of 
activation of brain areas believed to reflect craving returned or dropped below  
the control group levels. It can be expected that longer exposure to chocolate cues 
would result in a further decrease in subjective craving. The results of this study 
indicate that the presence of chocolate cues may initially increase craving.  
However, when chocolate cues do not signal availability for an extended period of 
time, at least at the neural level, craving response is ceased. Such an interpretation is 
consistent with suggestions that mechanisms underlying craving may involve  
an element of anticipation of a further drug reward (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002).  
For example, a recent fMRI study which involved immediate food availability 
provided empirical support for the moderating role of food reward availability on cue 
reactivity (Blechert, Klackl, Miedl, & Wilhelm, 2016). During the experiment, 
participants viewed pictures of foods that were available for consumption during and 
after the study, and pictures of foods that were unavailable. Availability had  
an impact on palatability ratings (“How palatable is this food to you?” rated on  
a 7-point Likert scales (from “not at all” to “very palatable” or “very much”)) with 
available foods being rated as more palatable than unavailable ones. Comparing to 
unavailable foods, the presentation of pictures of available foods caused stronger 
activation of brain circuits associated with reward, appetitive motivation and 
cognitive control. 
1.2.4. Imminent availability 
Some of studies suggest that availability should be imminent in order to have 
an impact on craving or behaviour (e.g., Blechert et al., 2016; Costanzo & Woody, 
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1979; Maas et al., 2012; Painter et al., 2002; Wansink et al., 2006). The significance 
of the immediacy of a substance use opportunity has previously been emphasised by 
other research groups (see Blechert et al., 2016; Tiffany, Warthen, & Goedeker, 
2009). It is possible that in the case of some studies the delay in substance delivery 
led to null results. For instance, Field and Duka (2004) observed no effects of 
smoking opportunity on craving and physiological measures of smoking cue 
reactivity. However, those authors noted that participants who expected to be able to 
smoke ‘soon’ still had to wait 20 minutes before they were able to smoke, and this 
delay may have reduced the impact of the expectancy information. Rejeski et al. 
(2010) found that delay in food availability interacted with state craving predicting 
negative affect during exposure to food cues. The highest negative affect was found 
in participants expecting a long delay in food availability (30 minutes vs. 6 hours) 
who reported high craving. Taking into account the potential importance of 
imminence of substance availability, the impact of availability information on 
positive affect could have been obscured due to relatively long food waiting time in 
the short delay condition. Therefore, it is possible that even a relatively small delay 
in substance availability may have an impact on the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of availability information. 
1.2.5. Cue reactivity and Pavlovian conditioning 
Exposure to food and drug-related stimuli may trigger preparatory, 
consummatory, or both type of responses (Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, & Everitt, 
2002). Learned physiological (e.g., increases in heart rate, activation of brain reward 
system), subjective (i.e., particularly craving) and behavioural (such as substance-
taking behaviour) reactions activated during exposure to substance-related cues are 
called cue reactivity. Increased responsiveness to drug-related cues in comparison to 
neutral ones is a common phenomenon found in substance use disorders, and could 
be a contributing factor to the maintenance of drug use behaviour (Carter & Tiffany, 
1999; Drummond, 2000; Kuhn & Gallinat, 2011; Schacht, Anton, & Myrick, 2013). 
Food-related cues are capable of eliciting similar reactions in both normal weight 
and overweight individuals (Nederkoorn, Smulders, & Jansen, 2000; Wang et al., 
2004). Studies indicate that overweight individuals might be more prone to  
the effects of exposure suggesting that enhanced cue reactivity could be  
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a contributing factor in obesity (Boswell & Kober, 2016; Ferriday & Brunstrom, 
2011; Halford, Gillespie, Brown, Pontin, & Dovey, 2004; Havermans, 2013; Tetley, 
Brunstrom, & Griffiths, 2009). 
According to conditioning accounts of cue reactivity, the substance acts as  
an unconditioned stimulus (US) that elicits unconditioned responses e.g., experience 
of rewarding properties of a drug. With repeated substance use, the user learns  
the contingency between drug/food effects and cues associated with substance 
administration (e.g., the sight and smell of a lit cigarette or food) such that those cues 
function as conditioned stimuli (CS) that are able to evoke conditioned responses 
(CRs). Once the CS-US contingency has been learned, the CS functions as a signal 
for the imminent availability of the substance, and, arguably, it is this anticipation 
that is responsible for the initial development of CRs such as changes in subjective 
state, physiological changes, and behavioural responses (Field & Cox, 2008; 
Havermans, 2013; Hogarth, Dickinson, Hutton, Bamborough, & Duka, 2006). 
Awareness of CS-US contingencies may be a crucial condition for the initial 
development of CRs. A considerable number of human conditioning studies 
demonstrate that, during the formation of conditioned associations, participants show 
CRs only after they can verbalise the CS-US contingency, i.e., when the presentation 
of the CS leads to the expectation that the US is imminent (Lovibond & Shanks, 
2002). In a follow-up review, Shanks (2010) concluded that research failed to 
provide a robust and replicable empirical base for unconscious learning, implying 
that awareness is necessary for conditioning and other forms of learning  
(see also Lovibond, 2004; Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2016). 
 An arbitrary cue that is paired with a substance reward is able to evoke  
an increase in craving (and other conditioned responses), but only after participants 
have learned the predictive significance of the cue, such that its presence elicits  
an expectation of the opportunity of substance use (Hogarth & Duka, 2006).  
For example, one study showed that a CS that had been paired with the opportunity 
to smoke (CS+) led to increased cigarette craving compared to a CS that had been 
explicitly unpaired with the opportunity to smoke (CS-) (Field & Duka, 2001).  
This CR (craving) was particularly pronounced in individuals who were aware of  
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the contingency between the CS and the US. Furthermore, the craving CR to  
the CS+ (versus the CS-) was completely abolished if participants were informed 
that smoking was unavailable. This study and several others reviewed by Hogarth 
and Duka (2006) reveal that drug expectancy in response to a CS that is paired with  
a drug use opportunity is an important determinant of other CRs in response to that 
cue (Field & Cox, 2008). To summarise, substance-related cues appear to able to 
evoke craving and physiological arousal only when individuals are aware of  
the predictive significance of those cues, such that their presence leads to  
an expectation that the substance is available. 
Pavlovian to instrumental transfer (PIT) studies demonstrate how substance 
anticipation can influence behaviour. Conditioned cues predicting a reward are 
capable of influencing the rate of instrumental responding for that same reward,  
an effect known as PIT. For instance, Lovibond and Colagiuri (2013) used  
a differential-conditioning design to study PIT effects. During the instrumental-
acquisition phase, participants were asked to respond by pressing a button in order to 
obtain M&M chocolate reward. The reward was dispensed on a variable ratio  
(VR 10) after the button was pressed 10 times on average (from 5 to 15).  
This stage ended after participants earned 12 chocolate rewards.  
During the Pavlovian-acquisition phase, one of the lights (red or blue - 
counterbalanced) was followed by the delivery of chocolate (CS+ trials) whereas the 
other light was followed by no outcome (CS- trials). Participants were asked to 
consume the obtained chocolate. In the final transfer-test phase participants were 
informed that they could press the button again. The final transfer test was conducted 
under extinction and neither instrumental response nor CS+ was followed by  
the delivery of chocolate reward. In the first stage of the transfer test, participants 
made instrumental responses under extinction and subsequently in the second stage 
CS+ and CS- were introduced for 10 s in random order. The responses were recorded 
from 30 s before to 60 s after the CS onset. Subsequently CS+ and CS- were 
presented again in random order. The results revealed that the presence of CS+ 
relative to CS- amplified instrumental responding during (10 s) and after (20 s) CS 
presentation. In the second experiment, CS presentation time was expanded from  
10 s to 30 s. A similar pattern of instrumental facilitation lasting approximately 30 s 
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from the onset of CS was found. This implicates that the increase in the instrumental 
response was caused by the presentation of CS rather than frustration caused by lack 
of reward. These results demonstrate how expectation of substance availability can 
facilitate behaviour focused on obtaining the substance. 
1.2.6. The effects of substance availability on AB 
Field and Cox (2008) proposed that during conditioning, drug cues elicit  
an expectation of imminent drug availability and as a consequence of this, drug users 
preferentially shift their attention to the cue. This theory makes the prediction that 
AB for drug cues should be moderated by the perceived availability of the drug. 
Wertz and Sayette (2001a) showed that AB for smoking-related words was highest 
in nicotine-deprived smokers who expected to be able to smoke imminently 
compared to those who believed that they would not be able to smoke, or who were 
uncertain if they could smoke or not. These effects were replicated by McCarthy, 
Gloria, and Curtin (2009) who showed that anticipation of smoking increased AB for 
smoking-related words and other emotionally valenced words in smokers who were 
deprived of nicotine, but there were no effects of smoking expectancy in smokers 
who were nicotine sated at the time of testing. Using a within-subjects design,  
Field et al. (2011) informed social drinking (non-dependent) participants about  
the probability that they would receive beer (100%, 50%, 0%) before each trial of  
a visual-probe task with concurrent eye-tracking. During this task, alcohol-related 
and neutral pictures were presented on a computer screen while participants’ eye 
movements were recorded. Results revealed that AB for alcohol cues was elevated 
when participants expected to be able to consume alcohol imminently, compared to 
when they knew that alcohol was not available. However, this sensitivity to 
availability information was only seen in relatively light drinkers. In heavier 
drinkers, AB for alcohol cues was seen regardless of availability information.  
This finding may suggest that AB can become decoupled from the anticipation of 
reward in those who drink more heavily or more frequently (see also Hogarth, 
Balleine, Corbit, & Killcross, 2013 for a broader discussion of this issue).  
In a follow-up study, Jones et al. (2012) used a similar methodology and replicated 
the basic demonstration of increased AB for alcohol cues when alcohol was 
anticipated imminently. However, unlike in the Field et al. (2011) study,  
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these effects were apparent in all participants regardless of whether they were  
a relatively heavy or light drinker. Overall, this evidence demonstrates that AB is 
sensitive to the perceived availability of reward. 
Although, the comparable effects of food reward anticipation on AB for 
food-related cues have been reported by some studies (Jones et al., 2012) these 
findings have not always been replicated (Hardman, Scott, Field, & Jones, 2014; 
Werthmann, Roefs, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2013). In the study conducted by 
Werthmann, Roefs, Nederkoorn, and Jansen (2013) AB for chocolate-related cues 
was not moderated by perceived availability of chocolate. It is possible that in this 
study there was a fairly long interval (estimated at 15-20 minutes) between giving 
participants the availability information and the actual opportunity to consume 
chocolate, and this could have blunted the motivational impact of availability 
information. As in the case of other cue reactivity measures the impact of availability 
on AB could depend on close time and distance proximity of reward (see 1.2.4 
Imminent availability, p. 17). To address this issue Hardman et al. (2014) 
manipulated the effects of food anticipation (i.e., pizza points) on a trial by trial basis 
(see also Field et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012). In line with the results reported by 
Werthmann, Roefs, Nederkoorn, and Jansen (2013), this study revealed that 
anticipation of food did not enhance AB neither for food or alcohol-related cues. 
However, a significant difference between probability conditions was revealed when 
mean gaze direction bias was averaged across food and alcohol pictures.  
Participants were more likely to initially direct their attention towards reward-related 
cues when food reward was anticipated (100% and 50% trials) in comparison to  
0% likelihood of receiving reward. These results are partially consistent with studies 
which revealed that AB was enhanced when reward was anticipated.  
The available studies suggest that the effects of anticipation of drugs (and other 
rewards) on AB are readily detected when anticipation (expectancy) is manipulated 
on a within-subjects, trial-by-trial basis, which ensures that participants expect to 
receive the reward (or not receive it) at the exact moment that AB is measured  
(e.g., Field et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012), albeit these effects are less clear for food 
anticipation (e.g., Hardman et al., 2014). 
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1.2.7. Are the effects of reward anticipation on attentional bias general or 
outcome specific? 
It is unclear whether the effects of availability anticipation are dependent on 
congruency between the type of reward that is anticipated and the type of reward cue 
for which AB is measured. One account based on emotion regulation (broad-and-
build theory; Fredrickson, 2001) suggests that effects of reward anticipation might be 
more generalised. According to this theory, positive emotions increase receptiveness 
to environmental signals that rewards are available. As predicted by the theory, 
induction of positive mood can facilitate AB for rewarding stimuli (Tamir & 
Robinson, 2007). It could be expected that reward anticipation may lead to 
comparable increases in AB. For instance, reward anticipation can increase positive 
mood as reflected by the correlation between the anticipatory increase of activation 
in the nucleus accumbens during reward anticipation and self-reported positive 
arousal (Knutson & Greer, 2008); and therefore, reward anticipation should also 
increase AB for a broad range of reward-related cues. 
Interactions between Pavlovian and instrumental associative learning, 
specifically PIT, suggest an alternative mechanism through which anticipation of  
a specific reward might increase AB for reward-related stimuli in general.  
Outcome-specific PIT occurs when the presentation of a Pavlovian cue  
(e.g., a discrete environmental cue previously paired with sucrose) increases 
instrumental responding for that reinforcer. However, that Pavlovian cue can also 
energise instrumental responding for other rewards as well, and this is known as 
General PIT (Cartoni, Puglisi-Allegra, & Baldassarre, 2013; Corbit & Balleine, 
2005, 2011; Holmes, Marchand, & Coutureau, 2010). Given that attentional 
selection precedes action selection (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Krajbich, 
Armel, & Rangel, 2010) we might expect that anticipation of a specific reward 
would increase AB for cues related to a range of rewarding stimuli. In the first test of 
this idea, Jones et al. (2012) investigated whether effects of reward anticipation 
could be attributed to an outcome-specific effect, or if they reflect a more generalised 
mechanism. In the Field et al. (2011) study participants received small amounts of 
alcohol on a trial-by-trial basis depending on the probability information and 
feedback, Jones et al. (2012) study involved secondary reinforcement (i.e., points 
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that participants’ believed would be exchanged for chocolate and beer at the end of  
the study). The lack of opportunity to consume rewards on the trial-by-trial basis 
suggests that Jones et al. (2012) was able to measure the effects of reward 
anticipation in isolation from the effects of satiety and intoxication. For example 
administration of alcohol reward could increase motivation to consume alcohol 
drinks (de Wit & Chutuape, 1993; Fillmore & Rush, 2001) and this could increase 
AB (Adams, Ataya, Attwood, & Munafo, 2012; Schoenmakers, Wiers, & Field, 
2008). The risk here is alcohol intoxication could alter or even drive the effects of 
availability anticipation, thus creating difficulties in interpretation of results. 
Furthermore, the impairment of inhibitory control after alcohol use could increase 
consumption of food (e.g., Christiansen, Rose, Randall-Smith, & Hardman, in press; 
Rose, Hardman, & Christiansen, 2015). Therefore, it is possible that  
the administration of alcohol reward could increase AB for food-related stimuli via 
changes in inhibition. At the same time, food intake could also affect food cravings 
and hence AB. Hence, the introduction of reward consumption during a reward 
anticipation task brings a new set of variables which could affect the clarity and 
interpretation of final results. Secondary reinforcement also allows for  
the simultaneous investigation of the impact of different substances on AB – actual 
consumption of chocolate and beer during the task could make participants nauseous 
affecting the value of anticipated reward as well as rising ethical concerns.  
The method introduced by Jones et al. (2012) showed that the anticipation of 
secondary reinforcers associated with the availability of actual rewards was 
sufficient to moderate AB. 
In the study conducted by Jones et al. (2012), participants completed  
a computerised task whilst their eye movements were recorded. On each trial, 
participants were shown a picture that represented the type of reward (beer or 
chocolate) and a percentage that indicated the chances of reward (100%, 0% 
likelihood of reward) points that would later be exchanged for that reward. 
Subsequently, one of two types of pairs of pictures was displayed on the screen 
(chocolate–neutral pairs or alcohol-neutral pairs). The primary finding was an effect 
of reward anticipation on AB that was generalised rather than outcome-specific: AB 
for both alcohol and chocolate pictures (as inferred from longer maintenance of gaze 
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on those pictures rather than the neutral pictures) was larger on 100% probability 
trials compared to 0% trials, regardless of the type of reward (alcohol or chocolate) 
that was anticipated. This demonstration that the effects of reward anticipation on 
AB are general rather than specific to the reward that is anticipated is problematic for 
conditioning-based accounts of this effect (Field & Cox, 2008). It can be argued that 
the use of points could mean that participants did not actually anticipate different 
rewards on the different types of trials. However, it was proposed that the probability 
cues are sufficient to trigger the representations of substance-related reward and 
direct attention (Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki & Duka, 2007),  
which makes them a valid substitute of actual rewards in the examination of  
the effects of anticipation on AB. However, methodological issues in this study may 
account for these findings and suggest an alternative explanation for the results, as 
discussed in Jones et al. (2012). 
1.2.8. Summary - Anticipation of reward 
Increased food and alcohol availability could be a contributing factor in 
substance-related problems. Both naturalistic and laboratory-based studies 
demonstrated that perceived substance availability can increase craving and facilitate 
consumption. It should be emphasised that imminence of availability may be  
a crucial condition for revealing its effects on cue reactivity. Associative learning 
processes explain how drug and food-related cues can trigger conditioned responses, 
including craving and AB, via anticipation of substance availability.  
Research implicates that at least at the early stage, learning may depend on  
the awareness of if-then rules between substance-related cues and availability 
(Hogarth & Duka, 2006). Cues signalling imminent substance availability are 
capable of increasing AB (Field et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012). Jones et al. (2012) 
demonstrated general effects of substance anticipation on AB – the anticipation of 
beer or chocolate can increase AB for both alcohol and chocolate cues regardless of 
the type of anticipated reward. However, it is fair to say that these findings are 
ambiguous, so one of the goals of the current research is to clarify whether effects of 
substance anticipation on AB are general or outcome specific.  
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1.3. AB and emotional regulation 
1.3.1. Introduction 
The anticipation of reward (substance) may have a moderating effect on AB. 
Apart from the presented effects of anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes 
like an alcohol or food reward on AB, research indicates that these moderating 
effects might generalise to a different type/category of motivationally salient stimuli. 
This section provides an overview of research related to the role of AB and 
anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes in emotional regulation focusing on 
the arguments provided by Rothermund and colleagues (Koole & Rothermund, 
2011; Rothermund, Gast, & Wentura, 2011; Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008). 
1.3.2. Positivity and negativity bias 
AB may be a crucial mechanism in successful goal-directed behaviour 
whereby it highlights reward opportunities or potential threat, allowing for adequate 
response selection. As pointed out by Rothermund et al. (2011) there seem to be  
a dichotomous split among accounts regarding whether positive or negative 
information command more attention. This split is reflected by the results of research 
from various branches of cognitive processing (e.g., selective attention, memory 
encoding or recall). Some evidence indicates that negative events are more salient 
than positive events and therefore they receive more attention (e.g., Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001; 
Pinkham, Griffin, Baron, Sasson, & Gur, 2010; Pratto & John, 1991; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001), while other research implicates the superiority of positive 
information over negative (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Mata, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2013; 
Silvera, Krull, & Sassler, 2002; Svenson, 1981). Overall Rothermund et al. (2008) 
and Rothermund et al. (2011) concluded that both positivity and negativity biases are 
important from the perspective of goal-directed behaviour. For example, negativity 
bias might be crucial in threat detection (see Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward, 2008) 
while positivity bias might be helpful in detection and tracking of rewarding stimuli, 
explaining an overall bias for rewards like food (e.g., Hardman et al., 2014; 
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Werthmann, Roefs, Nederkoorn, Mogg, et al., 2013). Therefore, survival may 
depend on both negativity and positivity bias, making them equally important. 
However, none of accounts arguing superiority of one type of bias over the other one 
seems to provide a complete explanation of the role of cognitive bias in behaviour. 
1.3.3. A rigid AB as a potential cause of ‘disordered’ goal behaviour 
The rigid AB could distort the perception of the reality to the extent where 
everyday behaviour could be jeopardised. Rothermund et al. (2008) provided  
an example of mental health disorders to illustrate how persistent bias could be 
associated with maladaptive behaviour and play a role in their aetiology  
(e.g., Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Field & Cox, 2008; Van Bockstaele et 
al., 2014). This seems to be true for both negativity and positivity AB.  
Anxiety disorders and mood disorders like depression tend to be accompanied by 
negativity bias. For anxiety disorders AB for some types of negative cues may lead 
to behavioural withdrawal and avoidance of certain situations (Perez-Edgar et al., 
2010; Perez-Edgar et al., 2011) leading to failure in achieving goals.  
For example increased AB for threat-related stimuli could jeopardise a goal of 
having a successful social life. Some studies of AB in depression revealed an AB for 
negative stimuli (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004) and negativity AB being 
associated with the maintenance of depression (Beevers, Clasen, Enock, & Schnyer, 
2015; Clasen, Wells, Ellis, & Beevers, 2013). At the same time, a failure to develop 
AB for reward-related stimuli (Brailean, Koster, Hoorelbeke, & De Raedt, 2014) 
may affect engagement in goal-directed behaviour. Research has also shown 
dysphoria and depression were associated with decreased positivity bias (Armstrong 
& Olatunji, 2012; Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2011; Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, & 
Johnson, 2010). From the perspective of goal-directed behaviour, constant negativity 
bias and problems with maintaining attention on positive stimuli could be considered 
as a partial positivity blindness which could lead to further emotional distress and 
progression of a mental health disorder. 
Conversely, a rigid AB for positive cues could make an individual 
underestimate warning signs, and lead to an excessive involvement in behaviour 
inconsistent with the achievement of long-term goals. Research has consistently 
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shown that addiction is characterised by AB for drug-related stimuli (Field & Cox, 
2008). A study involving a spatial orienting task revealed that AB towards cues 
predicting general reward and non-punishment cues was associated with tobacco, 
alcohol and cannabis use three years after testing (van Hemel-Ruiter, de Jong, 
Ostafin, & Oldehinkel, 2015). A recent review provided support for AB for food-
related cues in obesity (Hendrikse et al., 2015). Addiction and obesity, both of which 
could be characterised by positivity (reward-related) bias towards drug or food 
rewards respectively, illustrates how AB could distort perception of reality and lead 
to maladaptive behaviour. This explanation seems to be consistent with studies 
which have shown a link between impulsivity and substance misuse, obesity or binge 
eating disorder (Christiansen, Cole, Goudie, & Field, 2012; Fernie et al., 2013; 
Jentsch et al., 2014; Nederkoorn, Dassen, Franken, Resch, & Houben, 2015; Schag, 
Schonleber, Teufel, Zipfel, & Giel, 2013), and raises a question whether preference 
for instant gratification over achievement of long-term goals could be associated 
with being ‘blinded’ by the reward-related cues. Non-surprisingly a recent meta-
analysis revealed a small but robust relationship between substance-related AB and 
impulsivity (Coskunpinar & Cyders, 2013); similar results were also shown for 
obesity (Hou et al., 2011). 
The example of mental health disorders clearly shows that the avoidance of 
threat during reward pursuit could be as important as the ability to detect reward 
during threat avoidance behaviour. A rigid AB seems to be associated with the lack 
of ability to adjust or select behaviour, leading to behaviour preservation regardless 
of its consequences. While negativity and positivity bias might be beneficial and 
allow for survival, it is unlikely that in the long term successful goal-directed 
behaviour would depend on rigid cognitive mechanisms. Both of the groups of 
discussed mental health disorders characterised either by negativity and positivity 
bias demonstrate that goal achievement could be hindered by the formation of 
inflexible focus of attention. As pointed out by Rothermund et al. (2008) flexibility 
is an important concept in the successful goal-directed behaviour.  
Flexibility can help initiate, maintain and translate intentions into goal-directed 
behaviour (Brunstein, 1989; Gropel, Baumeister, & Beckmann, 2014; Kuhl, 1981, 
1994, 2000) and can be a predictor of success (Diefendorff, 2004; Diefendorff, Hall, 
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Lord, & Strean, 2000). This shows that successful goal behaviour depends on 
response flexibility and implicates that a rigid or constant AB either for negative or 
positive information could be counterproductive in goal pursuit (Rothermund et al., 
2008). 
1.3.4. Counter-regulation principle (CRP) 
As discussed before the experience of some negativity or positivity bias is  
a common trait cognitive characteristic. The reason behaviour is not sabotaged by 
AB allowing for goal achievement could lie in effective emotion regulation (Koole 
& Rothermund, 2011). The dual-process model of emotion regulation implicates that 
the regulatory processes take place at both explicit and implicit levels (Gyurak, 
Gross, & Etkin, 2011). Successful goal-directed behaviour depends on flexible and 
often quick decision making, where individuals can adjust their response while 
processing both negative and positive cues. The time restraint and the amount of 
information that has to be analysed during decision making suggest that some part of 
emotion regulation related to goal-directed behaviour must take place at  
the implicit (automatic) rather than the explicit (cognitively demanding) level  
(see review Koole & Rothermund, 2011). Rothermund et al. (2008) proposed CRP as 
one of the implicit processes which prevent emotional states from escalating,  
and supports the maintenance of emotional stability. CRP posits that attention is 
directed towards stimuli with valence that is incongruent with the goal-related 
motivational state. For example, the experience of loss should increase AB for 
positive (including reward-related cues) whereas the experience of reward should 
direct attention towards negative (including loss-related) stimuli. Rothermund et al. 
(2008) argues that this mechanism prevents us remaining in extreme emotional states 
and allows for flexible switching between motivational and emotional orientations. 
Counter-regulation in attentional processing has received solid empirical 
support (e.g., Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund et al., 2008; Schwager & 
Rothermund, 2013; Wentura, Voss, & Rothermund, 2009). For example in  
an innovative experiment conducted by Wentura et al. (2009), participants were 
asked to play a modified version of TETRIS game in order to study counter-
regulation processes in motivational context. Participants were asked to respond 
 31 
 
quickly and their response times and/or errors were recorded. The goal of the task 
was to either prevent the loss of high scores (negative outcome focus) or to gain high 
scores (positive outcome focus). The falling blocks were accompanied by positive 
(happy faces), negative (sad faces), neutral (neutral faces) distractor stimuli or none.  
During the negative outcome, focus participants experienced greater interference 
from positive distractors. In contrast, a positive outcome focus resulted in greater 
interference from negative distractors. These results are consistent with  
the predictions of CRP. However, incongruency effects could be explained in a more 
parsimonious way than emotion regulation. Incongruency in AB may reflect  
a mismatch between positively/negatively valenced stimuli and negative/positive 
motivational state or context. In comparison to a cue in which valence is consistent 
with a motivational context, presentation of valenced stimuli during  
a contrasting motivational context may enhance the cue’s relative salience.  
This arguably increases its ability to attract attention (see Rothermund et al., 2011). 
Rothermund et al. (2011) addressed this issue and found that incongruency effects 
occurred only during the spatial search when affective-motivational states were 
induced by performance-related feedback presented at the end of each of the trials.  
In the second experiment, when participants were asked to memorise motivationally 
salient information (i.e., the words: “good” or “bad”), the performance on the special 
search task revealed a congruency effect. Although this study suggests that counter-
regulation is specific to goal-directed behaviour and provides further support for  
the role of incongruency effects in emotion regulation, it should be mentioned that 
the memory task did not include a neutral world as a control condition.  
These findings are consistent with theories which suggest that AB for positive 
stimuli under stress may support emotion regulation (Frenkel, Lamy, Algoma, & 
Bar-Haima, 2009; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2008). 
It was proposed that the anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes 
should be sufficient to trigger counter regulation processes. Using a flanker task 
Rothermund et al. (2008) found that introduction of positive or negative outcome 
focuses activated incongruency effects as would be predicted by CRP.  
The interference of stimuli signalling gain opportunities was stronger during 
negative outcome focus blocks of trials – when participants had to attain a certain 
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amount of points in order not to lose their reward; and the interference effects of 
stimuli signalling a risk of losing a point were stronger during positive outcome 
focus blocks of trials – when participants had to gain a certain amount of points in 
order to win a reward. Therefore, it was proposed that the anticipation of the possible 
motivationally relevant outcome - defined by the outcome focus - affected 
attentional preference during the task revealing counter regulation processes. 
1.3.5. Congruency and incongruency in attentional processing 
Research on emotion regulation and AB provides additional information on 
the effects of anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes. Apart from  
the previously discussed learned AB substance-related responses, attention can be 
selectively directed towards motivationally salient stimuli incongruent with a current 
motivational context. These incongruency effects can be triggered by anticipation of 
reward and loss, and could play a significant role in emotion regulation preventing 
affective states from escalation and allowing for flexible decision making. 
Contrarily, research which demonstrated that attention is allocated towards stimuli 
congruent with the content of working memory implicates the opposite predictions. 
For instance, Van Dessel and Vogt (2012) investigated the impact of affective 
context on AB for facial expressions of emotion. On a trial-by-trial basis, one group 
of participants was required to memorise either a positive, negative or neutral sound 
during a dot probe task whereas the other group was also expected to encode  
the valence of the sound. The results revealed the congruency effects in attentional 
processing of facial expressions of emotion. Attention was more likely to be directed 
towards faces congruent with the valence of affective context, albeit, these effects 
were only present in the group which was required to encode the sound.  
It was proposed that the content of working memory can moderate AB leading to  
the congruency effects when memorised information is task-relevant. Smith et al. 
(2006) demonstrated that priming with positive information can diminish negativity 
bias in affective processing. This demonstrates that, affective context, apart from 
increasing AB for congruent stimuli, can also diminish AB for incongruent stimuli.  
In general, research suggests that attentional selection of visual cues may depend on 
its match/relevance with the content of working memory (see Olivers, 2008; Soto, 
Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008). Assuming that information about  
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the likelihood of motivationally salient outcomes is maintained in working memory,  
it can be expected that attention should be directed towards stimuli relevant to  
the current affective context. 
1.3.6. AB and emotion regulation - Summary 
Incongruency and congruency accounts of affective processing imply that 
anticipation of reward may have an impact on attentional processing of 
motivationally salient stimuli. While CRP based predictions suggest that anticipation 
of substance reward should increase AB for negatively valenced stimuli and 
anticipation of substance loss should increase AB for positively valenced cues,  
the congruency accounts suggest the opposite effects of anticipation of reward and 
loss on AB. The investigation of these hypotheses is important because  
the anticipation of drug or food reward or loss could have a more global impact on 
the attentional processing of surrounding stimuli. One of the goals of the current 
research is to explore whether the type of cues, comparable to those previously used 
by Jones et al. (2012) would be capable of triggering AB for motivationally salient 
stimuli congruent or incongruent with the anticipated outcome.  
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1.4. Aim and Outline of the Dissertation 
The aim of the thesis is to extend previous research on AB and examine some 
fundamental issues regarding the link between anticipation of reward and loss and 
attention for motivationally-salient cues. The first specific aim is to investigate  
the psychological mechanisms that underlie the effects of anticipation of reward on 
AB for substance-related cues. The second aim is to extend this line of enquiry to 
examine the effects of loss anticipation on AB for substance-related cues.  
The third aim is to identify the neural mechanisms that underlie the effects of reward 
anticipation on AB for substance-related cues. The final aim is to investigate if  
the anticipation of substance reward and loss can influence AB for negatively and 
positively valenced cues (facial expressions) rather than pictures of substance-related 
rewards. 
Chapter 2 reports the results of four empirical studies which investigate 
issues related to the effects of anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes on 
attentional bias for alcohol and chocolate-related stimuli. These studies utilise eye-
tracking methods to measure AB for substance-related cues under different 
probabilities of winning or losing substance-related reward. The aim of the initial 
study was to explore whether the generalised effects of reward anticipation on AB 
reported by Jones et al. (2012) are demonstrated after controlling for a potential 
methodological confound in that earlier study. I tested the hypothesis that  
the anticipation of substance-related reward should increase AB for substance-
related cues, and investigated whether this increase was: either outcome-specific  
i.e., the effects of anticipation are specific to stimuli closely related to the anticipated 
substance, or general i.e., anticipation of substance reward increases AB for  
the range of reward-related stimuli. This study clarifies the psychological 
mechanisms that underlie the effects reported previously (Field et al., 2011; Jones et 
al., 2012), and suggest avenues for follow-up studies. 
A distinct, but related research question addressed in Chapter 2 concerns  
the anticipation of loss and its effects on AB. Two competing hypothesis regarding 
the direction of effects of loss anticipation on AB can be made: the anticipation of 
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loss should increase AB for a substance-related cues (Kavanagh et al., 2005)  
and these effects could be generalised (see Rothermund et al., 2008); or loss 
anticipation should decrease AB for substance-related cues (e.g., Field et al., 2011; 
Jones et al., 2012) and these effects should be outcome specific (Field & Cox, 2008). 
These hypotheses are tested by the investigation of participants AB for substance-
related cues (chocolate and alcohol) under different probabilities of substance loss 
(chocolate and beer) using a crossover design. 
The effects of loss anticipation on AB may depend on the level of control 
over the outcomes of behaviour (see Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; 
Rothermund, 2011). Therefore, in addition to the studies which investigate  
the impact of probabilistic cues indicating reward and loss, additional studies 
reported in Chapter 2 address the issue of outcome control as a potential moderator 
of AB and the effects of loss as well as reward anticipation. In these eye-tracking 
studies participants have behavioural control over reward and loss outcomes. 
Chapter 3 expands upon the results of initial reward anticipation study,  
and aims to identify neurophysiological underpinnings of the effects of reward 
anticipation on the attentional processing of substance-related cues.  
This chapter provides a brief introduction to electroencephalography as a research 
method, explaining its’ basic technical aspects and related terminology.  
Two components which can reflect changes in the attentional processing of 
substance-related cues during reward anticipation are discussed. It can be expected 
that increased attentional processing of substance-related stimuli should be reflected 
by a more pronounced P300 component which is considered an index of motivated 
attention (Littel et al., 2012; Schupp et al., 2004). Since the P300 component is 
sensitive to the motivational value of stimuli, its amplitudes should be further 
enhanced by the anticipation of substance-related reward. Alternatively, feedback 
relative negativity a component which is known to be associated with outcome 
evaluation processes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 
2004) is considered as likely to be affected by reward anticipation. This chapter 
reports the results of an electroencephalography study which investigates  
the amplitude of these ERP components in response to substance-related and neutral 
cues under different probabilities of reward. 
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Chapter 4 investigates the effects of anticipation of reward and loss on AB 
for positively and negatively valenced cues (i.e., facial expression of emotions) 
rather than pictures of the substances (beer and chocolate) that participants are 
anticipating during the experimental tasks. Studies reported in this chapter examine  
the competing predictions based on research which reported congruency (e.g., Smith 
et al., 2006; Van Dessel & Vogt, 2012) and incongruency (e.g., Rothermund et al., 
2008; Wentura et al., 2009) effects in attentional processing. Congruency based 
accounts suggest that attention is more likely to be directed towards stimuli matching 
the content of working memory (see Olivers, 2008; Soto et al., 2008).  
This implicates that reward anticipation should increase AB for positively valenced 
information whereas loss anticipation should increase AB for negatively valenced 
information. In contrast, the emotion regulation literature (see Rothermund, 2011; 
Rothermund et al., 2008) yield the opposite predictions i.e., anticipation of reward 
should increase AB for negatively valenced cues and loss anticipation should 
increase AB for positively valenced cues. In order to investigate this issue,  
AB for facial expressions of emotion (happy, sad and neutral ones) is examined 
under different probabilities of substance reward and loss. 
The thesis ends with a general discussion of the results reported in  
the empirical chapters. The first section of general discussion recalls the findings 
reported in the empirical chapters. Subsequently, these findings are discussed in  
the context of previous research and theoretical as well as clinical implications. 
Finally, the limitations of the research presented in this thesis and of the broader 
literature are discussed. This thesis provides important data regarding the link 
between motivation and attention which has implications for our understanding of 
biased attention in disorders such as addiction, obesity.  
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CHAPTER 2 -  THE EFFECTS OF REWARD AND LOSS 
ANTICIPATION ON THE EYE MOVEMENT INDICES OF 
ATTENTIONAL BIAS FOR SUBSTANCE-RELATED CUES  
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ABes for substance-related cues are moderated by the expectation of 
imminent reward availability, but the psychological mechanisms that underlie this 
effect are unclear. This chapter reports a series of studies which investigated:  
(1) if effects of reward anticipation are specific to the type of reward that is 
anticipated; (2) if anticipation of loss has comparable effects to anticipation of 
reward; (3) the effects of uncertainty; and (4) how perceived control over rewards 
and losses moderates these effects. An eye tracking task was used to investigate  
the effects of anticipation of reward (Study 2.1) or loss (Study 2.2) of alcohol and 
chocolate on AB for alcohol and chocolate pictures using full crossover designs. 
Subsequently, the moderating role of perceived control on effects of loss anticipation 
(Study 2.3) and reward anticipation (Study 2.4) on AB was investigated.  
All of the studies investigated the effects of cues signalling certain (100% likelihood 
of outcome) and uncertain (50% likelihood of outcome) loss or reward. The results 
from Study 2.1 indicated outcome-specific effects of reward expectancy: anticipated 
alcohol reward increased AB for alcohol, but not chocolate, pictures,  
and the opposite pattern was seen for chocolate anticipation. The results from Study 
2.2 revealed no effects of loss anticipation on AB. However, when participants 
perceived control over potential losses (Study 2.3), outcome-specific effects of loss 
anticipation on AB were observed, although the pattern differed for alcohol and 
chocolate pictures. Yet, when participants perceived control over potential rewards 
(Study 2.4), anticipation of reward did not influence AB. Across all studies, effects of 
uncertainty tended to mimic effects of anticipated reward or loss. Together, these 
findings demonstrate that anticipation of reward and prevention of loss lead to 
outcome-specific increases in AB for reward-related cues, but these effects are 
dependent on participants’ perceived control over outcomes.  
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Introduction 
Motivationally salient cues in the environment are able to capture and hold 
attention (Cisler et al., 2009; Field et al., 2014). For example, people who use 
addictive substances (including alcohol) have an AB for substance-related cues 
(Field & Cox, 2008), whereas AB for food cues appears to be present in everybody 
to some degree (Werthmann, Jansen, & Roefs, 2014). AB is a dynamic variable that 
fluctuates within individuals and it is closely related to the current underlying 
motivational state (e.g., craving - Field et al., 2009; hunger - Werthmann et al., 
2015). For example in both cases, experimental manipulations of the underlying 
motivational state by imposing a period of substance deprivation or fasting lead to 
increases in the strength of AB (Field et al., 2016). 
Although previous research on AB highlighted the importance of between-
group differences in AB (e.g., addicts have a higher AB for drug-related cues in 
comparison to non-users), currently it appears to be agreed that the identification of 
variables responsible for the temporal changes in AB might be important in  
the prediction of substance-related behaviour. This has been emphasised for both 
food and addictive substances including alcohol (Field et al., 2016).  
One of the factors which may be responsible for the fluctuations of AB and related 
motivational states is substance availability. When food or drugs are anticipated 
imminently, this increases the strength of subjective craving and responses to 
reward-related cues, including AB. For instance, AB for substance-related cues can 
be potentiated if participants believe that they will have an opportunity to use  
the substance in the near future. Comparable effects of food anticipation on AB for 
food-related cues have been reported (e.g., Field et al., 2011; Hardman et al., 2014; 
Jones et al., 2012), although these findings have not always been replicated  
(see Hardman et al., 2014; Werthmann, Roefs, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2013). 
It is unclear if these effects are dependent on congruency between the type of 
reward that is anticipated and the type of reward cue for which AB is measured. 
Some of the emotion regulation accounts such as broaden-and-build theory 
(Fredrickson, 2001) suggest that effects of reward anticipation might be more 
generalised i.e., the anticipation of reward should increase AB for reward-related 
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cues in a generalised fashion. Similar predictions are implicated by General PIT 
effects where Pavlovian cues associated with one reinforcer can also energise 
instrumental responses for other rewards as well (Corbit & Balleine, 2005, 2011; 
Holmes et al., 2010). Assuming that attentional selection precedes action selection 
(Armel et al., 2008; Krajbich et al., 2010) it might be expected that anticipation of  
a specific reward would increase AB for a variety of rewarding stimuli.  
The first study that addressed this issue conducted by Jones et al. (2012) provided 
empirical support for the general effects of reward anticipation on AB. AB for both 
alcohol and chocolate pictures was larger when participants expected to win a reward 
compared to no reward trials. These effects were present regardless of the type of 
substance reward (alcohol or chocolate) that was anticipated. However,  
a methodological confound could have obscured outcome-specific effects of reward 
anticipation. 
The present chapter reports findings from four studies which attempted to 
clarify the psychological mechanisms that underlie the effects of substance 
anticipation on AB for reward-related cues. As a starting point, the generalised 
effects reported in the earlier study (Jones et al., 2012) were investigated to clarify 
whether these results could be replicated after considering a potential methodological 
confound. The role of uncertainty in comparison to the expectation of certain reward 
gains was also considered, as different theories of associative learning make 
competing predictions in this regard (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980).  
Next, the effects of anticipation of loss on AB were investigated, because some 
theories (Rothermund et al., 2008) but not others (Carver, 2001; Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2010), suggested comparable effects of reward and loss anticipation on AB 
for reward-related cues. Finally, theoretical claims that the effects of reward and loss 
anticipation would be moderated by participants’ perceived control over outcomes 
during the task (Rothermund, 2011) were tested.  
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Study 2.1. The effects of reward anticipation on AB 
2.1.1. Introduction 
Jones et al. (2012) demonstrated that the effects of anticipation of reward on 
AB were generalised rather than outcome-specific, because anticipation of alcohol or 
chocolate led to increased AB for both alcohol and chocolate pictures.  
However, some features of the experimental task could have contributed to these 
findings. The anticipation of alcohol and chocolate (points) reward was manipulated 
on a trial-by-trial basis and participants were instructed to make the same motor 
response (press the spacebar) on each trial, regardless of the type of reward that was 
available on that trial. Jones et al. (2012) acknowledged that this could have 
encouraged participants to focus on the probability information that was presented 
on each trial rather than the type of reward that was on offer. If this speculation is 
correct, this could explain the observed general effect of reward anticipation on AB 
rather than the hypothesised outcome-specific effects. The present study repeated  
the general methodology used in the earlier study, with one critical difference: 
participants were instructed to press one key on trials when alcohol expectancy was 
manipulated, and a different key when chocolate expectancy was manipulated.  
This should ensure that participants maintain awareness of the type of reward that is 
available throughout the trial, including, critically, whilst their eye movements are 
assessed. 
This study investigated how AB would be affected when participants were 
uncertain about the likelihood of reward, i.e., when they were informed that  
the probability of reward was 50%. This is important because the results for  
the effects of uncertainty were not reported by Jones et al. (2012). Associative 
learning theories make competing predictions about the nature of attention to 
conditioned stimuli during the formation of associations between conditioned and 
unconditioned stimuli, and after those associations have been established  
(see Hogarth, Dickinson, & Duka, 2010). One theory suggests that attention to 
conditioned stimuli should be maximal under conditions of uncertainty, i.e., when 
the predictive significance of that cue is uncertain (Pearce & Hall, 1980).  
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A competing theory suggests that attention closely tracks the predictive significance 
of conditioned cues, such that maximal attention is directed toward cues that are 
reliable predictors of unconditioned stimuli (Mackintosh, 1975). Although these are 
not theories of AB to reward-related cues, they can be used to generate competing 
predictions about the effects of uncertainty in the current research paradigm. 
According to Pearce and Hall (1980), the incongruity between presentation of 
uncertainty information and a pictorial cue that is reliably associated with that 
reward should maximise attention to the cue; therefore, AB under conditions of 
uncertainty should be higher compared to AB when reward is anticipated with 
certainty. According to Mackintosh (1975), the congruence between anticipation of 
imminent reward and the presentation of a reward-related cue should increase AB for 
that cue. Therefore, AB should closely track probability information,  
and be maximal when reward is anticipated with certainty, lower under conditions of 
uncertainty, and lower still when the reward is not expected at all. 
The aim of the first study was to investigate (1) whether the general effects of 
reward anticipation on AB would be demonstrated after controlling for the potential 
study artefact by using a crossover design with independent behavioural responses 
for chocolate and beer. The effects of probability were also investigated by testing if: 
(2) reliable reward predictors (100% probability of reward) have a greater impact on 
AB in comparison to uncertain ones (50% probability of reward); or if (3) the effects 
of uncertain loss predictors on AB are more pronounced than those of reliable 
predictors. 
2.1.2. Method 
Participants 
Assuming that the general effects of anticipation demonstrated by Jones et al. 
(2012) were a study artefact, a-priori power analysis was based on the outcome 
specific effects sizes reported in the study (d = 1.22 for alcohol and d = 0.97 for 
chocolate anticipation effects). G*Power3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) 
was used to conduct power analysis. This revealed that a total sample size of 9 
participants would be required to detect the effects of alcohol anticipation, and a total 
sample size of 13 participants would be needed to detect the effects of chocolate 
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anticipation with 95% power at α = .05. To assure the current study was not 
underpowered thirty-four participants (27 female) were recruited from the staff and 
students at the University of Liverpool. For all studies, inclusion criteria were regular 
consumption of chocolate and beer (both at least once per week), aged above 18, 
fluency in English, and normal or corrected to normal vision (participants who wore 
glasses could not take part due to incompatibility with the eye tracker). Participants 
who had ever received treatment for alcohol problems could not take part. Study 2.1 
was approved by the University of Liverpool Research Ethics committee (Ref. IPHS-
1213-LB-024), and all participants provided informed consent before taking part. 
Participant characteristics are shown in Table 2.1.2-1.  
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Table 2.1.2-1 Participant characteristics Study 2.1 
Recruited participants 34 (F = 27, M = 7) 
Participants included in the analysis 30 (F = 23, M =7) 
Age (years) 22.07 ± (3.85) 
Alcohol consumption (in units per week) 15.59 ± (8.70) 
AUDIT 10.43 ± (4.74) 
Weekly chocolate consumption (in bars) 3.31 ± (2.43) 
Chocolate bars usually kept at home 2.83 ± (3.50) 
Chocolate use/craving - CUQ 20.13 ± (5.52) 
AUDIT – Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, CUQ – Chocolate Use 
Questionnaire 
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Pictorial stimuli 
The current study utilised the same pictorial stimuli reported in Jones et al. 
(2012). The alcohol-related stimuli consisted of 10 alcohol-related images  
(e.g., a close-up of a model opening a bottle of beer, a can, and a glass of beer) each 
of which was paired with a neutral stationery-related picture (e.g., a close-up of  
a model sharpening a pencil, pens in desktop organizers). For the chocolate-related 
stimuli, 10 chocolate-related images (e.g., a chocolate bar, chocolate buttons) were 
paired with neutral stationery-related pictures (e.g., a voice recorder, clothing 
buttons). Pictures within each pair were matched on complexity and brightness,  
and each individual picture was 130 mm wide by 90 mm high. 
The expectancy AB task based on Jones et al. (2012) 
At the beginning of each trial, a picture of a Becks beer bottle or a bar of 
Cadbury’s Diary Milk chocolate (75 mm by 75 mm) determining the type of reward 
was displayed in the centre of the screen, directly above text that indicated  
the probability of winning a reward point on that trial (100%, 50%, or 0% - which 
reflected certain reward, uncertain reward and no reward respectively).  
These stimuli were presented for 1000 ms and were instantly replaced by a pair of 
either alcohol-neutral or chocolate-neutral pictures, with one picture to the left and 
one picture to the right of the central position, 120 mm apart, for 2000 ms. 
Immediately after the offset of pictures, the following text was displayed in  
the centre of the screen: ‘press the left key to try to win chocolate’ on chocolate 
outcome trials, or ‘press the right key to try to win beer’ on beer outcome trials.  
Text feedback was presented for 1000 ms as soon as participants pressed  
the appropriate key: ‘you win a beer point!’ on all certain reward and half of 
uncertain reward beer outcome trials; ‘you win a chocolate point’ on all certain 
reward and half of uncertain reward chocolate outcome trials; and ‘you win nothing’ 
on all no reward trials and the remaining uncertain reward trials. The inter-trial 
interval was 1500 ms. 
Participants completed a practice block of 12 trials comprising equal numbers 
of trials in which certain reward, uncertain reward and no reward beer and 
chocolate probability information were presented before pairs of neutral pictures 
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(e.g., household furniture); data from these trials were not analysed. The main block 
of 240 critical trials comprised 120 alcohol-neutral and 120 chocolate-neutral picture 
pairs. For each type of picture pair there were an equal number of alcohol and 
chocolate outcome trials (60 trials each); and within this an equal number of certain 
reward, uncertain reward or no reward probability trials (20 trials each). 
Participants had the opportunity to take a short break after every 60 trials, during 
which they received feedback about the number of beer and chocolate points that 
they had collected so far.  
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Procedure 
All testing took place between 1 pm and 6 pm in the eye movement 
laboratory in the Department of Psychological Sciences. Bottles of Becks beer and 
bars of Dairy Milk chocolate were placed around the laboratory so that they were 
visible to participants as they entered reinforcing the fact they would be competing 
for actual rewards, but these were out of view when participants completed the task. 
After providing informed consent participants completed three questionnaires:  
a two week Time-Line Followback alcohol consumption diary (Sobell & Sobell, 
1992), the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT - Babor, Higgins-
Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001) and a chocolate use questionnaire (Tibboel et 
al., 2011). 
Participants then completed the expectancy AB task. They were shown  
the beer and chocolate in the laboratory and were explicitly informed that the points 
that they accumulated during the task would be converted into actual rewards that 
they would receive at the end of the experiment. The beer and chocolate were then 
hidden from view before the eye tracker (Eye-Trac D6; Applied Science 
Laboratories, Bedford, MA) was calibrated and the task was explained. Participants 
were asked to pay close attention to the information about the type of outcome and 
the probability of winning that would be presented at the beginning of each trial,  
to rest their index fingers on two labelled keys (‘c’ for chocolate outcome trials and 
‘b’ for beer outcome trials), and to respond by pressing the appropriate key when 
prompted to do so. As they completed the task, their eye-movement data was 
continuously recorded at a sampling frequency of 120 Hz. Participants were fully 
debriefed at the end of the experiment. Participants received course credit or  
a shopping voucher instead of the beer and chocolate, and the requirement for  
the deception was explained during debriefing. 
Data reduction and analysis 
Eye-movement data were recorded during the 2000 ms when alcohol-neutral 
or chocolate-neutral pictures were presented. The total duration of fixations upon 
each area of interest (reward picture or neutral picture) was used to calculate gaze 
‘dwell time’ on each picture. Fixations were defined as the maintenance of gaze 
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within one degree of visual angle for 100 ms, as in previous AB research (Field et 
al., 2004; Jones et al., 2012; Mogg, Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003).  
The analysis focused on mean gaze duration as the primary outcome measure of AB. 
This measure was selected taking into account the results of meta-analysis conducted 
by Field et al. (2009) which revealed a larger association between AB and craving 
for the measures of the disengagement of attention from substance-related cues  
(r = .20, 4% of shared variance) relative to the measures of the initial orientation bias 
(r = .08, less than 1% of shared variance). Skewness statistics for some dwell time 
variables were twice the standard error, so data were log transformed in order to 
normalise distribution before analysis. Data included in the analysis came from 
participants who had at least 500 ms gaze fixation time recorded per trial on average 
– which is more than 25% of stimulus presentation time. Four participants had 
incomplete data records (i.e., no data recorded at all for certain trial types).  
Hence, all of their data was excluded from the analysis (N = 30).  
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2.1.3. Results 
Gaze dwell times were analysed using a four-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA (see Figures 2.1.3.1-2), with factors of Outcome Type (2: alcohol points vs. 
chocolate points), Probability (3: certain reward vs. uncertain reward vs.  
no reward), Picture Pair (2: alcohol-neutral vs. chocolate-neutral) and Picture Type  
(2: alcohol/chocolate vs. neutral). This revealed a significant main effect of Picture 
Type (F(1, 29) = 24.30, p < .001, 
2
p  = .46) indicating the presence of AB: 
participants maintained their gaze for longer on chocolate and alcohol pictures in 
comparison to the matched neutral pictures. The Probability x Picture Type 
interaction was not significant (F(2, 58) = 2.63, p = .081, 
2
p  = .08);  
therefore, there was no generalised effect of reward anticipation on AB.  
However, the four-way interaction Outcome Type x Probability x Picture Pair  
x Picture Type was significant (F(2, 58) = 3.33, p = .043, 
2
p  = .10).  
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Figure 2.1.3.1. The effects of beer and chocolate reward anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for alcohol-related and matched neutral pictures.  
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Figure 2.1.3.2. The effects of beer and chocolate reward anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for chocolate-related and matched neutral pictures.  
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To deconstruct the four-way interaction, AB scores were calculated by 
subtracting gaze dwell time on neutral pictures from gaze dwell time on  
the corresponding alcohol and chocolate pictures. One-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to determine if AB for alcohol and chocolate pictures was reliably 
affected by expectation of different reward outcomes. The effect of alcohol 
expectancy on AB for alcohol cues was reliable (F(2, 58) = 4.57, p = .014,  
2
p  = .14) but the effect of alcohol expectancy on AB for chocolate pictures was not  
(F(2, 58) = 0.62, p = .488, 
2
p  = .02) (see Figure 2.1.3.3). Conversely, chocolate 
expectancy had a reliable effect on AB for chocolate pictures (F(2, 58) = 3.79,  
p = .028, 
2
p  = .12), but the effect of chocolate expectancy on AB for alcohol 
pictures was not significant (F(2, 58) = 0.30, p = .686, 
2
p  = .01) (see Figure 
2.1.3.4). Two-way ANOVAs were run on the bias scores with factors of Outcome 
Type and Picture Pair, separately at each level of Probability (certain reward, 
uncertain reward, and no reward). The two-way Outcome Type x Picture Pair 
interactions were significant for certain reward (F(1, 29) = 8.87, p = .006, 
2
p  = .23) 
and uncertain reward trials (F(1, 29) = 8.57, p = .007, 
2
p  = .23), but not no reward 
trials (F(1, 29) = 0.14, p = .709, 
2
p  = .01).  
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Figure 2.1.3.3. The effects of alcohol reward anticipation on AB (ms) for alcohol 
and chocolate-related pictures.  
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Figure 2.1.3.4. The effects of chocolate reward anticipation on AB (ms) for alcohol 
and chocolate-related pictures.  
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Next, within-subject t-tests were performed to follow-up these main effects 
and interactions. When alcohol expectancy was manipulated, AB for alcohol pictures 
was larger on certain reward trials compared to no reward trials (t(29) = 2.89,  
p = .007, d = 0.39), although AB on uncertain reward trials did not reliably differ 
from AB on certain reward (t(29) = 1.56, p = .129, d = 0.18) or no reward trials  
(t(29) = 1.54, p = .135, d = 0.21). When chocolate expectancy was manipulated, 
none of the contrasts on alcohol AB were significant (certain reward vs. no reward, 
t(29) = 0.12, p = .906, d = 0.02; certain reward vs. uncertain reward, t(29) = 0.67,  
p = .511, d = 0.12; uncertain reward vs. no reward, t(29) = 0.58, p = .565, d = 0.13). 
A similar pattern was seen for AB for chocolate pictures. When chocolate 
expectancy was manipulated, chocolate AB was larger on certain reward compared 
to no reward trials and this difference approached significance (t(29) = 2.02,  
p = .052, d = 0.26). Similarly chocolate AB was larger on uncertain reward 
compared to no reward trials (t(29) = 2.71, p = .011, d = 0.38).  
Although, the contrast between certain reward and uncertain reward trials was not 
significant (t(29) = 0.70, p = .488, d = 0.10). When alcohol expectancy was 
manipulated, none of the contrasts on chocolate AB were significant (certain reward 
vs. no reward (t(29) = 0.49, p = .627, d = 0.06); certain reward vs. uncertain reward 
(t(29) = 0.89, p = .383, d = 0.23); uncertain reward vs. no reward  
(t(29) = 0.73, p = .470, d = 0.18)).  
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2.1.4. Discussion 
The results of this study confirmed that AB is sensitive to anticipated reward: 
AB was larger on certain reward trials compared to no reward. This replicates 
previous findings (e.g., Field et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012), but importantly it goes 
beyond them by demonstrating that these effects are outcome-specific rather than 
generalised. That is, the anticipation of alcohol reward increased AB for alcohol, but 
not chocolate pictures, whereas anticipation of chocolate reward increased AB for 
chocolate, but not alcohol pictures. This observation contrasts with the generalised 
effect of reward anticipation on AB demonstrated by Jones et al. (2012). 
Methodological differences between the two studies can account for these conflicting 
findings. In the present study, throughout each trial participants had to maintain  
a representation of both the type of anticipated reward (alcohol or chocolate points) 
and the probability of receiving it, and an outcome-specific effect was seen.  
In the earlier study, participants were likely to have focussed on the probability of 
receiving the reward rather than the type of reward that was available, and there  
a more generalised effect of reward anticipation was seen. 
The effects of uncertainty on AB were also observed, and these effects were 
also outcome-specific. On uncertain reward trials, AB was larger compared to no 
reward trials, although this contrast was only statistically significant on chocolate 
trials. No significant difference was observed between AB on certain reward and 
uncertain reward trials for both alcohol and chocolate pictures.  
Overall, these findings are not consistent with the proposed interpretation of 
predictions made by either Mackintosh (1975) or Pearce and Hall (1980),  
because the former would predict a linear relationship between probability and AB 
whereas the latter would predict that AB should be maximal under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
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Study 2.2. The effects of loss anticipation on AB 
2.2.1. Introduction 
The second experiment investigated the effects of loss anticipation on AB. 
Despite emerging evidence for the role of reward anticipation on AB, little is known 
about the effects of loss anticipation. The impact of loss anticipation can also be 
approached from the reward anticipation perspective. Loss could be considered as  
a specific case of substance availability i.e., an expectation of no loss is a condition 
comparable with reward availability. Aforementioned studies on reward anticipation 
(i.e., Field et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012) could suggest that while attention should 
be directed towards reward-related stimuli when individuals are able to keep their 
rewards, so they are perceived as imminently available, AB for rewarding cues 
should be attenuated when individuals expect to lose their rewards (reward becomes 
unavailable). As implied by the results of Study 2.1 and conditioning based accounts 
of the effects of reward anticipation on AB (Field & Cox, 2008) these effects should 
be outcome specific. The potential decrease in AB associated with anticipation of 
loss could also be explained in a different way. The anticipation of loss is likely to be 
an unpleasant event and therefore trigger negative affect. This could lead to 
attentional avoidance or withdrawal behaviour to prevent further distress reflected by 
the allocation of attention away from stimuli associated with loss (see Carver, 2001; 
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Koole, 2009). 
Some theoretical accounts implicate that the anticipation of substance loss 
could increase AB. For instance, the anticipation of substance loss could activate 
negative thoughts associated with previous situations when substance-related urges 
could not be satisfied. This negative experience could initiate substance seeking and 
increase AB for substance-related cues (Kavanagh et al., 2005). Alternatively,  
CRP (Rothermund et al., 2011; Rothermund et al., 2008) indicates that attention is 
allocated towards stimuli incongruent with the anticipated motivationally salient 
outcome. The incongruency effects in attentional processing, experienced during 
goal-directed behaviour, are argued to prevent individuals from reaching extreme 
emotional states allowing for better flexibility during decision making (Rothermund, 
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2003; Wentura et al., 2009). It can be expected that loss anticipation relative to  
no loss condition should direct attention towards substance-related cues to 
counterbalance negative emotions associated with loss. This has been demonstrated 
in the task where reward and loss depended on the detection of valenced stimuli as 
well as for valenced stimuli which were not crucial for the success of goal-directed 
behaviour (Rothermund et al., 2008). Although the incongruency effects for goal-
irrelevant valenced information were only present for negative stimuli during reward 
outcome focus, the authors suggested that the non-significant effects of loss 
anticipation could have been a consequence of the research method used or the lack 
of statistical power (see Rothermund et al., 2008). Therefore, general effects of loss 
anticipation on AB cannot be ruled out. 
The aim of Study 2.2 was to investigate issues related to the effects of loss 
anticipation on AB by using a crossover design in order to test competing 
hypotheses: (1) anticipation of loss increases AB for rewarding stimuli,  
and (2) anticipation of loss decreases AB for rewarding stimuli. (3) Anticipation of  
a specific loss has an outcome-specific effect on AB for rewarding stimuli,  
and (4) anticipation of loss has a generalised effect on AB for rewarding stimuli. 
Similarly to Study 2.1, the effects of probability were examined: (5) reliable loss 
predictors (100% chance of loss) have a greater impact on AB in comparison to 
uncertain ones (50% chance of loss), and (6) the effects of uncertain loss predictors 
on AB are more pronounced than those of reliable predictors.  
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2.2.2. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six participants were recruited from the staff and students at  
the University of Liverpool. Study 2.2 was approved by the University of Liverpool 
Research Ethics committee (Ref. IPHS-1213-LB-024), and all participants provided 
informed consent before taking part. Participant characteristics are shown in  
Table 2.2.2-1.  
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Table 2.2.2-1 Participant characteristics Study 2.2 
Recruited participants 36 (F = 32, M = 4)  
Participants included in the analysis 34 (F = 30, M =4) 
Age (years) 20.59 ± (3.35) 
Alcohol consumption (in units per week) 19.90 ± (13.12) 
AUDIT 10.29 ± (4.78) 
Weekly chocolate consumption (in bars) 3.29 ± (1.70) 
Chocolate bars usually kept at home 4.03 ± (5.11) 
Chocolate use/craving - CUQ 19.15 ± (4.20) 
AUDIT – Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, CUQ – Chocolate Use 
Questionnaire 
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Procedure 
The experimental procedure, pictures and stimulus timings were identical to 
those used in Study 2.1. To reinforce the fact they would be competing for actual 
rewards, participants were shown the beer and chocolate in the laboratory and were 
informed at the beginning of the study that they had 120 chocolate and 120 beer 
points. They were explicitly informed that these points represented three chocolate 
bars and three bottles of beer and they would lose some of their points as they 
completed the task. However, at the end of the experiment their remaining points 
would be converted into actual beer and chocolate that they could take with them. 
On each trial, the probability information indicated which type of outcome point they 
could lose or keep on that trial (alcohol or chocolate), and the probability that they 
would lose (100%, 50%, or 0% which indicated certain loss, uncertain loss and  
no loss respectively). After presentation and offset of the alcohol-neutral or 
chocolate-neutral image pair, the following text was displayed in the centre of  
the screen: ‘press the left key to check if you lost chocolate’ on chocolate outcome 
trials, or ‘press the right key to check if you lost beer’ on beer outcome trials.  
Text feedback was presented as soon as participants pressed the appropriate key: 
‘you lose a beer point!’ on all certain loss and half of uncertain loss alcohol outcome 
trials; ‘you lose a chocolate point’ on all certain loss and half of uncertain loss 
chocolate outcome trials; and ‘you lose nothing’ on all no loss trials and  
the remaining uncertain loss trials. Participants completed a total of 240 trials, and at 
the end of the study participants had 60 beer points and 60 chocolate points 
remaining - exactly the same number of points that participants had at the end of  
the experiment in Study 2.1.  
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Data reduction and analysis 
Skewness statistics for some dwell time variables were twice the standard 
error, so data were log transformed in order to normalise distribution before analysis. 
Two participants were excluded from the analysis as their mean gaze fixation time 
per trial was less than 500 ms (N = 34). 
2.2.3. Results 
Gaze dwell times were analysed using a four-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA (see Figures 2.2.3.1-2), with factors of Outcome Type (2: alcohol points vs. 
chocolate points), Probability (3: certain loss vs. uncertain loss vs. no loss),  
Picture Pair (2: alcohol-neutral vs. chocolate-neutral) and Picture Type  
(2: alcohol/chocolate vs. neutral). This revealed a significant main effect of  
Picture Type (F(1, 33) = 11.41, p = .003, 
2
p  = .24) indicating that participants 
maintained their gaze on reward pictures for longer than on matched neutral pictures.  
Neither the Probability x Picture Type interaction that would suggest general effects 
of loss anticipation on AB (F(2, 66) = 0.71, p = .495, 
2
p  = .02), nor the four-way 
Outcome Type x Probability x Picture Pair x Picture Type interaction which would 
indicate outcome specific effects (F(2, 66) = 0.38, p = .683, 
2
p  = .01)  
were significant.  
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Figure 2.2.3.1. The effects of beer and chocolate loss anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for alcohol-related and matched neutral pictures.  
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Figure 2.2.3.2. The effects of beer and chocolate loss anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for chocolate-related and matched neutral pictures.  
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2.2.4. Discussion 
In this experiment, a general AB was found for substance-related cues when 
compared with neutral pictures. The current results did not support predictions about 
the influence of chocolate or beer loss expectancy manipulation on AB.  
Therefore, the anticipation of reward and loss do not have the same effect, and they 
might not have opposing effects on AB. 
One of the initial hypotheses proposed that the anticipation of loss would 
direct attention away from the stimuli associated with loss. This would reflect 
withdrawal behaviour to prevent negative affect from escalation. This hypothesis 
was made under the assumption that otherwise rewarding substances could trigger  
a negative affect when presented in the context of loss anticipation. However, it is 
possible that the lack of control over the loss outcomes prevented participants from 
becoming involved in the task. This could suggest that the withdrawal behaviour was 
not expressed on a trial-by-trial basis depending on loss anticipation, but was  
a general response to the task. Rothermund (2011) proposed that the involvement in 
motivated behaviour may depend on the level of control over its outcomes.  
When individuals experience problems during goal pursuit, they may respond in two 
ways depending on perceived efficacy and level of control. They can either increase 
their commitment and face the difficulties trying to resolve a problem, or they may 
disengage from a blocked goal, preserve their resources, and achieve emotional relief 
(see Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). The withdrawal behaviour in the face of 
unavoidable loss could be reflected by a decrease in sensitivity to danger (i.e., loss) 
signals (Brandtstädter, Voss, & Rothermund, 2004). Thus, it is possible that fixed 
probability cues which signal inevitable loss can lead to disengagement from goal 
pursuit, and this could explain their lack of impact on AB.  
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Study 2.3. The effects of reward loss anticipation on AB under 
behavioural control over the outcomes 
2.3.1. Introduction 
The third experiment was adapted to address the possible explanation for  
the null effects of loss anticipation on AB, and re-test the Study 2.2 hypotheses.  
A modified version of loss anticipation task addressed the issue of lack of control 
over the outcomes. Taking into consideration the potential role of behavioural 
control in engagement in behaviour (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; 
Rothermund, 2011), it could be expected that introduction of control over loss 
outcomes should allow for revealing the effects of loss anticipation on AB.  
For example, Brandtstädter et al. (2004) have shown that participants paid more 
attention to cues signalling a danger of losing a point if they could prevent its’ loss 
by identifying the location of the cue. Therefore, in comparison to fixed probability 
information, the introduction of control over the outcomes should enhance  
the processing of cues signalling likelihood of loss, and hence, facilitate their impact 
on AB.  
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2.3.2. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-three participants (23 female) were recruited from the staff and 
students at the University of Liverpool. Study 2.3 was approved by the University of 
Liverpool Research Ethics committee (IPHS-1415-012 (Generic approval IPHS-
1213-LB-024)), and all participants provided informed consent before taking part. 
Participant characteristics are shown in Table 2.3.2-1.  
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Table 2.3.2-1 Participant characteristics Study 2.3  
Recruited participants 33 (F = 23, M = 10) 
Participants included in the analysis 30 (F =22, M = 8) 
Age (years) 24.10 ± (7.70) 
Alcohol consumption (in units per week) 17.94 ± (12.87) 
AUDIT 11.27 ± (6.02) 
Weekly chocolate consumption (in bars) 3.73 ± (2.27) 
Chocolate bars usually kept at home 3.82 ± (4.34) 
Chocolate use/craving - CUQ 22.33 ± (6.09) 
AUDIT – Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, CUQ – Chocolate Use 
Questionnaire 
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Procedure 
The experimental procedure, pictures and stimulus timings were identical to 
those used in Studies 2.1-2. To reinforce the fact they would be preventing the loss 
of actual rewards, participants were shown three bottles of beer and three chocolate 
bars in the laboratory and were informed at the beginning of the study that they had 
120 chocolate and 120 beer points. They were explicitly informed that these points 
represented three chocolate bars and three bottles of beer. They would lose some of 
their points as they completed the task, but at the end of the experiment their 
remaining points would be converted into actual rewards that they could take with 
them. 
Some important modifications to the task were made in order to increase 
participants’ perceived control over avoidance of loss on each trial and increase their 
involvement in the task. At the beginning of each trial two identical pictures were 
presented in the centre of the screen (5.92 mm wide by 4.49 mm high each),  
one directly above the central position and one directly below it.  
The pictures represented chocolate blocks with Cadbury’s logo on chocolate 
outcome trials and beer in a glass with Beck’s logo on beer outcome trials.  
This modification was made so participants could see the actual content of rewards 
that they were trying to maintain during a trial. Hence, their engagement in the task 
could be further increased. Information about the probability of losing on that trial 
was superimposed over the pictures. On beer reward certain loss prevention trials, 
the text ‘100% chance of keeping a beer point’ was superimposed over the top  
(or bottom; fully counterbalanced) beer picture, and the text ‘0% chance of keeping  
a beer point’ was superimposed on the other beer picture. On beer reward uncertain 
loss prevention trials, identical text (‘50% chance of keeping a beer point’) was 
superimposed on both beer pictures. On unlikely loss prevention beer trials, the text 
‘100% chance of keeping a beer point’ was superimposed on one beer picture and 
the text ‘0% chance of keeping a point’ was superimposed on the other.  
These trials differed from the certain loss prevention trials because the location of 
the text rapidly switched between the top and bottom boxes at a rate of one switch 
per 100 ms, therefore the text appeared to ‘flicker’. Chocolate anticipation trials used 
the same probability conditions but information about winning referred to chocolate 
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points (e.g., ‘100% chance of keeping a chocolate point’ vs. ‘0% chance of keeping  
a chocolate point’ etc.) and probability information was superimposed on the top of 
chocolate pictures. Probability pictures disappeared after participants pressed one of 
the trial specific buttons, as detailed below. 
On each trial, participants responded on a Sony PlayStation 3 gamepad by 
pressing the left and right upper and lower shoulder (trigger) buttons.  
They were instructed to press the left sided buttons on chocolate outcome trials and 
the right sided buttons on beer outcome trials, and to attempt to minimise the number 
of beer and chocolate points that they lost over the course of the experiment.  
On certain loss prevention trials, it was easy for participants to select the button that 
corresponded to the location of ‘100% chance of keeping a chocolate/beer point’ 
text. On uncertain loss prevention trials (‘50% chance of keeping a chocolate/beer 
point’), participants were aware that they had to guess and choose between pressing 
either the top or the bottom reward specific button. On unlikely loss prevention trials, 
participants were informed that avoidance of losses on these trials depended on 
precise synchronisation of their response, but the rapidly oscillating display would 
make this very difficult. In addition, participants were penalised for pressing  
an incorrect trigger (e.g., if they pressed one of the chocolate buttons during beer 
anticipation trials) and received feedback ‘you lose a beer and a chocolate point’. 
On certain loss prevention trials, if participants pressed the correct button  
the feedback stated ‘you keep a chocolate point’ or ‘you keep a beer point’ 
depending on the substance type on a given trial. The incorrect response resulted in 
‘you lose a chocolate point’ or ‘you lose a beer point’ for chocolate and beer trials 
respectively. On uncertain loss prevention chocolate trials, top and bottom buttons 
were fully counterbalanced – on half of chocolate trials pressing the top left button 
resulted in the ‘you keep a chocolate point’ feedback and pressing the left bottom 
button resulted in the ‘you lose a chocolate point’ feedback and vice versa for 
remaining half. The uncertain loss prevention beer trials were counterbalanced in  
the same manner but were followed by beer-specific feedback i.e., ‘you keep a beer 
point’ or you lose a beer point’. On unlikely loss prevention chocolate trials, 10% of 
trials had the ‘you keep a chocolate point’ feedback and 90% of trials had  
the ‘you lose a chocolate point’. The same feedback ratio was used for unlikely loss 
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prevention beer trials during which participants received beer specific feedback.  
For unlikely loss prevention trials, the feedback presented was selected randomly 
according to the contingencies described above. This modification to  
the experimental procedure gave participants a perception of control over  
the outcome, but in the case of unlikely loss prevention trials they did not actually 
control whether they retained or lost points on any individual trial. 
To further enhance participants’ involvement in the task, successful loss 
prevention was accompanied by cha-ching-like sound effects (similar to sound 
effects used in some of the vintage video games when a point is earned which 
remind of a cash register ringing sound) - one sound effect was specific for beer and 
one for chocolate outcome. The loss feedback was accompanied by a dissonant 
unpleasant sound effect based on an ascending minor second interval (Cousineau, 
McDermott, & Peretz, 2012; McDermott, Lehr, & Oxenham, 2010) one for the beer 
and one for the chocolate outcome. The incorrect response feedback was 
accompanied by an unpleasant buzzer sound effect. Each of the sound effects used 
was volume and length (600 ms) matched. 
Participants completed a practice block of 12 trials comprising equal numbers 
of trials in which certain loss prevention, uncertain loss prevention and unlikely loss 
prevention beer and chocolate probability information were presented before pairs of 
neutral pictures (e.g., household furniture); data from these trials were not analysed. 
The main block of 240 critical trials comprised 120 alcohol-neutral and 120 
chocolate-neutral picture pairs. For each type of picture pair there were an equal 
number of alcohol and chocolate outcome trials (60 trials each) and within this  
an equal number of certain loss prevention, uncertain loss prevention or unlikely loss 
prevention probability trials (20 trials each). Participants had the opportunity to take 
a short break after every 30 trials.  
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Data reduction and analysis 
Skewness statistics for some dwell time variables were twice the standard 
error, so data were log transformed in order to normalise distribution before analysis. 
Data of participants with at least 500 ms average total gaze fixation time per trial 
(more 25% of stimulus presentation time) was included in the analysis.  
Therefore, one participant was excluded. Two participants did not complete  
the experiment, hence, their data was also not included in the analysis (N = 30). 
2.3.3. Results 
Gaze dwell times were analysed using a four-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA (see Figures 2.3.3.1-2), with factors of Outcome Type (2: alcohol points vs. 
chocolate points), Probability (3: certain loss prevention vs. uncertain loss 
prevention vs. unlikely loss prevention), Picture Pair (2: alcohol-neutral vs. 
chocolate-neutral) and Picture Type (2: alcohol/chocolate vs. neutral). This revealed 
a significant main effect of Picture Type (F(1, 29) = 41.87, p < .001, 
2
p  = .59) 
indicating an overall AB: participants maintained their gaze for longer on chocolate 
and alcohol pictures in comparison to the matched neutral pictures.  
The Probability x Picture Type interaction was not significant (F(2, 58) = 0.22,  
p = .801, 
2
p  = .01); therefore, there was no generalised effect of reward loss 
anticipation on AB. The four-way Outcome type x Probability x Picture pair x 
Picture type interaction was significant (F(2, 58) = 4.18, p = .020, 
2
p  = .13).  
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Figure 2.3.3.1. The effects of beer and chocolate loss anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for alcohol-related and matched neutral pictures under behavioural 
control over the outcomes.  
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Figure 2.3.3.2. The effects of beer and chocolate loss anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for chocolate-related and matched neutral pictures under behavioural 
control over the outcomes.  
 78 
 
To deconstruct the four-way interaction, AB scores were first calculated by 
subtracting gaze dwell time on neutral pictures from gaze dwell time on  
the corresponding alcohol and chocolate pictures. Then one-way ANOVAs were run 
to determine if AB for alcohol and chocolate pictures was reliably affected by 
anticipation of loss of different outcomes. A significant effect of alcohol loss 
anticipation on AB for alcohol pictures was found (F(2, 58) = 4.01, p = .023,  
2
p  = .12), but alcohol loss anticipation had no effect on AB for chocolate pictures  
(F(2, 58) = 0.45, p = .643, 
2
p  = .02) (see Figure 2.3.3.3). The effect of chocolate 
loss anticipation on AB for chocolate pictures did not reach significance  
(F(2, 58) = 2.47, p = .094, 
2
p  = .08), chocolate loss anticipation had no effect on 
AB for alcohol pictures (F(2, 58) = 1.83, p = .170, 
2
p  = .06) (see Figure 2.3.3.4). 
Also, two-way ANOVAs were run on the bias scores with factors of Outcome Type 
and Picture Pair, separately at each level of Probability (certain loss prevention, 
uncertain loss prevention and unlikely loss prevention). The two-way Outcome Type 
x Picture Pair interaction was significant for uncertain loss prevention  
(F(1, 29) = 19.14, p < .001, 
2
p  = .40) but not for certain loss prevention  
(F(1, 29) = 3.03, p = .092, 
2
p  = .10) and unlikely loss prevention trials  
(F(1, 29) = 2.71, p = .111, 
2
p  = .09).  
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Figure 2.3.3.3. The effects of beer loss anticipation on AB (ms) for alcohol and 
chocolate-related pictures under behavioural control over the outcomes.  
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Figure 2.3.3.4. The effects of chocolate loss anticipation on AB (ms) for alcohol and 
chocolate related pictures under behavioural control over the outcomes.  
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Finally, within-subject t-tests were performed to analyse these findings. 
When alcohol loss was manipulated, AB for alcohol pictures was larger in  
the certain loss prevention (t(29) = 2.29, p = .029, d = 0.33) and uncertain loss 
prevention (t(29) = 2.54, p = .017, d = 0.43) compared to the unlikely loss prevention 
condition. Although bias in the certain loss prevention condition did not reliably 
differ from the uncertain loss prevention condition (t(29) = 0.67, p = .510,  
d = 0.11). When chocolate expectancy was manipulated, none of the contrasts on 
alcohol AB were significant (certain loss prevention vs. unlikely loss prevention,  
(t(29) = 0.24, p = .813, d = 0.04); certain loss prevention vs. uncertain loss 
prevention, (t(29) = 1.73, p = .095, d = 0.27); uncertain loss prevention vs. unlikely 
loss prevention, (t(29) = 1.73, p = .094, d = 0.22)). 
A different pattern of results was seen for AB for chocolate pictures.  
When chocolate loss was manipulated, the bias was smaller on certain loss 
prevention compared to uncertain loss prevention trials (t(29) = 2.27, p = .031,  
d = 0.30). However, uncertain loss prevention were not different from unlikely loss 
prevention expectancy trials (t(29) = 0.99, p = .329, d = 0.12). Furthermore, certain 
loss prevention compared to unlikely loss prevention expectancy trials (t(29) = 1.18, 
p = .249, d = 0.19) did not differ from each other. When alcohol loss expectancy was 
manipulated, none of the contrasts on chocolate AB were significant (certain loss 
prevention vs. unlikely loss prevention (t(29) = 0.85, p = .401, d = 0.12); certain loss 
prevention vs. uncertain loss prevention (t(29) = 0.06, p = .956, d = 0.01); uncertain 
loss prevention vs. unlikely loss prevention (t(29) = 0.92, p = .363, d = 0.13)).  
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2.3.4. Discussion 
Study 2.3 revealed an overall AB for reward-related pictures. This bias was 
influenced in the outcome specific manner by loss anticipation. A greater chance of 
keeping an alcohol point increased AB for alcohol-related pictures.  
Similarly, an opportunity to avoid the loss of chocolate points only influenced AB 
for chocolate-related pictures. As predicted, the introduction of control over loss 
outcomes allowed for revealing the effects of loss anticipation on AB. However,  
the impact of probability information is less clear for chocolate reward anticipation. 
One of the key differences between the current version of the task and  
the initial experiment (Study 2.2) was the introduction of two uncertainty conditions.  
On certain and uncertain loss prevention alcohol trials, AB for alcohol pictures was 
larger compared to the unlikely loss prevention of loss trials. No significant 
difference was observed between AB on certain and uncertain loss prevention 
alcohol pictures. This could indicate that participants were more engaged in both 
conditions where loss prevention was more achievable. However, these results are 
not consistent with the proposed interpretation of predictions made by Mackintosh 
(1975) – which would implicate a linear relationship between probability and AB; 
and Pearce and Hall (1980) – which would predict the maximal AB should under 
conditions of uncertainty. 
The effects of chocolate loss anticipation were different from those presented 
for alcohol and more difficult to interpret. Although AB was higher during uncertain 
loss prevention in comparison to certain loss prevention, there was no difference in 
AB between conditions during which participants were likely to prevent the loss of 
chocolate (i.e., certain loss prevention and uncertain loss prevention) and unlikely 
loss prevention. Since the presented evidence suggests that behavioural control may 
play a crucial role in the effects of loss anticipation on AB, the next step would be to 
include certain loss trials back into the task. This would give a reliable reference 
point for other probability conditions. 
The adjustment of experimental method was sufficient to reveal the effects of 
loss anticipation on AB. Implicating that the effects of loss anticipation on AB for 
rewarding cues may depend on behavioural control over the outcomes.  
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Moreover, the results of Study 2.3 provide additional support for the outcome 
specific effects of anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes.  
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Study 2.4. The effects of reward anticipation on AB under 
behavioural control over the outcomes 
2.4.1. Introduction 
To obtain a complete picture of the effects of reward and loss anticipation  
the initial experiment (Study 2.1) was replicated, and behavioural control 
modifications already used in Study 2.3 were included. Taking into account  
the results of Studies 2.1 and 2.3, it was expected that the introduction of behavioural 
control (1) will result in outcome specific effects of reward anticipation. Predictions 
regarding the impact of probability information were corresponding to the results of 
Study 2.1; (2) Outcome-specific effects of reward anticipation and greater AB were 
expected for reward-related pictures for certain reward and uncertain reward in 
comparison to the unlikely reward trials.  
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2.4.2. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-one participants (16 female) were recruited from the staff and students 
at the University of Liverpool. Study 2.4 was approved by the University of 
Liverpool Research Ethics committee (Ref. IPHS-1415-012 (Generic approval 
IPHS-1213-LB-024)). Participant characteristics are shown in Table 2.4.2-1.  
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Table 2.4.2-1 Participant characteristics Study 2.4  
Recruited participants 31 (F = 16, M = 15) 
Participants included in the analysis 31 (F = 16, M = 15) 
Age (years) 24.84 ± (4.90) 
Alcohol consumption (in units per week) 14.60 ± (11.17) 
AUDIT 8.42 ± (4.28) 
Weekly chocolate consumption (in bars) 3.48 ± (2.69) 
Chocolate bars usually kept at home 2.81 ± (2.99) 
Chocolate use/craving - CUQ 20.52 ± (6.14) 
AUDIT – Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, CUQ – Chocolate Use 
Questionnaire 
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Procedure 
The experimental procedure, pictures and stimulus timings were identical to 
those used in previous experiments (Studies 2.1–3). To reinforce the fact they would 
be competing for actual rewards, participants were shown the beer and chocolate in 
the laboratory and were explicitly informed that the points that they accumulated 
during the task would be converted into actual rewards. 
The task used in Study 2.3 was adjusted for the purpose of current 
experiment. Instead of being given chocolate and beer points at the beginning of  
the task and preventing their loss during the task, participants’ goal was to collect as 
many chocolate and beer points as possible. The probability information used in 
Study 2.3 were re-written to match reward anticipation conditions. Like in Study 2.3, 
probability texts were presented on substance-congruent backgrounds i.e., chocolate 
blocks with Cadbury’s logo background for chocolate outcome trials and beer in  
a glass with Beck’s logo background for beer outcome trials. For certain reward beer 
trials, the text ‘100% chance of winning a beer point’ was superimposed on the top 
(or bottom; fully counterbalanced) beer picture, and the text ‘0% chance of winning 
a beer point’ was superimposed on the bottom (or top) beer picture.  
On beer reward uncertain reward trials, identical text (‘50% chance of winning  
a beer point’) was superimposed on both beer pictures. On unlikely reward beer 
trials, the text ‘100% chance of winning a beer point’ was superimposed on one beer 
picture and the text ‘0% chance of winning a point’ was superimposed on the other. 
In contrast to certain reward trials the location of the text rapidly switched between 
the top and bottom boxes at a rate of one flip per 100 ms. Chocolate anticipation 
trials used the same probability conditions but information about winning referred to 
chocolate points (e.g., ‘100% chance of winning a chocolate point’ vs. ‘0% chance 
of winning a chocolate point’ etc.) and probability information was superimposed on 
the top of chocolate pictures. Probability pictures disappeared after participants 
pressed one of the trial specific buttons. 
On each trial, participants responded on a Sony PlayStation 3 gamepad by 
pressing the left and right upper and lower shoulder (trigger) buttons.  
They were instructed to press the left sided buttons on chocolate outcome trials and 
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the right sided buttons on beer outcome trials, and to attempt to gain as many beer 
and chocolate points as they could over the course of the experiment.  
On certain reward trials, it was easy for participants to select the button that 
corresponded to the location of ‘100% chance of winning a chocolate/beer point’ 
text. On uncertain reward trials ‘50% chance of winning a chocolate/beer point’, 
participants were aware that they had to guess which reward specific button to press. 
For unlikely reward condition, participants were informed that gain on these trials 
depended on precise synchronisation of their response, but the rapidly oscillating 
display would make this very difficult. Participants were penalised for pressing  
an incorrect trigger (e.g., one of the chocolate buttons during beer anticipation trials) 
and received the feedback ‘you lose a beer and a chocolate point’. 
On certain reward trials, if participants pressed the correct button  
the feedback stated ‘you win a chocolate point’ or ‘you win a beer point’ depending 
on the substance type on a given trial. The incorrect response resulted in ‘you didn’t 
win a chocolate point’ or ‘you didn’t win a beer point’ for chocolate and beer trials 
respectively. On uncertain reward chocolate trials, top and bottom buttons were 
fully counterbalanced – on half of chocolate trials pressing the top left button 
resulted in the ‘you win a chocolate point’ feedback and pressing the left bottom 
button resulted in the ‘you didn’t win a chocolate point’ feedback and vice versa for 
remaining half. The uncertain reward beer trials were counterbalanced in the same 
manner but were followed by beer-specific feedback i.e., ‘you win a beer point’  
or you didn’t win a beer point’. On unlikely reward chocolate trials, 10% trials had 
the ‘you win a chocolate point’ feedback and 90% had the ‘you didn’t win  
a chocolate point’. The same feedback ratio was used for unlikely reward beer trials 
during which participants received beer specific feedback. As in Study 2.3, 
participants did not have an impact on outcome of unlikely reward trials and  
the feedback presented was selected randomly according to the contingencies 
described above. 
The sounds effects previously used for successful loss prevention (Study 2.3) 
were now assigned to reward outcome. Whereas, the effects used for loss outcome 
were assigned to no reward feedback. The incorrect button response was 
accompanied by the buzzer sound. 
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Participants completed a practice block and the main block of trials which 
were counterbalanced and arranged in the same manner as in Study 2.3. 
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Data reduction and analysis 
Data was processed the same way as for the previous experiments. Skewness 
statistics for some dwell time variables were twice the standard error, so data were 
log transformed in order to normalise distribution before analysis. Data from all 
participants was included in the analysis (N = 31).  
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2.4.3. Results 
Gaze dwell times were analysed using a four-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA (see Figures 2.4.3.1-2), with factors of Outcome Type (2: alcohol points vs. 
chocolate points), Probability (3: certain reward vs. uncertain reward vs. unlikely 
reward), Picture Pair (2: alcohol-neutral vs. chocolate-neutral) and Picture Type  
(2: alcohol/chocolate vs. neutral). The Probability x Picture Type interaction that 
would suggest general effects of reward anticipation on AB was non-significant  
(F(2, 60) = 1.35, p = .268, 
2
p = .04). Also, the four-way Outcome Type  
x Probability x Picture Pair x Picture Type interaction which would indicate 
outcome specific effects was not significant (F(2, 60) = 0.86, p = .428, 
2
p  = .03).  
A significant main effect of Picture Type (F(1, 30) = 20.67, p < .001, 
2
p  = .41)  
was found, indicating that participants maintained their gaze on reward pictures for 
longer than on matched neutral pictures. As implicated by the Outcome Type  
x Picture Pair x Picture Type interaction (F(1, 30) = 8.27, p = .007, 
2
p  = .22)  
this overall AB was more pronounced for pictures which were congruent with  
the type of anticipated reward regardless of the Probability.  
 93 
 
Certain Uncertain Unlikely Certain Uncertain Unlikely
M
e
a
n
 D
w
e
ll 
T
im
e
s
 (
m
s
)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Alcohol 
Neutral 
Beer reward Chocolate reward
Figure 2.4.3.1. The effects of beer and chocolate reward anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for alcohol-related and matched neutral pictures under behavioural 
control over the outcomes.  
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Figure 2.4.3.2. The effects of beer and chocolate reward anticipation on mean dwell 
times (ms) for chocolate-related and matched neutral pictures under behavioural 
control over the outcomes.  
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To further analyse this three-way interaction, the mean bias score values were 
calculated across three probability conditions for each of the Outcome Type - Picture 
Type combinations (see Figure 2.4.3.3). Then, a two-way ANOVA with factors of 
Outcome Type (2: alcohol and chocolate) x Picture Type (2: alcohol and chocolate) 
was run. Both main effects approached significance (Picture Type (F(1, 30) = 3.99,  
p = .055, 
2
p  = .12), Outcome Type (F(1, 30) = 3.33, p = .078, 
2
p  = .10)), but were 
subsumed under a significant Outcome Type x Picture Type interaction  
(F(1, 30) = 8.27, p = .007, 
2
p  = .22). Independent paired samples t-tests indicated 
that, for alcohol outcome, alcohol and chocolate AB did not differ (t(30) = 0.68,  
p = .500, d = 0.14). However, for chocolate outcome, chocolate AB was bigger than 
alcohol AB (t(30) = 3.25, p = .003, d = 0.68).  
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Figure 2.4.3.3. The effects of beer and chocolate outcome anticipation (averaged 
across probability conditions) on AB (ms) for outcome congruent and incongruent 
pictures.  
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2.4.4. Discussion 
The goal of the final study was to examine whether behavioural control and 
anticipation of reward would have the same effects on AB as probability cues 
introduced in Study 2.1. Interestingly, while loss anticipation moderated AB when 
participants had an impact on the outcomes of the task, a different pattern of results 
was found for reward anticipation. The effects observed in Study 2.1 were abolished 
when participants had control over the outcomes. Probability manipulation did not 
have a distinctive effect on AB. However, it was found that when participants were 
expecting to win chocolate, their bias for chocolate-related pictures was higher in 
comparison to alcohol-related bias when averaged across probability conditions. 
It could be hypothesised that the priming-like impact of chocolate 
anticipation on AB reflects and the overall effect of chocolate reward-anticipation.  
In Study 2.1 participants were exposed to fixed probability information indicating 
the likelihood of chocolate or beer reward. In the current task, participants had  
an impact on the outcomes during certain reward and uncertain reward trials. 
Participants were informed that they had an impact on the outcome of unlikely 
reward trials. However, the outcome of these trials depended on a fixed probability 
ratio (10% chance of reward). This experimental manipulation was conducted to 
maintain the perception of behavioural control across all probability conditions.  
As pointed out by some of the theoretical accounts, behavioural control may enhance 
involvement in the task (see Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Rothermund, 
2011). Participants could have tried to adjust their response strategies in order to 
maximise chocolate reward and therefore it is possible that they expected to win 
chocolate across all three probability conditions. However, this hypothesis remains 
to be verified by further studies. 
Studies 2.1-4 General Discussion 
The goal of Chapter 1 was to explore the impact of different probabilities of 
reward and loss anticipation (i.e., beer and chocolate) on AB for substance-related 
cues. All of the experiments have revealed a general AB for substance-related in 
comparison to neutral pictures. Cues signalling reward and loss were shown to have 
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outcome specific effects on AB (Studies 2.1–3). The effect of perceived control had 
a dissociable moderating role on effects of reward and loss anticipation: compared to 
passive viewing (Studies 2.1–2), it abolishes the effect of reward anticipation  
(Study 2.4) but it is necessary to detect the effect of loss anticipation (Study 2.3). 
Outcome-specific effects of reward and loss anticipation 
One of the hypotheses proposed that AB for chocolate and alcohol-related 
cues would be increased by reward anticipation regardless of the type of anticipated 
reward. This prediction was based on the general effects of reward anticipation on 
AB reported by Jones et al. (2012) and was consistent with general PIT effects - 
which demonstrate that a Pavlovian cue predicting one type of reward can energise 
instrumental responding for a range of rewards (e.g., Cartoni et al., 2013; Corbit & 
Balleine, 2005, 2011; Holmes et al., 2010); as well as the ‘broaden-and-build’ theory 
of emotions - which suggests that positive affect triggered by reward anticipation 
could generate AB for a range of rewarding stimuli (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson 
& Branigan, 2005; Tamir & Robinson, 2007). 
Although the first experiment replicates and extends previous demonstrations 
of reward anticipation on AB for rewards (Wertz & Sayette, 2001; Field et al., 2011; 
but see Werthmann et al 2013; Hardman et al., 2014), the general effects of reward 
anticipation on AB showed by Jones et al. (2012) were not replicated.  
The anticipation of reward had outcome specific effects on AB whereby  
the anticipation of beer and chocolate affected only AB for stimuli congruent with 
the type of anticipated reward. This pattern of results could be considered as 
consistent with the outcome specific effects of PIT, where reward-specific Pavlovian 
cues increase instrumental responding only for the congruent rewards (Cartoni et al., 
2013). 
In the study conducted by Jones et al. (2012), participants responded in  
the same way for chocolate and alcohol anticipation trials by pressing the space bar.  
It was speculated that this could have encouraged participants to focus on  
the probability information that was presented on each trial rather than the type of 
reward that was on offer. This issue was addressed by incorporating two individual 
responses for chocolate and beer reward (Study 2.1), encouraging participants to 
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encode the type of anticipated reward in addition to the probability information.  
This methodological adjustment allowed for capturing outcome specific effects of 
reward anticipation. Therefore, suggesting that the generalised effects reported by 
Jones et al. (2012) were a study artefact. 
The general effects were also suggested for loss anticipation studies by CRP 
(Rothermund et al., 2008), whereby a global increase in attentional preference for 
incongruent reward-related stimuli could reflect emotion regulation. This hypothesis 
was not supported by the current findings. Study 2.2 did not reveal the effects of loss 
anticipation whereas Study 2.3 revealed outcome-specific effects of loss avoidance. 
While a chance of keeping alcohol only influenced AB for alcohol-related pictures, 
an opportunity to preserve the loss of chocolate points only influenced AB for 
chocolate-related pictures. These findings improve the understanding of reward 
stimuli in the context of anticipated reward or loss; potentially indicating that 
anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes (reward and loss) could be sufficient 
to affect the attentional selection of reward-related stimuli (albeit only in  
the outcome specific manner). 
Dissociative effects of control on the effects of reward and loss anticipation 
The perceived control over the outcomes of tasks (loss or reward) had  
a dissociative impact on the effects of anticipation on AB. For the experiments which 
involved loss anticipation, AB was moderated by reward expectancy when 
participants had control over the outcome of behaviour. In Study 2.3, participants 
experienced greater AB for alcohol-related pictures when they could influence 
alcohol loss prevention during both certain and uncertain loss prevention conditions 
in comparison to unlikely loss prevention. However, the comparable effects were not 
reported for chocolate loss prevention. Therefore, the results of Study 2.3 are only 
partially consistent with availability account – i.e., the ability to prevent loss could 
signal substance availability. In contrast, attention was only moderated by 
availability information during Study 2.1 when participants had no impact on  
the outcomes of the task. This suggests that the anticipation of loss could be guided 
by different mechanisms than the anticipation of reward. 
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It was initially argued (Study 2.2) that the withdrawal behaviour associated 
with anticipation of loss would be reflected by attentional avoidance of otherwise 
rewarding stimuli (chocolate or alcohol). It is possible that during Study 2.2 
withdrawal behaviour was initiated by the task itself. Brandtstädter et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that participants paid more attention to cues signalling a danger of 
losing a point if they could prevent its’ lose by identifying the location of the cue.  
In the uncontrollable condition, the presentation of cues signalling loss was 
associated with lower perceptual sensitivity. This could explain observed effects of 
loss anticipation reported in Study 2.3. It is possible that participants were not 
sensitive to probability cues when they had no control over the outcomes, and cues 
signalling unavoidable loss could have led to an adaptive response in the form of 
disengagement from the task. Consistent with predictions based on Brandtstädter et 
al. (2004), the effects of loss anticipation were revealed when behavioural control 
was introduced in Study 2.3, and participants could prevent the loss of rewards. 
These results are consistent with theories which posit that the level of involvement in 
behaviour may depend on perceived control over its outcomes  
(see Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Rothermund, 2011). 
A different pattern of results was found in the reward anticipation 
experiments. Despite the fact that participants had no impact on the outcomes,  
Study 2.1 showed that anticipation of reward had an impact on AB. This could be 
explained by the conceptual differences between the loss (Study 2.2) and reward 
(Study 2.1) anticipation tasks. Participation in Study 2.2 was associated with 
a progressing decrease in the number of reward points which arguably triggered 
behavioural withdrawal. Contrastingly, the reward anticipation experiment  
(Study 2.1) was associated with an increasing amount of chocolate and alcohol 
rewards (points). Hence, goal achievement did not require demanding behavioural 
adaptations or efforts which could potentially affect task engagement 
(see Rothermund, 2011). 
The final study on the reward anticipation was based on the findings of three 
previous experiments. The same type of outcome-specific effects of reward 
anticipation on AB to those reported in Study 2.1 was expected. Contradictory to this 
prediction, an overall boost in AB was observed for chocolate-related pictures during 
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chocolate anticipation trials when obtaining a reward depended on participants’ 
performance. During the trials where a chocolate reward could be won, attention was 
directed in the outcome specific manner towards chocolate-related pictures. 
However, AB was not moderated by outcome probability. It is possible that while 
participants were actively involved in goal pursuit they were trying to come up with 
‘trial specific strategies’ which would allow them to win points (i.e., during  
the previous uncertain reward trial I pressed the top button and I won nothing hence 
if I press it again during the current trial I should win a point). Therefore, active 
involvement in the task could have abolished the predictive value of uncertain 
reward and unlikely reward cues, explaining an overall boost in preference for 
chocolate-related pictures during chocolate trials. However, this does not explain 
why the effects were only visible for chocolate anticipation trials. 
The presented results suggest that some of the effects of loss anticipation on 
AB may depend on the level of perceived control over the negative outcomes (Study 
2.3), where low levels of control may potentially prevent engagement in the task 
(Study 2.2). In contrast to loss anticipation, the low level of perceived control does 
not appear to hinder the effects of fixed probability information on AB as reflected 
by the results of Study 2.1. It can be speculated that AB is affected by fixed reward 
probability information when goal achievement does not require behavioural 
adjustments and use of internal resources. However, when participants have control 
over the outcomes they expect their efforts to be rewarded, regardless of  
the likelihood of reward (Study 2.4). 
The impact of probability information on AB for rewarding cues 
The current experiments did not provide an unequivocal answer to the role of 
uncertainty in the effects of anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes on AB. 
Studies 2.1-3 showed that cues signalling reward and loss can direct attention 
towards reward-related stimuli, and these effects may depend on the level of control. 
However, these experiments did not provide unequivocal support for either linear 
relationship between probability and AB indicated by the Mackintosh theory (1975), 
or maximal AB under uncertainty conditions suggested by Pearce and Hall’s (1980) 
model of associative learning. For chocolate reward anticipation, the uncertainty  
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(i.e., 50% chance of gain) and certainty (i.e., 100% chance of gain) conditions did 
not differ from each other, and both increased AB in comparison to no gain 
condition (Study 2.1). For alcohol reward anticipation, the certainty condition 
increased AB for alcohol-related pictures in comparison to the no gain condition. 
However, there was no difference in AB for alcohol-related pictures between  
the uncertainty and no gain alcohol anticipation conditions (Study 2.1). 
The anticipation of alcohol loss investigated in Study 2.3 led to a similar 
pattern of results. AB for alcohol pictures was increased when participants were 
likely to preserve their alcohol reward during certain loss prevention  
(i.e., 100% chance of keeping a point) and uncertain loss prevention (i.e., 50% 
chance of keeping a point) in comparison to unlikely loss prevention (i.e., 10% 
chance of keeping a point) condition. However, there was no difference between 
certain loss prevention compared to uncertain loss prevention conditions. Therefore, 
these results are only partially consistent with Mackintosh’s theory of associative 
learning (1975) which suggests that more reliable predictors of the outcome should 
receive more attention. The results of chocolate trials were more complicated to 
interpret. AB for chocolate-related pictures was lower during certain loss prevention 
trials in comparison to uncertain loss prevention trials. This could be considered as 
consistent with the Pearce and Hall model (1980) which states that in order to 
facilitate learning CSs which accurately predict US receive less attention than those 
which are inaccurate predictors of US. However, contradictory to Pearce and Hall’s 
model, AB during unlikely loss prevention trials did not differ from certain loss 
prevention and uncertain loss prevention trials. 
The variability in the impact of certainty and uncertainty information could 
indicate that different mechanisms could be involved in the moderation of AB. 
Therefore, the effects of certainty could be qualitatively different from the effects of 
uncertainty. It is possible that the effects of certain outcome predictors are driven by  
a Mackintosh-type mechanism, and the effects of uncertain outcome predictors are 
be driven by a Pearce-Hall-type mechanism. This could explain why sometimes 
uncertainty and certainty condition have comparable and the other time dissociable 
effects on AB. This hypothesis should be addressed by further studies on the role of 
reward anticipation in moderation of AB. 
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Conclusion 
Four studies were conducted to examine the effects of reward and loss 
anticipation under different control conditions on AB for reward-related cues. 
Evidence for outcome specific effects of reward and loss anticipation was found.  
The anticipation of chocolate and alcohol loss/reward influenced AB only for reward 
congruent stimuli. The effects of loss and reward anticipation depended on the level 
of control over the outcomes of tasks. The effects of loss anticipation on AB were 
only significant when participants had control over the outcome of behaviour, 
whereas, availability information only influenced AB when participants had no 
impact on the outcomes of the task. When outcome control was introduced, AB was 
increased across probability conditions for pictures congruent with the anticipated 
outcome – although this was only reported for chocolate gain. The current studies 
did not provide an unequivocal answer for the role of uncertainty in the effects of 
anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes on AB. It was proposed that that 
uncertainty may have an independent effect on AB from uncertainty. These findings 
expand the current knowledge of the effects of reward and loss anticipation on AB 
and help to clarify some of the issues associated with previous research (Jones et al., 
2012).  
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CHAPTER 3 -  THE EFFECTS OF REWARD ANTICIPATION 
ON EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS  
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This chapter provides an overview of event-related potential (ERP) studies 
with the focus on neurophysiological indices of enhanced attentional processing of 
motivationally relevant stimuli (P300). A previous experiment (Study 2.1) revealed 
outcome specific effects of the reward of anticipation on AB. The current experiment 
was conducted to further explore the effects of reward anticipation on the attentional 
processing of motivationally relevant information. It was expected that anticipation 
of reward (chocolate and beer) should enhance processing of the congruent alcohol 
and chocolate related stimuli, and this should have been reflected by the facilitated 
electrical activity of the brain. Contrary to what was expected,  
the presentation of reward-related stimuli did not evoke the P300 component.  
In comparison to substance-related cues, neutral pictures evoked more pronounced 
N2 amplitudes (280 ms).  
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Study 3.1. An exploratory study on the effects of reward 
anticipation on event-related potentials associated with processing of 
substance-related cues. 
3.1.1. Introduction 
Electroencephalography (EEG) enables the direct measurement of 
physiological changes associated with AB, hence, making it a perfect tool for 
studying the effects of reward anticipation (Field & Franken, 2014).  
Synaptic activity, including both excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials is 
the main source of electric potentials recorded with EEG (Olejniczak, 2006).  
The electrical changes are generated in the intracellular fluid by neurotransmitter-
induced ion flux across the neuronal membrane (Woodman, 2010). EEG allows for 
the recording of electrical changes related to unison group activation of cortical 
neurons. The magnitude of the change depends on the size of a group of neurons 
activated in synchrony (Nunez & Srinivasan, 2006). 
Recording of ERP waveforms allows for capturing electrophysiological brain 
activity in response (or in preparation for) to stimulus exposure. ERP waveforms 
consist of series of positive and negative voltage deflections (peaks) which are 
referred to as components (Luck, 2005). ERPs are named using polarity  
(P for positive and N for negative peaks) combined with either time (e.g., 200, 300 
after the latency in ms after stimulus onset) or ordinal (e.g., 1 for first, 2 for  
the second peak in the waveform, etc.) nomenclature. It is assumed that the variation 
in component’s amplitude reflects the intensity of processes operating in response to 
stimuli (Kok, 1990). 
P300 is one of the most widely studied components and is generally agreed 
that it may indicate selective attention and information processing (e.g., Littel et al., 
2012; Schupp et al., 2004; Schupp, Flaisch, Stockburger, & Junghofer, 2006; Schupp 
et al., 2007). P300 is a large positive peak (ranging from 5 µV to 20 µV) 
conventionally assessed at the midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz) which typically occurs 
between ≈ 300 ms to ≈ 800 ms – P300 is a term used in reference to classical P300 or 
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more inclusive late positive component (Littel et al., 2012; Patel & Azzam, 2005; 
Polich, 2007). 
The classical P300 component was defined as a time locked positive peak 
typically appearing approximately 300 to 400 ms from the onset of stimulus 
presentation (Patel & Azzam, 2005). This component is typically obtained using  
an oddball paradigm. This paradigm requires either a covert (i.e., silent counting) or 
an overt (pressing a button in response to) detection of an infrequent ‘target’ 
stimulus presented within a train of repetitive standard visual cues. Presentation of 
‘oddball’ stimuli results in more pronounced P300 amplitudes in comparison to 
frequent cues (e.g., Donchin, 1981). This may reflect memory processes involved in 
the classification of goal relevance of target stimuli and associated allocation of 
attention (see Bledowski, Prvulovic, Goebel, Zanella, & Linden, 2004; Kok, 2001; 
Polich, 2007). 
It is generally agreed that evolutionary relevant stimuli signalling reward and 
threat receive selective attention (e.g., Jackson & Calvillo, 2013; Ohman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001; Rupp & Wallen, 2008; Werthmann et al., 2015). Attentional 
preference for highly arousing motivationally relevant information has been termed 
motivated attention (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). There is strong empirical 
evidence demonstrating the relationship between P300 as well as SP which can be 
thought as a long-lasting continuation of P300, and motivated attention.  
These components are known to be more pronounced in response to highly arousing 
unpleasant and pleasant stimuli when compared to neutral stimuli, and the magnitude 
of the enhancement may depend on the motivational significance, relevance or  
the level of arousal triggered by the stimuli (Briggs & Martin, 2009; Hajcak, 
MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010; Olofsson, Nordin, Sequeira, & Polich, 2008; Schupp et 
al., 2004). Therefore, P300 and SP are considered indices of motivated attention 
(Schupp et al., 2004). 
Motivationally relevant cues like drugs and food are capable of evoking P300 
and SP, indicating their capability to attract selective attention (Littel et al., 2012; 
Nijs, Franken, & Muris, 2008). The intensified processing of substance related cues 
in comparison to neutral stimuli found in substance users but not in non-users is 
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reflected by increased P300 and SP components. These findings represent a robust 
phenomenon found across cannabis, heroin, cocaine, alcohol and cigarettes users, 
and were obtained using passive viewing paradigms and active paradigms like  
the aforementioned ‘oddball’ task (see Littel et al., 2012). Similarily to drug-related 
cues, attention and motivation toward food-related stimuli are associated with P300 
and SP. Appetite research suggests that greater magnitude of P300 and SP may 
reflect a general attentional bias for food stimuli related to its motivational value 
(Nijs & Franken, 2012; Nijs et al., 2008; Sarlo, Ubel, Leutgeb, & Schienle, 2013). 
Furthermore, P300 and SP might be attenuated in individuals concerned about their 
eating behaviour as a consequence of cognitive strategies applied in order to avoid 
food-related cues (Nijs & Franken, 2012). 
Some studies suggest that anticipation of reward may enhance P300 while 
participants wait for feedback (e.g., Pfabigan et al., 2014). Since P300 is considered 
an index of motivated attention (Schupp et al., 2004), it can be expected that reward-
related pictures (i.e., alcohol and chocolate) will increase the magnitude of reward-
related component – possibly P300 – relative to the exposure to matched neutral 
pictures. These effects should be moderated by the likelihood of reward.  
For instance, anticipation of substance reward could enhance motivational value of 
substance-related cues and therefore increase P300 amplitudes (see Nijs & Franken, 
2012; Nijs et al., 2008; Sarlo et al., 2013). Such predictions are also based on  
the results of eye-tracking studies which demonstrated that anticipation of substance 
reward can increase AB for substance-related cues (see Study 2.1; Field et al., 2011; 
Jones et al., 2012), as well as studies which demonstrated that P300 can be sensitive 
to the effects of reward anticipation (e.g., Pfabigan et al., 2014). 
Alternatively, cues signalling reward availability could influence brain 
activity in a similar manner to feedback information. The experience and evaluation 
of outcomes of events, both positive and negative, is crucial for human survival and 
represents the late stage of decision making (Ernst & Paulus, 2005).  
The evaluative processes may be automatic, therefore allowing for instant decision 
making in response to feedback value (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). For instance,  
the strategic monitoring of outcomes could enable correct action selection via 
response inhibition required for readjustment (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; 
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Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). Thus, evaluative processes are crucial for successful 
goal-directed behaviour. 
ERP evidence supports the existence of a neural system for error detection. 
The examination of feedback-related ERPs revealed a negative deflection at around 
230-270 ms following the onset of feedback information. These components are 
often labelled as N200, feedback error-related negativity (fERN) or feedback-related 
negativity (FRN), and are arguably generated in the anterior cingulate cortex 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). It was proposed that this 
deflection could be a consequence of a mismatch between expectations and  
the actual outcomes (i.e., error detection). Reinforcement learning error related 
negativity theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004) posits that 
N200 could be the reflection of learning processes mediated through the impact of 
phasic dopamine activity in the midbrain dopamine system on the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (dACC). The dopamine system monitors whether outcomes are 
better (increased dopamine response) or worse (decreased dopamine response)  
than predicted, and the dACC uses this signals to adapt the behaviour. This account 
argues that N2 reflects unexpected negative feedback. However, it appears that  
the magnitude of N2 could be mediated by both positive and negative feedback 
information, where positive feedback could attenuate fERN (Baker & Holroyd, 
2011; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008). 
The binary categorization account posits that feedback-related negativity 
could encode categorical characteristics of feedback distinguishing between good 
and contrasting bad outcomes i.e., goal failure vs. goal achievement. Bad outcomes 
(i.e., lack of reward or loss – depending on the context) evoke greater negativity 
amplitude in comparison to positive feedback (i.e., reward), but this difference is 
independent of outcome magnitude (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006; 
Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). 
Motivational context could define the occurrence of fERN. Holroyd, Larsen, 
and Cohen (2004) showed that feedback signalling unexpected lack of reward 
evoked fERN when reward was the alternative outcome. However, the unexpected 
lack of reward feedback did not evoke fERN when loss was the alternative outcome. 
 110 
 
The results of this study demonstrate that ‘negativity’ of the outcome could be 
defined relative to alternative outcomes rather than being pre-assigned to the valence 
of the event. 
It is possible that outcome probability cues (i.e., 100%, 50% and 0% chance 
of reward) could influence brain activity in a similar manner to feedback 
information. For example, probabilistic information about pending motivationally 
salient outcomes can influence FRN via interaction between outcome valence and 
outcome expectancy. Liao, Gramann, Feng, Deak, and Li (2011) demonstrated that 
cues signalling motivationally salient outcomes evoked FRN, with unexpected 
outcomes generating larger difference waves than expected outcomes.  
Additionally, cues signalling loss have a greater impact on FRN than cues signalling 
positive outcomes. 
This study was conducted in order to examine if there would be an effect of 
reward anticipation on either P300 or N200 ERP components. Taking into account  
the results of previous research, this experiment investigates congruent effects of 
reward anticipation. Therefore, the effects of chocolate anticipation on  
the processing of alcohol-related stimuli and vice versa, is not the goal of the current 
study. On the one hand it is expected that (1) the presentation of substance-related 
stimuli should evoke greater P300 relative to neutral. Furthermore,  
(2) in comparisons to no reward condition, gain probability information could 
enhance the motivational value of substance-related cues leading to more 
pronounced P300 peaks. On the other hand, it can be expected that relative to 
no reward condition, cues signalling reward outcome could trigger outcome 
evaluation processes reflected by N200. Taking into account the results of previous 
research (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Liao et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004) 
which revealed enhancement of N200 during unexpected feedback (3) it can be 
expected that N200 should be most pronounced for the uncertainty condition.  
The outcome evaluation processes reflected by N200 (4) should be further enhanced 
across both gain conditions when reward gain information is followed up by neutral 
stimuli (i.e., unexpected outcome), in comparison substance-related stimuli.  
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3.1.2. Method 
Participants 
Twenty-nine participants (20 female) were recruited from the staff and 
students at the University of Liverpool. Inclusion criteria included: regular 
consumption of chocolate and beer (both at least once per week), aged above 18  
and fluency in English. Participants who had received treatment for alcohol problems 
could not take part. Study 3.1 was approved by the University of Liverpool Research 
Ethics committee (Ref. IPHS-1314-LB-256), and all participants provided informed 
consent before taking part. Participant characteristics are shown in Table 3.1.2-1.  
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Table 3.1.2-1 Participant characteristics Study 3.1 
Participants recruited 29 (F = 20, M = 9) 
Participants included in the analysis 22 (F = 14, M = 8) 
Age (years) 24.32 ± (6.47) 
Alcohol consumption (in units per week) 14.61 ± (5.70) 
AUDIT 7.91 ± (3.89) 
Weekly chocolate consumption (in bars) 3.00 ± (1.35) 
Chocolate bars usually kept at home 2.68 ± (2.03) 
Chocolate use/craving - CUQ 22.41 ± (5.34) 
AUDIT – Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test, CUQ – Chocolate Use 
Questionnaire 
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Pictorial stimuli 
The majority of the pictures presented in the previous experiments  
(Studies 2.1-4) were used in the current study, but due to the increased number of 
trials within probability conditions, 5 pairs of new reward-related and matched 
neutral pictures were added for each of the reward categories. The pictures used in 
the current study were considerably larger (176.4 mm wide by 117.6 mm high) than 
for Studies 2.1-4 (130 mm by 90 mm). Therefore, some of the stimuli were replaced 
with new matched pictures – if enlargement of initial pictures affected their quality 
and the raw image files were not available for size reduction. Pictures were also 
matched on complexity and brightness. The experiment involved 15 alcohol-related 
images (e.g., a close-up of a model opening a bottle of beer, a can and a glass of 
beer) and 15 matched neutral stationery-related pictures (e.g., a close-up of a model 
sharpening a pencil, pens in desktop organizers). Chocolate stimuli involved a set of 
15 chocolate-related images (e.g., a chocolate bar, chocolate buttons) and 15 
matched neutral stationery-related pictures (e.g., a voice recorder, clothing buttons). 
Expectancy task 
At the beginning of each trial, a blue fixation cross was displayed in  
the centre of the screen for 1500 ms. Subsequently a picture of a Becks beer bottle or  
a bar of Cadbury’s Diary Milk chocolate (75 mm by 75 mm) defining the type of 
point that could be won, was displayed in the centre of the screen, directly above text 
that indicated the probability (100%, 50%, or 0% - representing certain reward, 
uncertain reward and no reward respectively) of winning on that trial. These stimuli 
were presented for 1000 ms and were immediately replaced by either a reward-
related or a neutral picture presented for 2000 ms. Chocolate anticipation trials 
included only chocolate-related and chocolate-matched neutral pictures, whereas 
alcohol anticipation trials included only alcohol-related and alcohol-matched neutral 
pictures. Immediately after the offset of the picture, the following text was displayed 
in the centre of the screen: ‘press the left key to try to win chocolate’ on chocolate 
outcome trials, or ‘press the right key to try to win beer’ on beer outcome trials.  
Text feedback was presented for 1000 ms as soon as participants pressed the 
appropriate key: ‘you win a beer point!’ on all certain reward and half of uncertain 
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reward beer outcome trials; ‘you win a chocolate point’ on all certain reward and 
half of uncertain reward chocolate outcome trials; ‘you win nothing’ on all no 
reward trials and the remaining uncertain reward trials; ‘incorrect’ if participants 
pressed a button incongruent with the type of trial. Furthermore, participants 
received feedback ‘too fast’ if they pressed any of the buttons before being prompted 
to make a response, which resulted in skipping the ‘failed’ trial. The inter-trial 
interval ranged from 450 ms to 750 ms in 50 ms increments to control for trial 
preparation and temporal expectations which may affect EEG recording. 
Participants completed a practice block of 6 trials comprising equal numbers 
of trials in which certain reward, uncertain reward and no reward beer and 
chocolate probability information were presented before neutral pictures  
(e.g., porcelain cups); data from these trials were not analysed. The main block 
comprised of 360 critical trials, 180 with beer rewards and alcohol and matched 
neutral pictures, and 180 with chocolate rewards and matched neutral pictures.  
For alcohol and matched-alcohol neutral pictures there were an equal number of 
alcohol reward trials (90 trials each) and within this an equal number of certain 
reward, uncertain reward or no reward probability trials (30 trials each). Chocolate 
anticipation trials were intended to be counterbalanced in exactly the same way. 
Unfortunately, due to a programming error, participants were presented with  
15 x certain reward probability trials and 45 x uncertain reward probability trials 
(15 win, 30 loss) before neutral pictures, when they should have received  
30 repetitions of both of these trial types. Participants had the opportunity to take  
a short break after every 90 trials. 
Procedure 
All testing took place between 1 pm and 6 pm in the in electroencephalogram 
(EEG) laboratory in the Department of Psychological Sciences. Participants were 
tested during a single experimental session lasting approximately 1 hour 30 minutes. 
Bottles of Becks beer and bars of Dairy Milk chocolate were placed around  
the laboratory so that they were visible to participants as they entered, but these were 
out of view when participants completed the task. After providing informed consent, 
participants completed three questionnaires: a two week Time-Line Followback 
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alcohol consumption diary (Sobell & Sobell, 1992), AUDIT (Babor et al., 2001)  
and a chocolate use questionnaire (Tibboel et al., 2011). 
Participants then completed the expectancy task. The electrode cap was fitted 
before participants were asked to take a seat in a sound attenuated, shielded 
recording room. Participants sat approximately 150 cm away from a 40 cm x 30 cm, 
60 Hz CRT stimulus presentation monitor (Mitsubishi, Tokyo, Japan).  
They were shown the beer and chocolate in the laboratory and were explicitly 
informed that the points that they accumulated during the task would be converted 
into actual rewards that they would receive at the end of the experiment.  
The beer and chocolate were then hidden from view before the task was explained. 
Participants were asked to pay close attention to the information about the type of 
outcome and the probability of winning that would be presented at the beginning of 
each trial, to rest their index fingers on two labelled keys (‘c’ for chocolate outcome 
trials and ‘b’ for beer outcome trials), and to respond on the appropriate key when 
prompted to do so. They were informed that responding before being prompted 
would result in skipping the trial and therefore forfeiting the potential reward.  
As they completed the task, the EEG activity was continuously recorded.  
At the end of the experiment, the EEG cap and electrodes were removed and 
participants were fully debriefed. Participants received course credit or a shopping 
voucher instead of the beer and chocolate, and the requirement for the deception was 
explained during debriefing.  
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EEG Recording 
EEG activity was continuously recorded using a BioSemi Active-Two 
amplifier sampling at 512 Hz (BioSemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands).  
Sixty-four electrodes were arranged in an elastic cap with plastic electrode holders 
according to the 10–20 system. Additionally, Common Mode Sense (CMS) 
reference and Driven Right Leg (DRL) ground electrodes were used. Horizontal and 
vertical electrooculograms (EOG) were recorded with four external electrodes. 
Data reduction and analysis 
EEG data was analysed using Brain Electrical Source Analysis version 6.0 
(MEGIS GmbH., Germany). EOG artefacts were corrected using principal 
component analysis procedure (Berg & Scherg, 1994). Each EEG recording was 
visually inspected to eliminate muscular artefacts and remaining eye blinks before 
averaging. Common average reference method was applied in order to spatially 
transform data to reference-free data. Data were then segmented into epochs from 
200 ms to 3000 ms and ERPs were time-locked relative to the onset of pictorial 
stimuli. The raw EEG data were initially filtered using a band pass filter at 0.5 – 70 
Hz to remove artefacts and a notch filter at 50 Hz. Epochs containing artefacts were 
removed from the analysis. The remaining epochs were averaged across all twelve 
reward type (chocolate and alcohol), probability (certain reward, uncertain reward 
and no reward) and picture (reward and matched neutral) conditions. The average 
data were filtered at 0.5 – 30 Hz and grand averages for individual electrode analysis 
were exported to Matlab 2014 (Mathworks: Natick, Massachusetts, USA).  
During the visual inspection of data files, seven participants were excluded from  
the analysis due to low quality data. 
3.1.3. Results 
ERP Component at midline electrodes 
In contrast to the initial predictions, P300 was not observed during the task. 
However, visual inspection identified a negativity peak at around 280 ms (N2) for 
both chocolate and beer anticipation trials. To investigate effects of reward 
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anticipation on ERP components, the midline electrodes FCz, Cz, CPz and Pz were 
analysed in detail. The grand average ERPs for these electrodes are shown in  
Figure 3.1.3.1.  
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Figure 3.1.3.1. The effects of beer and chocolate reward anticipation (certain, 
uncertain and no reward) on ERPs (μV) for congruent reward-related and matched 
neutral pictures recorded at FCz, Cz, Pz and CPz electrodes.  
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N2 ERP 
In order to explore the effects of reward anticipation on the N2 (taken from 
the epoch between 260 – 300 ms), data were analysed using a four-way repeated-
measures ANOVA, with factors of Electrode (4: FCz vs. Cz vs. CPz vs. Pz), 
Outcome Type (2: beer points vs. chocolate points), Probability (3: certain reward 
vs. uncertain reward vs. no reward) and Picture Type (2: alcohol/chocolate vs. 
neutral). This revealed significant main effects of Electrode (F(3, 63) = 35.14,  
p < .001, 
2
p  = .63; indicating the largest N2 amplitude at the central electrode 
compared to fronto-central, centro-parietal and parietal electrodes); Outcome Type  
(F(1, 21) = 20.01, p < .001, 
2
p  = .49; indicating larger N2 amplitudes for beer 
outcome)); and Picture Type (F(1, 21) = 60.01, p < .001, 
2
p  = .74; indicating larger 
N2 amplitudes for neutral pictures). The four-way Electrode x Outcome Type  
x Probability x Picture Type interaction was not significant (F(6, 126) = .51,  
p = .208, 
2
p  = .07). This suggests that the effects of reward anticipation on ERP did 
not vary across the electrodes. The three-way Outcome Type x Probability x Picture 
Type interaction was not significant (F(2, 42) = 1.11, p = .339, 
2
p  = .05).  
However, a two-way Probability x Picture Type interaction approached significance  
(F(1, 21) = 3.18, p = .052, 
2
p  = .13) and a two-way Outcome Type x Picture Type 
interaction was significant (F(1, 21) = 11.73, p = .003, 
2
p  = .36). 
To further analyse the Outcome Type x Picture Type interaction, mean N2 
values were calculated across three probability conditions for each of the Outcome 
Type - Picture Type combinations. For beer Outcome Type trials, a paired-sample  
t-test revealed larger N2 amplitudes for neutral in comparison to alcohol-related cues 
(t(21) = 9.17, p < .001, d = 0.91). Similarly for chocolate Outcome Type trials, larger 
N2 amplitudes were evoked by the presentation of neutral cues in comparison to 
chocolate-related cues (t(21) = 2.98, p = .007, d = 0.38). To further investigate  
the two-way Probability x Picture Type trend interaction ERP values were averaged 
across electrodes, and mean N2 amplitudes were calculated for accumulated 
Outcome Type (beer + chocolate) and accumulated Picture Types i.e., beer + 
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chocolate for reward pictures, and alcohol-neutral + chocolate-neutral for neutral 
pictures) at each level of probability. Figure 3.1.3.2 demonstrates that at each level 
of reward probability, neutral pictures evoked greater N2 amplitudes in comparison 
to reward pictures. This difference appears to be smaller for the certain reward 
relative to no reward condition. However, two independent one-way ANOVAs 
conducted for reward pictures and neutral pictures revealed no difference in  
the amplitudes of N2 components between probability conditions (reward pictures 
(F(2, 42) = 1.55, p = .224, 
2
p  = .07); neutral pictures (F(2, 42) = 2.05, p = .142,  
2
p  = .09)).  
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Figure 3.1.3.2. The effects of reward anticipation (beer and chocolate) beer on ERPs 
(μV) averaged across FCz, Cz, Pz and CPz electrodes for reward-related (alcohol and 
chocolate) and neutral pictures.  
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3.1.4. Discussion 
One of the hypotheses proposed that the attentional processing of reward-
related pictures should be more pronounced in comparison to neutral stimuli.  
It was predicted that these difference would be associated with shifts in  
the magnitude of P300 component. Moreover, it was expected that this difference 
would be moderated by the effects of reward anticipation. The presented results did 
not provide support for the presence and enhancement of P300 during viewing of 
reward-related stimuli under different probabilities of reward. However, current 
findings revealed N2 component for both chocolate and beer anticipation trials. 
Therefore, the hypothesis based on research findings which revealed an enhanced 
P300 during the presentation of motivationally salient stimuli (see Littel et al., 2012; 
Nijs et al., 2008) has to be rejected. 
Alternatively, it was proposed that probabilistic cues which indicate pending 
motivationally salient outcomes could influence N2 (Liao et al., 2011).  
Such a neurophysiological response could suggest the activation of learning 
processes (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). For example, some 
research suggests that positive feedback could attenuate N2 whereas negative 
feedback information could enhance it (Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Holroyd et al., 
2008). This could explain why N2 amplitudes were smaller for substance-related 
cues in comparison to neutral ones. The negative component observed approximately 
280 ms after the onset of pictorial stimuli could reflect the activation of automatic 
evaluative processes and decision-making response to feedback value (see Bargh & 
Ferguson, 2000). For instance, pictures associated with reward could be perceived as 
a form of positive feedback and thus attenuate N2 amplitudes. Neutral pictures that 
were not associated with reward could be evaluated as negative feedback as they 
may indicate a decreased likelihood of receiving a reward. Alternatively, the neutral 
stimuli could be considered as unexpected outcome or feedback error, thus 
explaining greater N2 amplitudes. Such an interpretation is consistent with  
the accounts which suggest that N2 deflection is a consequence of  
a mismatch between expectations and the actual outcomes (i.e., error detection) 
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). These results provide a partial 
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support for the hypothesis which suggested the activation of evaluative processes 
during reward anticipation. 
It was expected that a greater negativity would be elicited during both reward 
anticipation trials relative to no reward condition, with the highest N2 amplitude for 
uncertainty condition. This prediction was made taking into account research which 
reported most pronounced N2 amplitudes for unexpected outcomes (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002; Liao et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). This hypothesis was not 
supported by current results as probability of reward did not influence N2 
amplitudes. 
The second part of the hypothesis proposed that effects of anticipation should 
be further enhanced by the presentation of ‘unexpected’ neutral stimuli.  
The hypothesised interaction was not observed. Instead for chocolate and beer trials, 
the presentation of neutral pictures evoked greater N2 amplitude relative to 
substance-related pictures, and these differences were consistent across probability 
conditions.  
This pattern of results could be interpreted in the following way – overall  
the anticipation of chocolate reward activated evaluative processes as demonstrated 
by the difference between substance-related and neutral cues. For instance, during 
substance anticipation, outcome congruent cues could be perceived as expected and 
rewarding and diminish N2. On the other hand, it could by hypothesised that neutral 
cues increase N2 amplitudes as they could indicate diminished likelihood of reward 
or could be perceived as unexpected feedback (see Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). This difference in 
N2 may implicate changes related to strategic monitoring preceding response 
adjustment which might be necessary for unexpected events (see Folstein & Van 
Petten, 2008). These effects were not moderated by the perceived likelihood of 
reward and were consistent across all of the probability conditions. 
It is also possible that the pictorial cue signalling the outcome type (i.e., a bar 
of Cadbury’s Diary Milk chocolate) contributed to the differences in N2 observed 
between chocolate-related and neutral picture. The enhanced N2 recorded during  
the presentation of neutral stimuli relative to the chocolate stimuli could have been  
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a consequence of the mismatch between the outcome-type cue and the subsequently 
presented neutral stimuli. Accordingly, it is possible that the observed differences in 
N2 were not triggered by the effects of outcome anticipation but by the stimulus 
novelty (see Daffner et al., 2000; Ferrari, Bradley, Codispoti, & Lang, 2010; Folstein 
& Van Petten, 2008). 
It can be hypothesised that the impact of probability information on N2 
would be revealed when anticipated outcome is confronted with actual feedback at 
the end of a trial. Alternatively, the methodological differences between the current 
EEG research method and the previous eye-tracking studies (see Study 2.1, Field et 
al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012) which demonstrated the effects of reward anticipation, 
should be considered. It can be hypothesised that reward-related cues need to be 
presented in competition with neutral cues to reveal the effects of reward anticipation 
on attentional processing. Future research could investigate if the simultaneous 
presentation of reward and neutral stimuli could influence the evaluative processes 
and interact with perceived likelihood of reward. 
It should be emphasised that the interpretation of current results is limited 
due to the possible effect of the counterbalancing error, which could have influenced 
the subjective experience of probability information during chocolate anticipation 
trials. Due to a programming error, uncertain reward neutral pictures trials suffered 
from decreased likelihood of winning chocolate i.e., 33% instead of intended 50%. 
As a consequence, this condition could have appeared more similar to no reward 
neutral pictures trails. 
In general, the neurophysiological response to substance-related and neutral 
stimuli preceded by the outcome probability cues (i.e., N2) was different from  
the one implicated by the results of AB studies (i.e., P300, see Littel et al., 2012).  
The current study did not provide support for the role of probabilistic reward 
information on the responsiveness to substance-related stimuli. The presented 
component is different from the one implicated by attention studies (i.e., P300).  
This could suggest that the presentation of substance-related cues in the context of 
reward anticipation is sufficient for the activation of evaluative processes which are 
influenced by a type of external cue.  
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CHAPTER 4 -  THE EFFECTS OF ANTICIPATION OF 
SUBSTANCE REWARD AND LOSS ON ATTENTIONAL BIAS 
FOR MOTIVATIONALLY SALIENT STIMULI  
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It has been demonstrated that the anticipation of reward or loss may have  
a moderating effect on AB for substance-related stimuli (Chapter 2). The current 
chapter explores whether the effects of anticipation of motivationally salient 
outcomes (reward or loss) on AB could generalise to a different type/category of 
motivationally relevant stimuli. Two studies based on emotion regulation literature 
were conducted to investigate the effects of reward anticipation on AB for 
motivationally salient stimuli (facial expressions of emotions). Study 4.1 revealed 
significant linear effects of reward and loss anticipation on AB when sad and happy 
facial expressions were presented in competition and five levels of probability were 
used (definitely win, maybe win, cannot win or lose, maybe lose, definitely lose). 
These effects were not present in Study 4.2 when uncertainty conditions were 
excluded from the task.  
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Introduction 
AB may be a crucial mechanism in successful goal-directed behaviour 
whereby it highlights reward opportunities or potential threat, allowing for adequate 
response selection. Therefore, both positivity and negativity biases are important 
from the perspective of goal-directed behaviour. However, neither general positivity 
or negativity bias accounts provide a complete explanation of affective processing 
(Rothermund, 2011). In fact, a rigid AB could be problematic insofar as distorting 
the perception of reality and jeopardising everyday behaviour. The hindering effects 
of rigid AB are present in mental health disorders some of which could be 
characterised by the enhanced processing of either negative (e.g., anxiety - AB for 
threat) or positive information (e.g., addiction/obesity - AB for drug/food reward, 
respectively). Additionally, aside from AB being one of the symptoms, it could also 
be involved in the aetiology (Everaert et al., 2012; Field & Cox, 2008; Hendrikse et 
al., 2015; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). Therefore, rigidity in attentional processing 
can be considered as threatening for successful goal-directed behaviour (Rothermund 
et al., 2008). 
Emotion regulation processes allow for handling the extent of positively and 
negatively valenced information. Preventing individuals from becoming locked up in 
extreme emotional states and hence allowing for flexible switching between 
motivational orientations and goal achievement (see Koole & Rothermund, 2011; 
Rothermund, 2011; Rothermund et al., 2008). For instance, the counter-regulation 
principle (CRP) argues that during goal-directed behaviour, emotional equilibrium is 
achieved via attention being automatically directed towards stimuli incongruent with 
the experienced affective-motivational state (Rothermund, 2011; Rothermund et al., 
2008). Therefore, the experience of goal success can direct attention towards 
negatively valenced cues whereas goal failure can direct attention towards positively 
valenced information. Research indicates these counter regulation processes can be 
activated even when motivationally salient outcomes are anticipated and have not yet 
been experienced (Rothermund et al., 2008). 
On the contrary, some theoretical accounts suggest that AB could depend on 
the match with the content of working memory (see Olivers, 2008; Soto et al., 2008). 
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These accounts indicate that the anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes 
should direct attention towards stimuli congruent with the content of working 
memory. Assuming that information about the likelihood of motivationally salient 
outcomes is maintained in working memory, it can be expected that attention should 
be directed towards stimuli relevant to the current affective context. 
The present chapter reports findings from two studies which attempted to 
clarify the psychological mechanisms that underlie the effects of substance loss and 
reward anticipation on AB for motivationally salient cues (i.e., facial expressions of 
emotion). The predictions implicated by incongruency accounts (e.g., Rothermund, 
2011; Rothermund et al., 2008) and those suggested by congruency accounts  
(see Olivers, 2008; Soto et al., 2008) were investigated using a modified version of 
eye-tracking tasks previously used in Studies 2.1-2. The current research was 
conducted to clarify whether the anticipation of substance-related loss and reward 
would have a congruent or incongruent effect on AB for motivationally salient cues. 
The role of uncertainty in comparison to the expectation of certain reward gains and 
losses was also considered, as different theories of associative learning make 
competing predictions in this regard (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980).  
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Study 4.1. The effects of certain and uncertain predictors of 
motivationally salient outcomes on AB for facial expressions of 
emotions. 
4.1.1. Introduction 
The current examination of the role of anticipation in emotional regulation is 
different from the previously reviewed studies, which showed that the anticipation of 
motivationally salient outcomes (i.e., substance reward) can have a powerful 
energizing effect leading to increased cue reactivity (e.g., AB and craving).  
For example, it was demonstrated that the anticipation of substance 
reward/availability can increase AB for substance-related stimuli (e.g., Study 2.1, 
Field et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012). Studies 2.1 and 2.3 clarified that the effects of 
anticipation of reward and loss anticipation are outcome specific within  
the substance-specific domain. The results of these studies implicate that AB is 
greater when substances are perceived as available i.e., when reward is anticipated or 
loss prevention is possible. However, these experiments do not provide an answer to 
the effects of anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes on AB for different 
categories of valenced stimuli. These effects are implicated by CRP. Studies which 
found incongruency effects during goal-directed behaviour (e.g., Rothermund et al., 
2008; Rothermund, Wentura, & Bak, 2001; Wentura et al., 2009) suggest that  
the anticipation of reward should increase AB for negatively valenced stimuli 
whereas the anticipation of loss should increase AB for positively valenced stimuli. 
The difference between studies which used fixed probability information to 
show the effects of anticipation on AB for substance-related stimuli and CRP studies 
should be emphasised. Some research which demonstrated incongruency effects 
during goal-directed behaviour involved an outcome focus manipulation  
(e.g., Rothermund et al., 2008; Rothermund et al., 2001; Wentura et al., 2009).  
In these studies, depending on their performance, participants could win rewards 
(positive outcome focus trials) or prevent their loss (negative outcome focus trials). 
Therefore, in the case of all of these studies participants had an active role in 
winning or losing their rewards. Overall the manipulation of outcome focus results in 
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a greater interference of negatively valenced distractors during positive outcome 
focus and a greater interference of positively valenced distractors during negative 
outcome focus. 
Contrastingly, in the aforementioned studies which demonstrated the impact 
of fixed outcome probability information on substance-related AB performance did 
influence the outcomes (e.g., Study 2.1, Field et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2012),  
the lack of active control over the outcomes could have limited participants’ 
emotional involvement in the task. For instance in the discussion of results of 
Studies 2.2-3, it was suggested that the lack of control over loss could have 
prevented participants from becoming involved in the task. For Studies 2.1 and 2.4, 
it was speculated that when participants had control over the reward outcomes they 
always expected their behaviour to be rewarded. This could explain the lack of 
impact of probability information and the overall boost in AB for chocolate stimuli 
during chocolate outcome trials. It is reasonable to argue that a limited involvement 
in the task may not be sufficient to affect emotional stability. Thus, fixed probability 
information may be not sufficient to activate the counter regulation processes.  
In such a case, assuming participants maintain information about chances of winning 
and losing in their working memory, the introduction of a different set of stimuli 
(e.g., happy vs. sad faces instead of alcohol vs. neutral or chocolate vs. neutral 
pictures) is more likely to lead to the congruency effects. This prediction is 
consistent with theories which indicate that attention is allocated towards cues 
congruent with the contents of memory (Grecucci, Soto, Rumiati, Humphreys, & 
Rotshtein, 2010; Olivers, 2008; Smith et al., 2006; Soto et al., 2008; Van Dessel & 
Vogt, 2012). 
The goal of the current study is to examine whether the anticipation of 
motivationally salient outcomes (loss or reward) triggered by fixed probability 
information would lead to congruency or incongruency effects in AB for facial 
expressions of emotion. Furthermore, a novel type of reward (i.e., chocolate) could 
help to examine whether incongruency would occur for other types of rewards other 
than the previously reported incongruency effects for monetary reinforcement  
(e.g., Rothermund et al., 2008; Rothermund et al., 2001; Wentura et al., 2009). 
Counter-regulation processes were previously shown using happy and sad faces 
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(Wentura et al., 2009) as well as happy and angry faces (Rothermund et al., 2008). 
Taking into account the passive nature of the task the choice of sad (rather than 
angry) and happy faces appears to be more adequate. Sadness is associated with 
behavioural withdrawal and giving up effort (Frijda, 1986). A loss could be 
considered as an unpleasant event, therefore, it could trigger avoidance or 
withdrawal behaviour (Carver, 2001; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010); especially 
when the loss is independent of participants’ actions (see Studies 2.2-3). 
Additionally, anger is an affect associated with approach tendencies and activation of 
both approach and appetitive systems (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).  
Therefore, sadness seems to be a more appropriate emotional response than anger 
when a goal cannot be reinstated (see Stein & Levine, 1990). 
In order to test the competing hypotheses based on the congruency and 
incongruency accounts, the current study used a modified version of the expectancy 
AB task (Studies 2.1-2). The task involved loss and reward anticipation conditions 
and pictorial stimuli of happy, sad and neutral faces. (1) Congruency account 
implicates that reward anticipation should increase AB for happy faces for happy-sad 
and happy-neutral picture pairs. Congruency accounts make no predictions regarding 
AB pattern for sad-neutral faces during reward anticipation. Similarly, loss 
anticipation should increase AB for sad faces for happy-sad and sad-neutral picture 
pairs. Congruency accounts make no predictions regarding AB pattern for happy-
neutral faces during loss anticipation. CRP based predictions were adjusted to match  
the nature of the AB task where pictures were presented in competition. (2) CRP 
account suggests that reward anticipation should increase AB for sad faces for 
happy-sad and sad-neutral picture pairs. Assuming that one of the functions of AB 
during goal-directed behaviour is the maintenance of emotional equilibrium, it can 
be expected that AB for neutral faces should be increased during reward anticipation 
for happy-neutral picture pairs. Similarly, loss anticipation should increase AB for 
happy faces for happy-sad and happy-neutral picture pairs. Whereas,  
loss anticipation should increase AB for neutral faces for sad-neutral picture pairs. 
The effects of probability were also investigated by testing if: (3) reliable predictors 
of motivationally salient outcomes (100% probability of reward/loss) have a greater 
impact on AB in comparison to uncertain ones (50% probability of reward/loss); or 
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if (4) the effects of uncertain motivationally salient outcomes predictors on AB are 
more pronounced than those of reliable ones.  
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4.1.2. Method 
Participants 
Thirty participants were recruited from the staff and students at  
the University of Liverpool. Study 4.1 was approved by the University of Liverpool 
Research Ethics committee (Ref. IPHS-1213-LB-024), and all participants provided 
informed consent before taking part. Participant characteristics are shown in  
Table 4.1.2-1.  
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Table 4.1.2-1 Participant characteristics Study 4.1 
Recruited participants 30 (F = 25, M =5) 
Participants included in the analysis 24 (F = 20, M= 4) 
Age (years) 24.38 ± (4.20) 
Weekly chocolate consumption (in bars) 5.38 ± (4.12) 
Chocolate bars usually kept at home 4.13 ± (4.48) 
Chocolate use/craving - CUQ 21.58 ± (5.94) 
PANAS – positive attitude 29.13 ± (6.64) 
PANAS – negative attitude 13.08 ± (3.54) 
CUQ – Chocolate Use Questionnaire, PANAS – Positive and Negative Attitude Scale 
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Pictorial stimuli  
The experiment involved pictures taken from the NimStim set (Tottenham et 
al., 2009). Pictures of four actors were used – two females (Asian and White) and 
two males (Black and White). For each of the actors, pictures of happy sad, and 
neutral facial expressions were selected. The combination of facial expressions 
established three types of picture pairs: happy vs. neutral, sad vs. neutral, and happy 
vs. sad. Each individual picture was 110 mm wide x 72 mm high (as previously used 
by Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006). 
The expectancy AB task 
At the beginning of each trial, a picture of a Cadbury’s Diary Milk chocolate 
bar (75 mm wide by 75 mm high) was displayed in the centre of the screen, directly 
above text which indicated the probability of winning or losing a reward point 
(definitely win, maybe win, cannot win or lose, maybe lose and definitely lose – 
referred to as certain reward, uncertain reward, no reward/loss, uncertain loss and 
certain loss respectively). Due to the involvement of reward and loss conditions in 
one task, the percentage information was replaced with text information in order to 
avoid confusion. These stimuli were presented for 1000 ms and were immediately 
replaced by one of the three picture pairs, with one picture to the left and one picture 
to the right of the central position, with their centres 186 mm apart, for 1500 ms.  
These time and picture settings have previously been used by Garner et al. (2006). 
Immediately after offset of the pictures, the following text was displayed in  
the centre of the screen: ‘press the left key’ for certain and uncertain reward trials, 
‘press the right key’ for certain and uncertain loss trials and ‘press the spacebar to 
continue’ for no reward/loss trials. Text feedback was presented for 1000 ms as soon 
as participants pressed the appropriate key: ‘you win a chocolate point!’ on all 
certain reward and half of uncertain reward trials; ‘you lose a chocolate point’ on 
all certain loss and half of uncertain loss trials; ‘you win/lose nothing’ on all no 
reward/loss; ‘you win nothing’ on the remaining uncertain reward; and ‘you lose 
nothing’ on the remaining uncertain loss trials. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms. 
Participants completed a practice block of 10 practice trials during which 
each of the probability conditions was presented twice and 10 pairs of neutral picture 
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pairs (e.g., household furniture) were presented. The main block of 120 critical trials 
comprised 40 happy-neutral, 40 sad-neutral and 40 happy-sad picture pairs.  
For each type of picture pair, there was an equal number of certain reward, 
uncertain reward, no reward/loss, uncertain loss and certain loss maybe lose and 
definitely lose probability trials (8 trials each). Participants had the opportunity to 
take a short break after 60 trials. 
Picture Rating Task 
Participants rated each of the pictures presented during the task.  
The task involved 36 trials (4 actors x 3 facial expressions x 3 ratings). Three blocks 
of pictures (happy, sad and neutral) were presented in random order and pictures 
were randomised within each of the blocks. Each of the pictures was presented three 
times so that participants could rate each picture on three scales: happy, sad and 
neutral. Participants rated each picture by pressing keys labelled from 1 (neutral)  
to 9 (extremely sad/happy) to indicate how sad or happy the facial expression was 
and by pressing keys labelled from 1 (extremely emotional) to 9 (neutral) for neutral 
pictures. 
Procedure 
All testing took place between 1 pm and 6 pm in the eye movement 
laboratory in the Department of Psychological Sciences. Bars of Dairy Milk 
chocolate were placed around the laboratory so that they were visible to participants 
as they entered, but these were out of view when participants completed the eye 
movement task. After providing informed consent participants completed two 
questionnaires, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS - Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988) and a chocolate use questionnaire (Tibboel et al., 2011). 
Participants then completed the expectancy AB task. Participants were 
informed the points they could win or lose during the task represented some small 
quantities of chocolate. At the beginning of the task participants received two 
chocolate bars and were informed that they could win more or lose chocolate 
depending on the number of accumulated points. The chocolate bars were then 
hidden from view before the eye-tracker (Eye-Trac D6; Applied Science 
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Laboratories, Bedford, MA) was calibrated and the task was explained. Participants 
were asked to pay close attention to outcome probability information presented at  
the beginning of each trial, to rest their index fingers and thumbs on three labelled 
keys (‘c’ for certain and uncertain reward trials, ‘m’ for certain and uncertain lose 
trials, and ‘spacebar’ for no reward/loss trials), and to respond on the appropriate 
key when prompted to do so. As they completed the task, their eye-movement data 
was continuously recorded at a sampling frequency of 120 Hz. After completing  
the expectancy AB task, participants completed the picture rating task. Participants 
were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. Participants received course credit 
or a shopping voucher instead of the chocolate, and the requirement for the deception 
was explained during debriefing.  
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Data reduction and analysis 
Eye-movement data were recorded during the 1500 ms when happy-neutral, 
sad-neutral or happy-sad picture pairs were presented. The total duration of fixations 
was used to calculate gaze ‘dwell time’ on each picture.  
Fixations were defined as the maintenance of gaze within one degree of visual angle 
for 100 ms, as in previous AB research (Field et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2012; Mogg 
et al., 2003). Skewness statistics for some of the mean dwell times were twice  
the standard error, therefore, data was log transformed to normalise distribution.  
Data of two participants was excluded from the analysis due to no data recorded for 
certain types of trials. Due to missing data – less than 375 ms average total gaze 
fixation time per trial (less than 25% of 1500 ms stimulus presentation) – additional 
four participants were excluded from the analysis (N = 24). Due to incomplete data 
recordings one participant was excluded from the picture rating analysis (N = 23). 
4.1.3. Results 
Attentional bias 
Gaze dwell times were analyzed using a three-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA (see Figures 4.1.3.1-3) with factors of Probability (5: certain reward vs. 
uncertain reward vs. no reward/loss vs. uncertain loss vs. certain loss) x Face Pair 
(3: happy vs. sad, happy vs. neutral, sad vs. neutral) x Face Type (2: expression 1 vs. 
expression 2). Probability x Face Pair x Face Type interaction was statistically 
significant (F(8, 184) = 2.91, p = .022, 
2
p  = .11), which indicates that AB for facial 
expressions was moderated by the effect of reward and loss anticipation.  
A significant main effect of Face Type was found (F(1, 23) = 6.67, p = .017,  
2
p  = .22). To deconstruct this effect, data from the different picture pairs was 
analysed in separate Probability x Face Type ANOVAs. There was a significant 
effect of Face Type for happy vs. sad picture pairs (F(1, 23) = 6.70, p = .016,  
2
p  = .23), indicating AB for happy faces. A Face Type effect approached 
significance for happy vs. neutral picture pairs, suggesting AB for happy faces  
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(F(1, 23) = 3.80, p = .064, 
2
p  = .14). The effect of Face Type was not significant for 
sad vs. neutral picture pairs (F(1, 23) = 0.77, p = .390, 
2
p  = .03).  
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Figure 4.1.3.1. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on mean gaze 
dwell times (ms) for happy and sad facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.1.3.2. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on mean gaze 
dwell times (ms) for happy and neutral facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.1.3.3. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on mean gaze 
dwell times (ms) for sad and neutral facial expressions.  
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To deconstruct the Probability x Face Pair x Face Type interaction,  
AB scores for each type of picture pairs (happy vs. sad; sad vs. neutral; happy vs. 
neutral) were calculated. The bias scores were obtained by subtracting gaze dwell 
time on matched neutral pictures from gaze dwell time on the corresponding happy 
and sad pictures. AB scores for happy vs. sad pairs of pictures were calculated by 
subtracting gaze dwell time on matched sad pictures from gaze dwell time on  
the corresponding happy pictures. Data was analysed using three independent one-
way repeated measures ANOVAs with five levels of Probability (certain reward vs. 
uncertain reward vs. no reward/loss vs. uncertain loss vs. certain loss) run for each 
kind of AB scores. A significant effect of Probability on AB scores for happy vs. sad 
pairs was found (F(4, 92) = 5.78, p = .003, 
2
p  = .20) (see Figure 4.1.3.4)  
The effects of probability on AB scores for happy vs. neutral pairs (F(4, 92) = 1.29, 
p = .281, 
2
p  = .05) (see Figure 4.1.3.5) and sad vs. neutral pairs (F(4, 92) = 1.07,  
p = .377, 
2
p  = .04) (see Figure 4.1.3.6) were not significant.  
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Figure 4.1.3.4. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on AB (ms) for 
happy and sad facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.1.3.5. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on AB (ms) for 
happy and neutral facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.1.3.6. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on AB (ms) for 
sad and neutral facial expressions.  
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Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to investigate the effect of probability 
information on the magnitude of AB for happy vs. sad faces. Note that a positive 
value indicates a bias to attend to happy faces, while a negative value indicates a bias 
to attend to sad faces. The AB for happy faces was significantly larger on certain 
reward trials compared to: no reward/loss trials (t(23) = 2.61, p = .016, d = .69), 
uncertain loss trials (t(23) = 3.09, p = .005, d = .96) and certain loss trials  
(t(23) = 2.93, p = .007, d = 1.02). There was a difference between uncertain reward 
and uncertain loss (t(23) = 2.55, p = .018, d = .71) as well as certain loss trials  
(t(23) = 2.30, p = .031, d = .76). However, uncertain reward trials did not differ from 
certain reward (t(23) = 1.34, p = .195, d = .24), and from no reward/loss trials  
(t(23) = 1.63, p = .117, d = .40). Although this difference only approached statistical 
significance, in comparison to no reward/loss trials the AB scores for happy faces 
appeared to be smaller on certain loss trials (t(23) = 1.84, p = .079, d = .50). 
Uncertain loss trials did not differ no reward/loss (t(23) = 1.74, p = .095, d = .44) 
and from certain loss trials (t(23) = .19, p = .848, d = .04). 
Comparison of AB scores with zero revealed significant AB for happy faces 
for both types of reward conditions certain reward (t(23) = 3.77, p = .001)  
and uncertain reward (t(23) = 2.63, p = .015). However, none of the other AB scores 
were significantly different from zero (no reward/loss (t(23) = 1.59, p = .125); 
uncertain loss (t(23) = .75, p = .463); certain loss (t(23) = 1.00, p = .328)). 
Picture ratings 
Ratings were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with factors of 
Picture Type (3: happy vs. sad vs. neutral) x Question Type: (3: happy vs. sad vs. 
neutral). A significant interaction of Picture Type and Question Type  
(F(4, 88) = 222.87, p < .001, 
2
p  = .91) was found. To deconstruct the interaction 
individual ANOVAs were run for each Question Type, with Picture Type as  
the within-subjects factor. The effect of Picture Type was statistically significant for 
happy Question Type (F(2, 44) = 157.07, p < .001, 
2
p  = .88), sad Question Type  
(F(2, 44) = 165.72, p < .001, 
2
p  = .88) and neutral Question Type  
(F(2, 44) = 99.87, p < .001, 
2
p  = .82). 
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Paired-sample t-tests confirmed that participants gave higher ‘happy’ ratings 
for happy pictures than sad (t(22) = 27.99, p < .001, d = 8.18) and neutral pictures  
(t(22) = 11.28, p < .001, d = 3.50). ‘Sad’ ratings were higher for sad pictures in 
comparison to happy (t(22) = 12.72, p < .001, d = 4.35) and neutral pictures  
(t(22) = 14.62, p < .001, d = 4.16). ‘Neutral’ ratings were higher for neutral pictures 
in comparison to happy (t(22) = 13.32, p < .001, d = 4.20) and sad pictures  
(t(22) = 10.94, p < .001, d = 2.91). These results confirm that participants were 
capable of correctly identifying the pictures of facial expressions used in the task. 
4.1.4. Discussion 
The results of Study 4.1 revealed that AB for facial expressions of emotion 
was moderated by the anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes.  
However, the moderating effects of reward and loss anticipation were only shown 
when happy and sad faces were presented in competition. While the anticipation of 
reward directed attention towards happy facial expressions, the anticipation of loss 
had the opposite effects, directing attention towards sad faces. Although for loss 
anticipation, these results only approached significance when no reward/loss 
condition was used as the reference point. It should be emphasised that only effects 
of reward anticipation resulted in AB for happy faces. The anticipation of loss 
caused a shift in preference towards sad faces and equal preference for happy and 
sad faces. Although the results of previous studies suggested the outcome specific 
effects of reward and loss anticipation within the substance-related domain  
(Studies 2.1 and 2.3), these findings suggest that the effects of substance reward and 
loss anticipation could also apply to a different type of motivationally salient stimuli 
like facial expressions of emotion. 
These effects are in contrast to those predicted by the CRP. The anticipation 
of motivationally salient outcomes did not direct attention towards stimuli which had 
incongruent valence with the anticipated outcome. The anticipation of reward did not 
increase AB for sad faces in comparison to neutral or happy facial expressions,  
and the anticipation of loss did not increase AB for happy faces in comparison to 
neutral or sad facial expressions. These findings reveal an opposing congruent 
pattern of anticipation on AB for happy-sad picture pairs. Since these effects were 
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not present for happy-neutral pairs as well as sad-neutral pairs, these results provide 
partial support for the priming explanation of congruency effects (e.g., Grecucci et 
al., 2010; Smith et al., 2006; Van Dessel & Vogt, 2012). 
There seems to be a linear relationship between outcome probability and 
attentional preference for happy and sad faces. This could indicate that the impact of 
probability information may depend on its reliability. However, although AB scores 
for happy faces were smaller for uncertain reward in comparison to the certain 
reward condition and larger for uncertain loss when compared to the certain loss 
condition, these differences did not reach significance. AB scores for uncertainty 
conditions did not reliably differ from no reward/loss condition.  
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Study 4.2. The effects of certain and uncertain predictors of 
motivationally salient outcomes on AB for facial expressions of 
emotions. 
4.2.1. Introduction 
The first experiment demonstrated that the effects of anticipation were 
especially pronounced for the certainty condition (definitely win/lose) and were not 
as clear for uncertainty trials (maybe win/lose). To clarify the initial results,  
the study was replicated with uncertainty conditions excluded. To increase 
variability in stimuli and to prevent demand characteristics all of the three types of 
picture pairs were included. Results of the initial study suggest congruent effects of 
anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes on AB – with anticipation of reward 
increasing AB for happy faces and anticipation of loss directing attention towards 
sad faces.  
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4.2.2. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants were recruited from the staff and students at  
the University of Liverpool. Study 4.2 was approved by the University of Liverpool 
Research Ethics committee (Ref. IPHS-1314-LB-145 (Generic approval IPHS-1213-
LB-024), and all participants provided informed consent before taking part. 
Participant characteristics are shown in Table 4.2.2-1.  
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Table 4.2.2-1 Participant characteristics Study 4.2  
Recruited participants 32 (F = 26, M = 6) 
Participants included in the analysis 29 (F = 23, M = 6) 
Age (years) 20.24 ± (5.12) 
Weekly chocolate consumption (in bars) 2.59 ± (1.15) 
Chocolate bars usually kept at home 3.41 ± (5.01) 
Chocolate use/craving - CUQ  19.38 ± (4.75) 
PANAS – positive attitude 31.90 ± 5.74 
PANAS – negative attitude 18.41 ± 6.27 
CUQ – Chocolate Use Questionnaire, PANAS – Positive and Negative Attitude Scale 
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Pictorial stimuli  
This experiment involved the same picture pairs as the initial study. 
The modifications to expectancy AB task 
The second study involved a modified version of the task used in the first 
study. The procedure remained the same apart from the adjustments which were 
made to the probability conditions. The uncertain reward and uncertain loss 
conditions were removed, so that the number of probability conditions was reduced 
to: ‘win’, ‘cannot win or lose’ and ‘lose’ representing certain reward, no reward/loss 
and certain loss, respectively. Picture pairs were presented in the same way as in  
the initial experiment and participants responded in the same way to reward 
anticipation trials (‘press the left key'); loss anticipation trials (‘press the right key’); 
and neutral trials (‘press the spacebar to continue’). Text feedback was presented for 
1000 ms as soon as participants pressed the appropriate key: ‘you win a chocolate 
point!’ on all certain reward trials; ‘you lose a chocolate point’ on all certain loss;  
and ‘you win/lose nothing’ on all no reward/loss trials. The inter-trial interval was 
1500 ms. 
Participants completed a practice block of 6 practice trials which contained  
2 certain reward, 2 no reward/loss and 2 certain loss trials, in which 6 pairs of 
neutral picture pairs (e.g., household furniture) were presented. The main block of  
72 critical trials comprised 24 happy-neutral, 24 sad-neutral and 24 happy-sad 
picture pairs. For each type of picture pair, there were equal numbers of certain 
reward, no reward/loss and certain loss trials (8 trials each). 
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Data reduction and analysis 
Data was recorded and extracted in the same way as in the first experiment. 
Skewness statistics for some of the mean dwell times were twice the standard error 
hence data was log transformed to normalise distribution. Due to incomplete data 
recording, no data recorded for certain types of events, data from two participants 
were excluded from the analysis. Due to missing data – less than 375 ms average 
total gaze fixation time per trial (less than 25% of 1500 ms stimulus presentation) – 
an additional participant was excluded from the analysis (N = 29). 
4.2.3. Results 
Gaze dwell times were analysed using a three-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA (see Figures 4.2.3.1-3) with the factors of Probability (3: certain reward 
vs. no reward/loss vs. certain loss) x Face Pair (3: happy vs. sad, happy vs. neutral, 
sad vs. neutral) x Face type (2: expression 1 vs. expression 2). In contrast to  
the initial experiment the effect of Face Type was not significant (F(1, 28) = .14,  
p = .709, 
2
p  = .01). Probability x Face Pair x Face Type interaction  
(F(4, 112) = 2.92, p = .042, 
2
p  = .09) indicates that AB for facial expressions was 
moderated by anticipation.  
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Figure 4.2.3.1. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on mean gaze 
dwell times (ms) for happy and sad facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.2.3.2. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on mean gaze 
dwell times (ms) for happy and neutral facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.2.3.3. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on mean gaze 
dwell times (ms) for sad and neutral facial expressions.  
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To deconstruct the three-way interaction, AB scores were calculated the same 
way as in the first study. The AB scores were analysed using three separate one-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs with three levels of Probability (certain reward vs.  
no reward/loss vs. certain loss) for each type of bias score. The effect of probability 
for happy vs. sad (F(2, 56) = 1.64, p = .204, 
2
p  = .06) (see Figure 4.2.3.4)  
and happy vs. neutral bias scores (F(2, 56) = .30, p = .745, 
2
p  = .01) (see Figure 
4.2.3.5) were not significant. The main three-way interaction was driven by  
the effect of Probability for sad vs. neutral AB scores (F(2, 56) = 6.04, p = .004,  
2
p  = .18) (see Figure 4.2.3.6).  
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Figure 4.2.3.4. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on AB (ms) for 
happy and sad facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.2.3.5. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on AB (ms) for 
happy and neutral facial expressions.  
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Figure 4.2.3.6. The effects of chocolate reward and loss anticipation on AB (ms) for 
sad and neutral facial expressions.  
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Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to investigate the effect of probability 
information on the magnitude of AB for sad vs. neutral faces. Note that a positive 
value indicates a bias to attend to sad faces, but a negative value indicates a bias to 
attend to neutral faces. Paired-samples t-tests revealed greater AB scores for sad 
emotional expressions for certain loss in comparison to no reward/loss trials  
(t(28) = 2.93, p = .007, d = .76) and certain reward (t(28) = 2.31, p = .029, d = .63).  
There was no difference in preference for sad and neutral facial expressions between 
certain reward and no reward/loss trials (t(28) = 1.36, p = .186, d = .24). 
A comparison of the AB scores to zero revealed AB for sad faces during 
certain loss (t(28) = 2.50, p = .019) and AB for neutral faces for no reward/loss 
condition (t(28) = 2.05, p = .050). The same comparison showed no AB for neither 
neutral nor sad faces for certain reward condition (t(28) = 1.06, p = .297). 
Picture ratings 
Ratings were analysed using a Picture Type (3: happy vs. sad vs. neutral) x 
Question Type (3: happy vs. sad vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA.  
A significant interaction of picture type and question type (F(4, 112) = 307.32,  
 p < .001, ηp² = .92) was found. To deconstruct the interaction individual ANOVAs 
were run for each Question Type, with Picture Type as the within-subjects factor.  
A significant effect of Picture Type for happy (F(2, 56) = 426.42, p < .001,  
2
p  = .94), sad (F(2, 56) = 201.06, p < .001, 
2
p  = .88) and neutral  
(F(2, 56) = 194.80, p < .001, 
2
p  = .87) Question Type was found. 
Paired-sample t-tests were run to analyse the differences in picture evaluation 
for each of the questions. ‘Happy’ pictures were rated as more happy in comparison 
to ‘sad’ (t(28) = 24.65, p < .001, d = 6.95) and ‘neutral’ pictures (t(28) = 28.13,  
p < .001, d = 5.63). ‘Sad’ pictures were rated higher on a sadness scale than ‘happy’  
(t(28) = 18.63, p < .001, d = 5.33) and ‘neutral’ pictures (t(28) = 8.24, p < .001,  
d = 1.79). ‘Neutral’ pictures received higher neutral ratings in comparison to ‘happy’ 
(t(28) = 13.64, p < .001, d = 4.07) and ‘sad’ pictures (t(28) = 17.56, p < .001,  
d = 4.91). These results confirm that participants were capable of correctly 
identifying the pictures of facial expressions used in the task. 
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4.2.4. Discussion 
The second experiment sought to replicate the results of the initial study.  
In comparison to the first experiment, the uncertainty conditions were excluded.  
This was done because the first experiment revealed no difference between certain 
and uncertain reward conditions, certain and uncertain loss conditions as well as 
between uncertain reward/loss and no reward/loss conditions. The results of  
the second experiment are partially consistent with the findings of the initial one,  
as loss anticipation increased AB for sad faces for sad-neutral picture pairs – 
indicating congruency effects. However, the effects of anticipation were not 
replicated for happy-sad picture pairs. Taking into account the robust results of  
the first experiment it is possible that the manipulation of the original research 
method had a significant impact on the results of the second experiment. 
Studies 4.1-2 General Discussion 
The results of previous research, as well as experiments conducted as part of 
this thesis, indicate that the anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes may have 
an impact on AB for substance-related cues. Two experiments reported in  
the current chapter investigated whether the effects of anticipation would generalise 
to a different category of motivationally salient stimuli – i.e., facial expressions of 
emotion. Emotion regulation research suggests that attention tends to be directed 
towards stimuli which are incongruent with the current motivational context  
(e.g., Rothermund, 2003; Rothermund et al., 2008; Schwager & Rothermund, 2013; 
Wentura et al., 2009). These incongruency effects in affective processing, 
demonstrated during goal-directed behaviour, were argued to support emotion 
regulation (Rothermund et al., 2008). Furthermore, research suggests that  
the anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes could be a sufficient condition for 
triggering counter regulation processes (Rothermund et al., 2008).  
This concept appeared to be closely related to the aspects of motivated behaviour 
explored in this thesis. While the impact of anticipation of food and alcohol on AB 
for substance-related stimuli has received some research coverage, the effects of 
substance reward and loss anticipation on AB for other types of motivationally 
relevant information has received little attention. 
 167 
 
The results of the first experiment demonstrated that anticipation of reward 
and loss of reward can have congruent effects on AB for facial expressions of 
emotion. These findings are consistent with accounts which suggest that attention is 
directed towards stimuli congruent with the content of working memory (see Olivers, 
2008; Soto et al., 2008). Interestingly, the effects of anticipation were only revealed 
when happy and sad facial expressions were presented in competition.  
It can be speculated that the involvement of contrasting picture types catalysed  
the effects of anticipation. The observed effects for happy-sad picture pairs could be  
a consequence of two combined processes - one of them attracting attention towards 
the congruent stimuli and the other driving it away from the stimuli incongruent with 
the motivational context. 
That is not to say that the presented congruency effects disprove the evidence 
provided for incongruency effects (e.g., Rothermund et al., 2011; Rothermund et al., 
2008; Rothermund et al., 2001; Schwager & Rothermund, 2013; Wentura et al., 
2009). It is more likely that congruency effects might be a specific characteristic of 
attentional processing guided by fixed probability information. As previously 
emphasised, the lack of active control over the outcomes could have limited 
participants’ emotional involvement in the task. Therefore, limited involvement in 
the task may not be sufficient to affect emotional stability and trigger  
the counterbalancing processes. Therefore, it is possible that congruency effects may 
depend on the level of behavioural control over the motivationally salient outcomes. 
While active involvement in goal pursuit or loss aversion may result in incongruent 
AB, passive response to probability information may result in congruency effects. 
However, this hypothesis needs to be evaluated. 
The second study aimed to replicate the initial findings. The effects of 
anticipation were only revealed for sad-neutral picture pairs. This pattern of results is 
not mutually exclusive with the outcomes of the initial experiment and still could be 
considered as evidence for the congruent effects of anticipation on AB.  
However, these findings were clearly different from the expected ones. 
It should be noted that participants demonstrated a general positivity bias for 
facial expressions of emotion during Study 4.1. This positivity bias was reflected by 
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AB for happy facial expressions for happy-sad picture pairs, a trend for preference 
for happy expressions for happy-neutral picture pairs and a lack of difference in AB 
between sad and neutral facial expressions. Comparable biases were not observed in 
Study 4.2. It could be speculated that the initial difference in affective bias could 
have reflected the differences in participants’ mood (also notice the higher PANAS 
negative affect ratings for Study 4.2 (18.41 ± 6.27) vs. Study 4.1 (13.08 ± 3.54)). 
This difference in the baseline AB could have influenced responsiveness to  
the outcome probability cues demonstrated between two experiments. The congruent 
effects of reward anticipation were more pronounced in Study 4.1 (initial positivity 
bias) and the congruent effects of loss were more pronounced in Study 4.2 (lack of 
initial affective bias). 
Alternatively, it is possible that removal of uncertainty conditions had  
an impact on the value of remaining probability trials. Despite the fact that the first 
experiment revealed no difference between certainty and uncertainty conditions for 
both reward and loss anticipation, and for the contrasts of neutral condition with  
the uncertainty ones, it is possible that the role of uncertainty was underestimated. 
For example, the initial study revealed a difference in AB score times between 
uncertainty and the predictors of opposite outcomes (i.e., uncertain loss vs. certain 
reward, uncertain reward vs. certain loss, uncertain loss vs. uncertain reward).  
The lack of uncertainty could have had an impact on the subjective experience of  
the value of win and lose trials, which were always associated with reward or loss 
respectively. Therefore, the potential arousal associated with the uncertainty 
conditions was removed from the task. These issues should be addressed in further 
studies. 
To conclude, current results suggest that the effects of anticipation could be 
generalised to other types of motivationally salient stimuli such as facial expressions 
of emotion. These findings are important because they imply that anticipation of 
reward and loss of drugs or food could also have a more global impact on attention 
apart from substance-related AB. The current understanding of these effects for food 
and drug-related rewards is limited and, as discussed, further research is required to 
distinguish factors determining the occurrence of congruency or incongruency of 
effects of reward or loss anticipation on AB for valenced information.  
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CHAPTER 5 -  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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The goal of the thesis was to explore the effects of anticipation of 
motivationally salient outcomes (i.e., substance reward or loss) on AB for substance-
related cues (i.e., alcohol- and chocolate-related pictures). These effects were also 
investigated for another type of motivationally salient cues (i.e., facial expressions of 
emotion). In this section, a general overview of findings will be provided to recall 
the results reported in each of the seven studies. Study 2.1 explored the effects of 
substance anticipation on AB for substance-related cues to clarify the general effects 
of anticipation previously demonstrated by (Jones et al., 2012). This study revealed 
that cues signalling substance reward increased AB for substance-related cues but in 
the outcome specific manner: the anticipation of beer increased AB for alcohol-
related cues but not for chocolate-related ones, and the anticipation of chocolate 
increased AB for chocolate-related but not for alcohol-related cues.  
A follow-up Study 2.2 investigated the effects of loss anticipation.  
The anticipation of chocolate and beer loss had no impact on AB for substance-
related cues. It was proposed that lack of control over loss outcome could have 
contributed to disengagement from the task which led to the lack of effects of loss 
anticipation. This hypothesis was subsequently tested and supported in Study 2.3. 
The effects of loss anticipation were revealed when behavioural control was 
introduced. Alcohol-related pictures received less attention when participants were 
unlikely to keep their rewards. Although the pattern of results obtained for chocolate 
loss anticipation was less clear and did not follow up the effects of alcohol, these 
results could be considered as outcome specific. Study 2.4 elaborated on the issue of 
behavioural control in the effects of reward anticipation on AB. This study revealed 
that probability cues did have differentiating effects on AB when participants had 
control over reward outcomes. It was hypothesised that during chocolate anticipation 
trials, participants always expect their behaviour to be rewarded. This explains  
the general boost in AB for chocolate-related cues. These findings demonstrate that 
anticipation of reward as well as loss prevention leads to outcome-specific increases 
in AB for substance-related cues. Nonetheless, some of these effects are dependent 
on participants’ perceived control over outcomes. 
Study 3.1 involved an exploratory design, examining the effects of reward 
anticipation on electrophysiological indices of enhanced attentional processing of 
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substance-related cues. N2 amplitudes were recorded during the presentation of 
substance-related as well as neutral cues. This particular component could suggest 
activation of outcome evaluation processes as well as decision-making response to 
feedback value (see Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Holroyd et 
al., 2008). However, N2 amplitudes were not affected by the manipulation of 
outcome probability. Current results suggest that the general context of reward 
anticipation can trigger evaluative processes which are sensitive to  
the type of presented visual stimuli yet are not affected by outcome probability 
information. 
The final chapter reported the results of two studies which investigated  
the effects of reward and loss anticipation on AB for facial expression of emotion. 
Studies 4.1-2 demonstrated that the effects of anticipation of motivationally salient 
outcomes can be generalised to a different category of motivationally salient stimuli. 
Study 4.1 revealed a linear relationship for the effects of chocolate reward and loss 
anticipation on AB for facial expressions of emotion when happy and sad were 
presented in competition. The anticipation of substance reward increased AB for 
happy faces, whereas the anticipation of loss directed attention towards sad facial 
expressions led to equal attentional preference for happy and sad faces.  
The result of the subsequent experiment also implied congruency effects of outcome 
anticipation for sad vs. neutral picture pairs. However, the effects demonstrated in 
the initial study for happy vs. sad picture pairs were not replicated when uncertainty 
conditions were removed from the task. Study 4.2 showed the effects of reward and 
loss anticipation when sad facial expressions were presented in competition with 
neutral ones. In comparison to certain reward and no loss/reward conditions,  
the anticipation of loss increased AB for sad faces. There was no difference in AB 
for sad and neutral faces between certain loss and no loss/reward conditions.  
These findings will be discussed in more detail in the follow-up sections. 
Outcome specificity of effects of anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes on 
AB 
Outcome specificity of effects of anticipation of motivationally salient 
outcomes on AB was one of the main themes investigated in this thesis.  
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The results of Study 2.1 revealed outcome specific effects of reward anticipation – 
cues indicating that reward only moderated AB for substance-related stimuli that 
were congruent with anticipated substance. Therefore, the predictions based on  
the theories which suggested the enhancing properties of positive affect associated 
with reward anticipation (i.e., general effects e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007; Tamir & Robinson, 2007),  
were not supported for the substance-related category of stimuli. The current results 
demonstrated that the effects of cues signalling the likelihood and outcome type on 
AB, conform strictly to ‘if-then’ rule, which defines CS-US contingencies (see Field 
& Cox, 2008; Havermans, 2013; Hogarth et al., 2006). Hence, the outcome specific 
effects of reward anticipation on AB are similar to outcome-specific PIT effects. 
Outcome-specific PIT effects occur when the presentation of a Pavlovian cue which 
was previously paired with a reward, increases instrumental responding only for that 
specific reinforcer (see Cartoni et al., 2013). 
The results of Study 2.1 indicate that the general effects demonstrated by 
Jones et al. (2012) were caused by the methodological confound.  
In the previous study (Jones et al., 2012) participants were not encouraged by  
the experimental design to pay attention to the outcome type information, i.e., for 
both types of reward participants were required to press ‘spacebar’ to check if they 
had won a reward. This explains why their attention was exclusively guided by  
the probabilistic cues, and thus, why AB for both alcohol and chocolate-related cues 
was increased regardless of the type of anticipated substance.  
Study 2.1 introduced two independent responses for chocolate and beer reward  
(i.e., independent buttons) to increase participants’ awareness of the outcome type 
information. The modified version of the task allowed for revealing outcome-
specific effects of reward anticipation. This indicates that the awareness of CS-US 
contingencies is crucial for the development of CRs (see Lovibond, 2004; Lovibond 
& Shanks, 2002; Shanks, 2010; Vadillo et al., 2016), and that the effects of reward 
anticipation could be determined by the content of working memory (see also 
Grecucci et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2006; Van Dessel & Vogt, 2012). 
Predictions based on emotion-regulation theories (e.g., Rothermund et al., 
2008) implicated that the effects of loss anticipation could direct attention towards 
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rewarding stimuli, even when these stimuli are not directly associated with  
the anticipated loss. These predictions were not supported by the results of Study 
2.2, which demonstrated that AB was not influenced by loss anticipation. 
Moreover, the follow-up study on the effects of loss anticipation revealed outcome 
specific effects of loss anticipation when participants had a control (or its’ 
perception) over the outcomes (Study 2.3). The higher likelihood of loss prevention 
(i.e., certain loss prevention and uncertain loss prevention) increased AB for 
substance-related cues relative to unlikely loss prevention condition, albeit this 
pattern of results was only demonstrated for the prevention of alcohol loss. 
Similarly, the anticipation of chocolote loss prevention only influenced AB for 
chocolate-related pictures. This pattern of results was more difficult to interpret. 
Uncertain loss prevention increased AB for chocolate in comparison to certain loss 
prevention trials but ABes during both uncertain and certain loss prevention trials 
were not different from unlikely loss prevention condition.  
A comparable modification of the reward anticipation task (Study 2.4) did not reveal  
the effects of probability information on AB. However, the outcome specific boost in 
AB for chocolate-related stimuli, observed in Study 2.4 during chocolate reward 
anticipation trials, could be considered to be partially consistent with the outcome-
specific effects demonstrated in Studies 2.1 and 2.3. To summarise, the current 
results showed that when present, the effects of anticipation of motivationally salient 
outcomes on AB are outcome-specific, for the substance-related cues at least. 
Probabilistic cues signalling motivationally salient outcomes and congruency 
effects in attentional processing of valenced stimuli. 
Studies 4.1-2 investigated whether the anticipation of reward (i.e., positive 
outcome) and loss (i.e., negative outcome) would have a congruent or incongruent 
impact on AB for positively and negatively valenced cues. This research was 
conducted because some theories implicated incongruency effects of anticipation in 
affective processing (e.g., Rothermund, 2011; Rothermund et al., 2011; Rothermund 
et al., 2008; Rothermund et al., 2001; Schwager & Rothermund, 2013; Wentura et 
al., 2009). The incongruency accounts suggested that attention should be directed 
towards stimuli that were incongruent with the anticipated outcome – i.e., loss 
anticipation was expected to direct attention towards positively valenced stimuli and 
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reward anticipation was proposed to direct attention towards negatively valenced 
cues. This incongruency in affective processing was considered to contribute to 
emotion regulation during anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes.  
On the other hand, other congruency accounts indicated that attention would be 
directed towards stimuli that were congruent with a content of working memory and 
a current motivational state (e.g., Grecucci et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2006; Van 
Dessel & Vogt, 2012).  
The hypothesised incongruency effects were not revealed in Studies 4.1-2. 
Instead, the presented pattern of results was consistent with the congruency accounts. 
The results of the first experiment demonstrated that the anticipation of reward 
increased AB for happy faces whereas anticipation of loss shifted attention towards 
sad facial expressions, leading to equilibrium between happy and sad faces. 
However, these results were only partially replicated in the second experiment. 
When uncertainty conditions were excluded, the anticipation of loss increased AB 
for sad faces (vs. neutral faces) relative to certain reward and no reward/loss 
conditions, but there was no difference in AB between certain reward and  
no reward/loss conditions. Overall, these findings showed that counter-regulation 
processes were not triggered by the fixed probability cues. The fixed probability cues 
direct attention towards stimuli whose valence is congruent with the anticipated 
outcome. 
It should be emphasised that during Study 4.1, participants experienced  
a general positivity bias for facial expressions which was reflected by AB for happy 
facial expressions (happy-sad picture pairs), a trend for preference for happy 
expressions (happy-neutral) and a lack of difference in AB between sad and neutral 
facial expressions. A comparable positivity bias was not observed in Study 4.2.  
It is possible that the initial difference in affective bias could have reflected  
the differences in participants’ mood. The difference in the baseline AB could have 
influenced responsiveness to outcome probability information.  
For instance, the positivity bias could strengthen the impact of cues signalling 
reward, explaining the difference in results observed between Study 4.1 and 4.2. 
Although this hypothesis was not tested by the current research, it appears to be 
plausible and hence should be evaluated by future research. 
 175 
 
In general, the results of Studies 4.1-2 demonstrated that the effects of 
anticipation could be generalised to another category of motivationally salient 
stimuli. This suggests, that in certain cases, probability cues signalling substance 
reward can enhance the processing of positively valenced stimuli leading to AB 
whereas the anticipation of loss can direct attention towards negatively valenced 
stimuli (Study 4.1), which in some situations can lead to a negativity bias (Study 
4.2). Hence, it is possible that the effects of reward and loss anticipation are outcome 
specific within the substance-related category but also can be generalised to another 
category of motivationally relevant cues. 
Dissociative effects of control on the effects of reward and loss anticipation 
Studies 2.3 and 2.4 investigated the role of outcome control in the effects of 
anticipation of reward and loss on AB. The aspect of perceived control over 
outcomes of behaviour is important because it may moderate engagement in goal-
directed behaviour (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Brandtstädter et al., 2004; 
Rothermund, 2011). The following interpretation of results of Studies 2.1-4 can be 
proposed:  
The results of Studies 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that the effects of loss anticipation 
on AB depend on the level of control over outcomes. When loss is unavoidable, 
probabilistic cues have a limited impact on AB because low levels of outcome 
control may prevent engagement in the task (Study 2.2). However, AB can be 
moderated by cues signalling loss when individuals are able to prevent the negative 
outcome (Study 2.3). This could suggest that individuals are more likely to direct 
attention to relevant cues when they can prevent loss, but their attention is not 
affected by cues signalling unavoidable negative outcomes (see Brandtstädter & 
Rothermund, 2002; Brandtstädter et al., 2004; Rothermund, 2011). 
Although, fixed probability cues could seemingly not affect attentional 
processes (Study 2.2), the results of Studies 4.1-2 showed that comparable cues 
could influence the processing of negatively valenced information.  
These findings are important because they demonstrate that the same type of loss 
probability information may have an impact on attentional processing within one 
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domain of motivationally salient cues (facial expression of emotions), yet be not as 
pronounced or present in another one (substance-related cues). 
The results of Study 2.4 revealed an overall boost in AB for chocolate-related 
pictures during chocolate anticipation trials when participants had control over 
reward outcomes. From the perspective of reward-driven behaviour, the results of 
Study 2.1 suggest that individuals might be sensitive to cues signalling reward and 
their attention is directed towards substances perceived as available. It might be 
proposed that when individuals are actively involved in substance-seeking behaviour 
and have an impact on reward outcomes, they may expect their attempts to be 
rewarded regardless of the outcome probability – as reflected by a general boost in 
AB (Study 2.4). This could mean that once the threshold is reached and the initial 
attentional response is translated into actions, individuals may become ‘extremely’ 
focused on the goal of behaviour. Therefore, it is unlikely that substance seeking 
behaviour is stopped until the goal is reached. 
Future research could be interested in the identification of factors which may 
facilitate the transition from a ‘passive’ attentional response to cues signalling 
substance reward to active goal pursuit. Some individuals may be more prone than 
others to the effects of substance availability and may experience problems with  
the regulation of once initiated eating or drinking behaviour (Guastello, Aruka, 
Doyle, & Smerz, 2008; Hetherington & MacDiarmid, 1993; Smerz & Guastello, 
2008; Sugarman & Carey, 2007). It could be hypothesised that impulsive individuals 
should be more sensitive to cues signalling substance reward and hence more likely 
to initiate substance seeking behaviour (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2012; Dawe & 
Loxton, 2004; Doran, McChargue, & Spring, 2008; Doran, Spring, & McChargue, 
2007; Fernie et al., 2013; Jansen et al., 2015; Jentsch et al., 2014; Nederkoorn et al., 
2015; Schag et al., 2013; van den Akker, Stewart, Antoniou, Palmberg, & Jansen, 
2014). Impulsivity is a multifaceted construct, which, in a simplified way, can be 
described as a tendency to act on the ‘spur of the moment’ and a preference for  
the instance gratification over achievement of long-term goals.  
Hence, current findings could be expanded by the investigation of the impact of 
sensitivity to substances’ rewarding value and spontaneous decision making on 
responsiveness to the probabilistic cues signalling substance availability.  
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Likewise, findings could be expanded by examining whether the initiation of active 
substance seeking behaviour would abolish the probability effects and result in  
a general boost in AB. This research would help to further clarify the role of 
probabilistic cues signalling substance reward in AB and substance seeking 
behaviour and could improve understanding of the relationship between drug and 
food-related AB and impulsivity (see Coskunpinar & Cyders, 2013; Hou et al., 
2011). 
The role of certainty and uncertainty in the effects of motivationally salient 
outcomes on AB and their neurophysiologic indices  
All of the current studies tested competing predictions about the impact of 
outcome certainty and uncertainty information on AB (see Hogarth et al., 2010). 
According to the predictions based on Pearce and Hall (1980) model of associative 
learning, cues indicating reward uncertainty should evoke greater AB in comparison 
to the certain predictors of reward. Mackintosh’s theory of associative learning 
(1975) suggests the opposite predictions, in that AB should closely track probability 
information and be maximal when reward is anticipated with certainty, lower under 
conditions of uncertainty, and lower still when the reward is not expected at all.  
It is reasonable to say that the current research did not provide  
an unequivocal answer to the role of certainty and uncertainty in the effects of 
anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes on AB. In general, Studies 2.1 and 
2.3 demonstrated that cues signalling reward and loss prevention can increase AB for 
substance-related cues in the outcome specific manner. Study 4.1 revealed a linear 
relationship between probability and attentional processing of happy and sad facial 
expressions. However, in the case of all of these studies, the differences between 
certainty and uncertainty conditions as well as uncertainty and the neutral  
no reward/loss condition, were not clear. It was proposed that the effects of certain 
outcome predictors revealed when compared to the effects of ‘no outcome’ 
predictors could be driven by a mechanism described by Mackintosh (1975). 
Conversely, the effects of uncertain outcome predictors revealed when compared to 
the effects of ‘no outcome’ predictors could be driven by a mechanism defined by 
 178 
 
Pearce and Hall (1980) model of associative learning. Therefore, the effects of 
certainty could be qualitatively different from the effects of uncertainty. 
The results of Study 3.1 revealed that attentional processing of substance-
related cues was not affected by reward anticipation. The effects of anticipation were 
expected to be associated with the differences in P300 amplitudes, which is the index 
of motivated attention (Briggs & Martin, 2009; Hajcak et al., 2010; Olofsson et al., 
2008; Schupp et al., 2004). However, the general presence of the N2 component 
demonstrated in the context of reward anticipation could suggest that reward 
anticipation is accompanied by the activation of outcome evaluation processes.  
It was found that the presentation of neutral cues evoked greater N2 amplitudes 
relative to the presentation of substance-related cues. This observation is consistent 
with the results of previous research demonstrating that N2 amplitudes can be 
enhanced by unexpected or undesirable outcomes (see Baker & Holroyd, 2011; 
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004).  
The difference in the N2 component between neutral and substance-related cues 
could reflect a decision-making response to feedback value required for correct 
action selection (see Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Botvinick et al., 2004; Folstein & 
Van Petten, 2008) and learning processes (see Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2004). These processes were not affected by the probability information.  
It should be emphasised that these particular results could have been affected by  
a programming error, and therefore, await replication. Alternatively, it could be 
hypothesised that these processes are responsible for the changes in attentional 
processing of substance-related cues when substance-related and neutral stimuli are 
presented in competition. In contrast, when attentional selection is ‘blocked’ by  
the independent presentation of neutral and substance-related stimuli, the N2 
component is not affected by the probability information. This hypothesis remains to 
be tested by further research and could allow clarification of the differences in  
the impact of certainty and uncertainty reward information on AB. 
Substance anticipation, craving and substance seeking behaviour - speculations 
Franken (2003) argued that “enhanced attentional focusing on drug cues may 
trigger more explicit cognitive processes such as positive drug-related expectancies 
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and intrusive thoughts” (p. 572). This argument was one of the focal points of  
the model of craving proposed by Kavanagh and colleagues (Elaborated Intrusion 
(EI) Theory - Kavanagh et al., 2005). EI model proposes that external cues, 
anticipatory responses and substance associated thoughts can influence  
the experience of craving, which is an emotional and cognitive experience driven by  
a progressive activation of substance-related associations. EI suggests the experience 
of craving is a combination of both positive and negative affective states. The initial 
experience of craving could be positive. Probabilistic cue signalling substance 
reward may initiate the experience of positive memories, expectancies and emotional 
states associated with the previous instances of substance use. During the experience 
of craving, cues signalling substance availability could initiate elaborative processes. 
These processes could activate an attentional search for stimuli positively associated 
with substance use (i.e., AB for positive happy facial expressions demonstrated in 
Study 4.1 and AB for substance-related cues in Study 2.1). For instance, anticipation 
of smoking availability may enhance AB for smoking-related cues (e.g., ashtrays, 
lighters, cigarette packs) but also cues associated with positive smoking experience 
(e.g., relief experienced during a cigarette break or positive social event associated 
with smoking). This could facilitate substance seeking and diminish the perceived 
impact of negative consequences of behaviour (e.g., ‘having a cigarette would make 
me feel good’ or ‘one cigarette does not make a difference’), promoting impulsive 
decision making. When the initial elaborative processes initiate active substance 
seeking, individuals may expect all of their behaviour to be followed up by substance 
use (Study 2.4). At this stage, the effects of probability could be abolished leading to 
a general boost in AB (e.g., attention is even more sensitive to all available cigarette-
related cues to increase the likelihood of goal achievement).  
Therefore, the enhancing properties of positive affect associated with reward 
anticipation, implicated by some theoretical accounts (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; 
Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Rowe et al., 2007; Tamir & Robinson, 2007)  
could be associated with the positive stage of craving. 
The initial positive craving experiences could be followed by more negative 
associations related to the realisation of substance deficits (e.g., thoughts of  
a desperate need to smoke to satisfy the urge or prevent the withdrawal).  
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Therefore, the awareness of physiological deficits and negative memories of  
the previous situations when the craving could not be satisfied can further initiate 
substance seeking (see Tiffany, 1990; Tiffany & Conklin, 2000).  
Active substance seeking can be guided by cues signalling loss prevention, which 
increase their AB for substance-related cues to avoid negative consequences of the 
deficit (e.g., ‘I cannot share my cigarettes because I only have limited amount’ or  
‘I need to make sure I take my cigarettes with me’). If the negative outcomes cannot 
be prevented, participants may try to disengage themselves from the substance 
seeking behaviour to prevent their negative mood from escalating (see Brandtstädter 
& Rothermund, 2002). Therefore, cues signalling unavoidable substance loss may 
not have an impact on AB for substance-related cues (Study 2.2).  
In both of the scenarios, avoidable and unavoidable substance loss could 
hypothetically enhance the negative affect. The enhancement of negative affect 
could in turn increase sensitivity to cues signalling negative outcomes, leading to AB 
for negativity information (Study 4.2). This could further increase negative mood 
and enhance craving experience (e.g., Bradley et al., 2007; Hepworth et al., 2010). 
The interpretation of the current results is consistent with IE, which posits 
that craving is a combined experience of positive and negative substance-related 
associations (Kavanagh et al., 2005). The current findings demonstrate that 
anticipation of substance reward or loss could influence temporal changes in AB. 
This is important because Marhe et al. (2013) found that an increase in substance-
related AB may precede relapse. Additionally, changes in AB for positively and 
negatively valenced stimuli associated with the anticipation of substance-related 
motivationally salient outcomes, can influence affective states, and therefore 
facilitate substance seeking behaviour. 
Research methods and predictions for aversive disorders 
The understanding of motivational processes involved in the effects of 
substance loss and reward on AB could be improved by the investigation of 
comparable effects in disorders characterised by pronounced aversive motivation 
(e.g., depression). Negativity bias may be associated with the maintenance of 
depression (Beevers et al., 2015; Clasen et al., 2013). Consequently, the examination 
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of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the decreased responsiveness to reward-
related stimuli, or the preservation of negativity bias could allow for  
the improvement of treatment methods. The results of Studies 2.2-3 demonstrated 
that the ability to prevent loss was a sufficient condition for revealing the impact of 
probability information on AB. Learned helplessness theory of depression 
(Seligman, 1972), implies that the introduction of control over the outcomes would 
not have comparable effects on AB in individuals suffering from depression. 
Learned helplessness is a pattern of behaviour which may develop in individuals 
repeatedly exposed to unavoidable negative (aversive or painful) outcomes.  
Having learned that a situation could not be controlled, such an individual may 
become unable or unwilling to prevent those negative outcomes when prevention is 
possible. Accordingly, it could be expected that the effects of learned helplessness 
should be visible in both the clinical and non-clinical population when comparing 
performance on tasks involving behavioural control over negative outcomes. 
Depression can hinder the development of AB for reward-related stimuli (Brailean et 
al., 2014), and it could be argued that decreased sensitivity to cues signalling loss 
prevention could be a contributing factor. This aspect of depression could be 
investigated using the research methods developed as a part of this thesis (Studies 
2.2-3). 
Similarly, the tasks used for the purpose of Studies 4.1-2 could be used to 
investigate the negativity bias associated with depression (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et 
al., 2004). As reflected in the results of Study 4.1, the effects of reward anticipation 
enhanced the positivity bias, whereas loss anticipation led to  
a balance in attentional preference for sad and happy faces.  
However, individuals suffering from depression can be expected to be more sensitive 
to cues signalling loss. Therefore, the opposite pattern of results could be expected. 
The research methods used in Studies 4.1-2 could clarify this if AB for one type of 
negative information (loss signalling cues) could further enhance the effects of 
another type of negative bias (facial expressions of sadness) on AB.  
Overall, the experimental designs developed for the purpose of this thesis could be 
adapted to examine issues beyond the current scope of research on addiction and 
appetite. 
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Limitations and further directions for future research 
Although the current studies clearly demonstrate the moderating effects of 
substance reward and loss anticipation on AB, they do not explain why certain 
effects were observed for one substance but not the other. For instance, Study 2.3 
demonstrated that anticipation of beer loss prevention increased AB for alcohol-
related pictures in comparison to unlikely loss prevention trials. However, the pattern 
of results obtained for chocolate was different and more difficult to interpret  
(i.e., certain loss prevention evoked a lower AB for chocolate in comparison to  
the uncertainty condition, but none of these conditions differed from the unlikely loss 
prevention condition). Study 2.4 demonstrated an outcome specific general boost in 
AB during chocolate anticipation trials, but the results were not observed for alcohol 
anticipation. For instance, Study 2.3 could have included more participants 
motivated by obtaining an alcohol reward, whereas Study 2.4 could have included 
more participants focused on the chocolate reward. It can be speculated that this 
difference contributed to the lack of consistency in the effects of chocolate and beer 
anticipation. Thus, future research should consider this confound and control for 
participants’ motivation for taking part in the study. 
The current research focused on the investigation of general mechanisms 
which direct attention during anticipation of motivationally salient outcomes,  
and, consequently, the impact of individual differences was not considered.  
The inclusion of measurements of personality traits associated with  
the responsiveness to substance-related cues could help to clarify some of the results. 
For instance, it could be speculated that the individual level of sensation seeking and 
risk taking might be particularly relevant. Sensation seeking is a personality trait 
defined by the active pursuit of novel, complex and intense sensations,  
and the willingness to take the risks achieving these intense states (Zuckerman, 
2001). It could be expected that high sensation-seekers could be more affected by  
the uncertainty conditions, whereas attention of low sensation seekers could prefer 
the predictors of certain outcomes. Therefore, follow-up research investigating  
the effects of certain and uncertain outcome predictors on AB should include  
the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 2007). 
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Similarly, responsiveness to alcohol and food rewards could be related to 
individual differences in impulsivity (Christiansen et al., 2012; Fernie et al., 2013; 
Jentsch et al., 2014; Nederkoorn et al., 2015; Schag et al., 2013). Meta-analysis 
revealed a small but robust relationship between substance-related AB and 
impulsivity (Coskunpinar & Cyders, 2013) and similar effects have been reported for 
obesity (Hou et al., 2011). This could indicate that high impulsivity may either 
enhance or overdrive the effects of reward anticipation. Thus, further research should 
consider measuring this trait as a potential moderator of effects of reward 
anticipation on AB. 
Apart from the two aforementioned personality traits, the base-line levels of 
state characteristics, like craving or hunger, could be significant moderators of  
the effects of reward anticipation. This prediction is based on the results of studies 
which demonstrated a link between craving/hunger and AB (Field et al., 2009; Rose 
et al., 2013; Werthmann et al., 2015). Although the current studies recorded alcohol 
and chocolate use and habits as well as chocolate craving, this information was only 
obtained as a sample characteristic. Since this was not the purpose of current 
research, the impact of these variables on the effects of anticipation was not 
investigated. Taking into account the magnitude of positive correlation between 
craving and AB (r = .19) demonstrated in the meta-analysis conducted by Field et al. 
(2009), the authors reported that the sample size required to detect this correlation 
with 80% power at α = .05 would be at least N = 212. Therefore, the sample size 
required to investigate the impact of individual differences in craving on the effects 
of anticipation on AB is much larger than those used in the studies conducted as part 
of this thesis. Investigation of the impact of individual differences in the baseline 
craving and hunger on the effects of anticipation on AB could be considered as 
avenues for future research. Such studies could help further clarify the role of 
anticipatory processes in motivated behaviour. 
Studies 4.1-2 demonstrated congruency effects of loss and reward 
anticipation on the attentional processing of facial expressions of emotion.  
However, these effects were demonstrated for different types of picture pairs  
(i.e., happy-sad pairs for Study 4.1 and sad-neutral pairs for Study 4.2).  
It was speculated that the difference in results of Studies 4.1 and 4.2 was  
 184 
 
the consequence of the baseline differences in affective bias (i.e., positivity bias in 
Study 4.1 and the lack of comparable bias in Study 4.2). However, an alternative 
explanation cannot be ruled out. It is possible that the alterations that were done to 
the task did not allow for the replication of the initial findings. The uncertainty trials 
were not included in Study 4.2, because in Study 4.1 the differences in AB between 
uncertainty and certainty as well as certainty and no reward/loss conditions were not 
clear. This task adjustment could have influenced the results. Research suggests that 
uncertainty is positively associated with motivation (Ozcelika, Cagiltayb, & 
Ozcelikc, 2013) and can facilitate curiosity and emotional reactivity to 
motivationally valenced stimuli (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Howard-Jones 
& Demetriou, 2009) which in turn may lead to enhanced task engagement. 
Therefore, even if there are no a clear differences between the effects of uncertainty 
and certainty on AB, the uncertainty condition could be crucial for participants 
engagement in the task. It is possible that the difference in task engagement could be 
responsible for the different patterns of results of Studies 4.1 and 4.2.  
Thus, the impact of uncertainty on task engagement and AB should be further 
investigated to clarify this issue. 
The element of deception could be examined as a possible limitation of 
current studies. In Jones et al. (2012) study, participants expected that a number of 
points they accumulated during the task would be converted into actual rewards 
which they would obtain at the end of the study. However, due to ethical concerns, 
participants did not receive any substance-related rewards at any point in the task. 
Provision of small quantities of chocolate and beer during all of the certain reward 
and a half of uncertain reward trials conducted during the study could have made 
participants nauseous. Consumption of chocolate and beer during the study would 
also affect the level of satiety and intoxication, both of which could alter the value of 
rewards, thus making the interpretation of results problematic. This research method 
is different than one implemented in similar studies (Field et al., 2011; Wertz & 
Sayette, 2001a), during which participants received substances. However, it was 
proposed that the probability cues are sufficient to trigger  
the representations of substance-related reward and therefore direct attention 
(Hogarth, Dickinson, Wright, Kouvaraki, & Duka, 2007). The goal of Study 2.1 was 
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to replicate the results provided by Jones et al. (2012) while controlling for  
the potential study artefact (i.e., single behavioural response for both substance 
types). Therefore, Study 2.1 scrupulously followed the design introduced by Jones et 
al. (2012) and included the element of deception. Since the studies, were by design, 
closely related to each other, the introduction of actual substance rewards would 
make interpretation of results difficult and would have raised the same ethical 
concerns as in the study. Although the effectiveness of deception was not formally 
tested, it should be emphasised that participants asked about  
the quantities of beer and chocolate they either ‘won’ or ‘maintained’ and some of 
them were visibly upset when they learned about the deception. This suggests that 
participants believed they would receive chocolate and beer at the end of studies. 
Finally, it should be noted that the results of EEG study (Study 3.1) should be 
treated with caution as, due to the programming error probability, trials were not 
completely counterbalanced. The findings of this study await replication. 
Conclusions 
The results of the current studies provide further support for the effects of 
substance anticipation on cue reactivity by showing that reward anticipation is 
sufficient for altering AB for substance-related cues. However, the results extend 
beyond this by demonstrating that comparable effects can be observed for loss 
anticipation. The level of behavioural control over the reward or loss outcomes was 
identified as a moderator of the impact of probability cues on AB. The effects of 
anticipation of substance reward and loss were shown to be outcome specific for 
cues belonging to the substance-related domain. The anticipation of motivationally 
salient outcomes can also influence the processing of positively and negatively 
valenced information. The effects of anticipation may have an independent impact 
on AB for substance-related stimuli and AB for valenced information (i.e., cues 
signalling unavoidable loss had a limited impact on AB for substance-related cues 
but influenced the attentional processing of facial expressions of emotion).  
Eye-tracking studies did not demonstrate a clear difference in the impact of certainty 
and uncertainty on AB. However, the results of the EEG study suggest that 
evaluative processes triggered by cues signalling uncertain outcomes might be 
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diminished when these cues are followed-up by neutral stimuli. Overall,  
these findings provide a further support for the dynamic nature of AB (see Field et 
al., 2016), and suggest that temporal changes in AB might be responsible for  
the variability in substance seeking behaviour. The current results and research 
methods may have important implications for addiction and appetite research, as 
well as psychological disorders characterised by altered processing of motivationally 
salient information.  
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APPENDIX A - Questionnaires 
  
  
 
Age:  
 
Gender: M / F 
Timeline Followback 
 
To help me evaluate your drinking I need to get an idea of your alcohol consumption 
in the past fourteen days. Please fill out the table with the number of units of alcohol 
consumed on each day, being as accurate as possible. Please use the information 
given below to work out how many units you consumed on each day in the past 
week and fill in the number of units in the table. On days when you did not drink 
please write 0 (zero). I realise it isn’t easy to recall things with 100% accuracy, but if 
you are not sure how many units you drank on a certain day please try to give it your 
best guess.  
 
What is a unit of alcohol? 
The list below shows the number of units of alcohol in common drinks:- 
 A pint of ordinary strength lager (Carling Black Label, Fosters) - 2 units  
 A pint of strong lager (Stella Artois, Kronenbourg 1664) - 3 units  
 A pint of ordinary bitter (John Smith's, Boddingtons) - 2 units  
 A pint of best bitter (Fuller's ESB, Young's Special) - 3 units    
 A pint of ordinary strength cider (Woodpecker) - 2 units  
 A pint of strong cider (Dry Blackthorn, Strongbow) - 3 units  
 A 175ml glass of red or white wine - around 2 units  
 A 750ml bottle of red or white wine – around 9 units 
 A pub measure of spirits - 1 unit  
 An alcopop (eg Smirnoff Ice, Bacardi Breezer, WKD, Reef) - around 1.5 units  
 
 
Please now fill in the following table stating the total number of alcohol units 
you consumed for each day. Please start from whichever day it was yesterday and 
work backwards. For example if today is Monday start from Sunday and work 
backwards, with Monday being Monday a week ago. Please double check that you 
have filled in the number of units for all fourteen days. 
 
Last week: 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
       
 
Previous week: 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
       
 
  
  
 
AUDIT 
 
1) How often do you have a drink containing alcohol? 
 
Never     Less than monthly   2-4 times a month     2-3 times per week    4+per week 
 
2) How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you’re 
drinking? 
 
1-2   3-4   5-6   7-9 
 10+ 
 
3) How often do you have 6 or more drinks on one occasion? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
4) How often during the last year have you found that you were not able to stop 
drinking once you had started? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
5) How often during the last year have you failed to do what was normally expected 
from you because of drinking? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
6) How often during the last year have you needed a drink first thing in the morning to 
get yourself going after a heavy drinking session? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
7) How often during the last year have you had a feeling of guilt or remorse after 
drinking? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
8) How often during the last year have you been unable to remember what happened 
the night before because you had been drinking? 
 
Never       Less than monthly         Monthly       Weekly              Daily or almost daily 
 
9) Have you or someone else been injured because of your drinking? 
 
No       Yes, but not in the last year  Yes, during the last year 
 
10) Has a relative, friend, doctor or other health worker been concerned about your 
drinking or suggested you cut down? 
 
No      Yes, but not in the last year  Yes, during the last year 
  
  
 
Chocolate use questionnaire: 
 
In an average week, can you please indicate how much chocolate (roughly, in standard sized 
bars, e.g. mars, snickers, twix, etc) you would consume? 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
How many bars of chocolate do you usually keep at home? 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Please give an indication of how you feel about the following statements;  
 
How much do you like to eat chocolate? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not a lot      Lots 
 
How often do you feel the urge to eat chocolate? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Never       Always 
 
How strongly do you feel this urge? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not very strongly      Very strongly 
 
To what extent do you feel you need to eat chocolate? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all       A large extent 
 
How difficult do you find it to stop eating chocolate once you have started? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Extremely 
  
 
PANAS 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. 
Read each item and then circle the appropriate answer next to that word. Indicate to 
what extent you are feeling this way right now. 
 
Use the following scale to record your answers. 
 
(1) = Very slightly 
or not at all 
(2) = A little (3) = Moderately (4) = Quite a bit (5) = Extremely 
 
 
Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
1. Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6. Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10. Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17. Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19. Active 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
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Abstract: Addiction is a chronically relapsing disorder, and substance users 
frequently relapse when they encounter opportunities to use drugs. In this paper, we 
review evidence regarding the psychological response to anticipation of imminent 
drug availability, its neural substrates, and its relationship to other phenomena 
implicated in addiction. Naturalistic and laboratory studies indicate that drug 
anticipation increases cue-provoked craving and attentional biases for drug-related 
cues. As predicted by existing theoretical models, these effects reflect hyper-
valuation of drugs that are perceived as available for consumption, which is linked to 
activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex that, in turn, innervates subcortical 
regions associated with reward processing. Drug expectancy is necessary for the 
formation of conditioned responses to drug-related cues and it modulates the strength 
of conditioned responses. Furthermore, the role of impulsivity in addiction can be 
understood in terms of its interaction with the response to imminent drug 
availability. These results have a number of implications for the treatment of 
addiction, ranging from government policies that restrict the perceived availability of 
drugs to novel biological and psychological interventions that could blunt the 
response to signals of drug availability.  
 
Keywords: attentional bias, availability, conditioning, cue-reactivity, expectancy, 
substance use disorders 
  
 
Introduction 
The majority of addicted individuals will relapse to drug use after a period of 
abstinence.
1
 Relapses are frequently attributed to the presence of others who are 
using the drug, or to being in an environment in which the drug is readily available, 
such as a bar.
2–5
 A large body of research demonstrates that the anticipation of an 
imminently available psychoactive drug has a potent emotional and motivational 
effect in addicts. In Memoirs of an Addicted Brain, the neuroscientist and recovered 
addict Marc Lewis describes the experience eloquently: 
I sit at the dinner table, gazing down at my plate, and imagine that liquid 
pearl of opium dripping from that Chinese woman’s skewer. And my ventral 
striatum says “That’s what I want. That’s exactly what I want, and I want it now.”6 
In this paper, we will discuss theoretical models that incorporate a key role for drug 
anticipation in the development of substance use disorders (more colloquially known 
as addiction).
7
 We will then review evidence regarding the role of drug anticipation 
in learning, subjective craving, cognitive processing, and the underlying neural 
substrates of these effects. Finally, we will discuss the clinical implications of this 
work and how it can be applied in the search for more effective treatments for 
substance use disorders. 
Theoretical background 
Smith et al
8
 propose that reward (including drug reward) comprises three distinct 
components: liking, wanting, and learning. Drugs are initially used primarily for 
their hedonic rewarding properties (liking). With repeated drug use, a Pavlovian 
conditioning process (learning) causes the rewarding properties of drugs to be paired 
with environmental cues that are present at the time of drug consumption, such as the 
sight and smell of alcoholic drinks or cigarettes. As addiction progresses, excessive 
wanting for the drug develops, which leads to compulsive drug use and loss of 
control. This wanting process is thought to reflect adaptations in dopamine function 
in the brain reward system (including the nucleus accumbens [NAcc] and ventral 
tegmental area [VTA]) as well as impaired function in subregions of the prefrontal 
cortex. In the addicted brain, excessive wanting can be evoked by drug-related cues, 
which trigger increases in dopamine activity in the reward system. This increase in 
dopamine activity is experienced as the expectation of imminent consumption of the 
drug, which is powerfully motivating.
9
 
  
 
There is now a broad consensus regarding the core psychological changes that occur 
in addiction. That is, dependent individuals continue to use drugs despite negative 
consequences because they overestimate the hedonic rewarding value of the 
substance, but become relatively insensitive to other forms of reinforcement (eg, 
from social interactions and/or occupational achievement).
10
 It has been proposed 
that addiction is maintained because the expectation of hedonic effects obtained from 
drug reward becomes more motivating over time. However, at the same time, both 
cognitive control and the actual hedonic effects of drugs begin to 
decline.
9,11
 Anticipation of the hedonic effects of drugs can be triggered by 
information that the drug is available (eg, “Would you like a beer?”) or by the 
detection of drug-related cues that signal the availability of the drug.
12
 Therefore, the 
theories discussed in this section propose that anticipation of drug effects evokes 
powerful motivational and emotional responses that may maintain drug use, despite 
negative consequences of drug use and the fact that the hedonic experience of drug 
use never quite lives up to that which was anticipated. 
Does drug expectancy play a role in drug conditioning? 
The theoretical models discussed in the previous section suggest that reactivity to 
drug-related cues occurs because those cues have been repeatedly paired with the 
rewarding effects of drugs, which leads to the formation of conditioned associations. 
Exposure to drug-related cues reliably leads to increased craving and physiological 
arousal in drug users. These responses have been documented in patients with 
alcohol, nicotine, opiate, and cocaine dependence as well as in pathological 
gamblers.
13–17
 According to conditioning accounts of cue reactivity, the drug acts as 
an unconditioned stimulus (US) that elicits unconditioned responses. With repeated 
drug use, the user learns the contingency between drug effects and cues associated 
with drug administration (eg, the sight and smell of a lit cigarette) such that those 
cues function as conditioned stimuli (CS) that are able to evoke conditioned 
responses (CRs). Once the CS-US contingency has been learned, the CS functions as 
a signal for the imminent availability of the drug, and, arguably, it is this anticipation 
that is responsible for the initial development of CRs such as changes in subjective 
state (particularly craving), physiological changes (eg, increases in heart rate), and 
behavioral responses (such as drug-taking behavior).
18,19
 
Awareness of CS-US contingencies may be a crucial condition for the initial 
development of CRs. A considerable number of human conditioning studies 
  
 
demonstrate that, during the formation of conditioned associations, participants show 
CRs only after they can verbalize the CS-US contingency, ie, when presentation of 
the CS leads to the expectation that the US is imminent.
20
This is also true when 
participants are learning associations between the opportunity to consume drugs and 
arbitrary stimuli. An arbitrary cue that is paired with smoking is able to evoke an 
increase in cigarette craving (and other conditioned responses), but only after 
participants have learned the predictive significance of the cue, such that its presence 
elicits an expectation of the opportunity to smoke.
21
 For example, one 
study
22
 showed that a CS that had been paired with the opportunity to smoke (CS+) 
led to increased cigarette craving compared to a CS that had been explicitly unpaired 
with the opportunity to smoke (CS−). This CR (craving) was particularly 
pronounced in individuals who were aware of the contingency between the CS and 
the US. Furthermore, the craving CR to the CS+ (versus the CS−) was completely 
abolished if participants were informed that smoking was unavailable. This study, 
and several others reviewed by Hogarth and Duka,
21
 reveal that drug expectancy in 
response to a CS that is paired with a drug use opportunity is an important 
determinant of other CRs in response to that cue.
18
 To summarize, drug-related cues 
are able to evoke craving and physiological arousal only when individuals are aware 
of the predictive significance of those cues, such that their presence leads to an 
expectation that the drug is available. 
Naturalistic studies of the effects of drug anticipation 
Theoretical models suggest that drug expectancy should increase craving, and results 
from studies discussed in the previous section demonstrate that this is an important 
determinant of the development of craving reactivity to drug-related cues. Two 
elegant studies demonstrate that drug expectancy influences the strength of craving 
in naturalistic settings, outside of the laboratory. Dar et al
23
 assessed the strength of 
cigarette craving in flight attendants during a two-way short flight (each leg was 
between 3 and 5.5 hours in duration) and a one-way long flight (between 8 and 13 
hours duration). In both short and long flights, the strength of craving increased 
gradually and peaked as landing approached. The strength of craving appeared to be 
proportional to the proximity to the opportunity to smoke, rather than to the duration 
of nicotine deprivation; craving strength at the end of the first leg of the short flight 
was comparable to that at the end of the long flight (when a smoking opportunity 
was imminent). However, craving was much stronger at the end of the first leg of the 
  
 
short flight compared to the equivalent time point in the long flight, when the 
duration of nicotine deprivation was the same. This study demonstrates that cigarette 
craving increases when individuals anticipate an imminent opportunity to smoke and 
decreases when cigarettes are not available for a period of time. Although nicotine 
deprivation also influences the strength of cigarette craving, the powerful effects of 
smoking opportunity can be clearly seen when nicotine deprivation is controlled. 
In another study, Dar et al
24
 investigated the effects of habitual abstinence on 
cigarette craving in a population of Orthodox Jewish smokers. Craving strength was 
generally lower during the Sabbath (when Orthodox Jews must not smoke) in 
comparison to both a regular workday, when they could smoke as usual, and on a 
different workday, when smoking was not permitted. However, craving levels did 
not differ between the regular workdays in which smoking was allowed versus those 
in which smoking was not permitted. One interpretation of these findings is that, 
when individuals habitually abstain from drug use for religious reasons, they may 
perceive the drug as “unavailable” on those days, and this results in lower craving. 
On the other hand, the absence of a difference in the strength of craving on working 
days when smoking was permitted versus days on which it was not allowed suggests 
that the effects of smoking opportunity on cigarette craving in naturalistic settings 
are moderated by other factors, such as the reason for the opportunity, or lack 
thereof, to smoke. 
Laboratory research exploring the role of drug expectancy on cue reactivity 
and subjective craving 
In addition to the aforementioned naturalistic studies,
23,24
 laboratory research reveals 
that the anticipation of drug availability can have a robust impact on the strength of 
subjective craving, particularly craving that is evoked by drug-related cues. 
Numerous studies demonstrated that the strength of subjective craving during drug 
cue exposure was significantly higher among participants who were able to use the 
drug soon after cue exposure versus those who were not. Some of these studies also 
suggested that craving was elevated when drug use was anticipated, even among 
participants who were not exposed to drug cues
12,25–31
 (see Wertz and Sayette
32
 for 
review). The majority of these studies were conducted with cigarette smokers, 
although one study demonstrated comparable findings in individuals with cocaine 
dependence. In this study, all participants received a dose of cocaine, but one group 
was expecting to receive cocaine whereas another group believed that there was only 
  
 
a 33% chance that they would receive the drug. The most important finding was that 
the participants who were expecting to receive cocaine reported significantly higher 
levels of cocaine craving immediately before the cocaine was actually administered, 
compared to the participants who were uncertain if they would receive 
cocaine.
33
 Overall, these studies are consistent with the suggestion that subjective 
craving may involve anticipation of further drug-related reward.
10
 
Despite this consistency, some studies have failed to replicate the finding of 
increased craving in response to drug cues when the drug is perceived as available. 
Field and Duka
34
 observed no effects of smoking opportunity on craving and 
physiological measures of smoking cue reactivity. However, those authors noted that 
participants who expected to be able to smoke soon still had to wait around 20 
minutes before they were able to smoke, and this delay may have reduced the impact 
of the expectancy information. With regard to alcohol cue reactivity, Davidson et 
al
35
 and Kruse et al
36
 found no effect of alcohol availability on subjective craving in 
response to alcohol cues, although the anticipation of alcohol did lead to a reduction 
in negative mood in the Davidson et al
35
 study. One study demonstrated that craving 
induced by alcohol cues was stronger in participants who thought that they could not 
consume alcoholic drinks after cue exposure compared to those who expected to be 
able to consume alcohol
37
 (see also MacKillop and Lisman
38
). The latter findings are 
consistent with Tiffany’s39 theoretical model. This model posits that drug self-
administration becomes habitual in experienced users, such that it is elicited 
automatically in the absence of strong cravings. However, addicts experience 
cravings when automatic drug self-administration behaviors are blocked because the 
drug is not available. Therefore, the findings from this study lend support to 
Tiffany’s model, although it is notable that the other studies discussed in this section 
fail to support the predictions made by this model. 
Overall, it is possible that anticipation of imminent drug availability may lead to 
increased craving, but exposure to drug cues alongside information that the drug 
cannot be consumed may lead to frustration and negative mood, which leads to 
increased craving via a different mechanism. A further possibility is that drug 
expectancy has differential effects on craving for tobacco and alcohol. We 
emphasize that there are so few studies on this topic that this issue, and these 
alternative explanations, await further study. 
  
  
 
Effects of drug expectancy on attentional bias for drug cues 
In addition to its effects on subjective craving, drug expectancy influences other 
aspects of cue reactivity including attentional biases for drug cues. It is known that 
drug users have an attentional bias for drug-related cues; drug cues are able to 
capture and hold their attention at the expense of other stimuli.
18
 It has been 
demonstrated that attentional biases for drug cues develop as a consequence of the 
same classical conditioning process that results in other aspects of cue reactivity, 
including changes in physiological activity and subjective craving,
40
 as discussed in 
the previous section on conditioning. Whilst the clinical relevance of attentional bias 
in substance use disorders is debated,
41
 it is generally agreed that attentional bias is 
modulated by dopamine activity
42
 and it reflects the current motivational value of the 
drug.
43,44
 
Field and Cox
18
 proposed that, during conditioning, drug cues elicit an expectation 
of imminent drug availability and, as a consequence of this, the drug user 
preferentially shifts their attention to the cue. This theory makes the prediction that 
attentional bias for drug cues should be moderated by the perceived availability of 
the drug. Wertz and Sayette
45
 showed that attentional bias for smoking-related words 
was highest in nicotine-deprived smokers who expected to be able to smoke 
imminently compared to those who believed that they would not be able to smoke, or 
who were uncertain if they could smoke or not. These effects were replicated by 
McCarthy et al
46
 who showed that anticipation of smoking increased attentional bias 
for smoking-related words and other emotionally valenced words in smokers who 
were deprived from nicotine, but there were no effects of smoking expectancy in 
smokers who were nicotine sated at the time of testing. Using a within-subjects 
design, Field et al
47
 informed social drinking (nondependent) participants about the 
probability that they would receive beer (100%, 50%, or 0%) before each trial of an 
eye-tracking task. During this task, alcohol-related and neutral pictures were 
presented on a computer screen while participants’ eye movements were recorded. 
Results revealed that attentional bias for alcohol cues was elevated when participants 
expected to be able to consume alcohol imminently, compared to when they knew 
that alcohol was not available. However, this sensitivity to availability information 
was only seen in relatively light drinkers. In heavier drinkers, attentional bias for 
alcohol cues was seen regardless of availability information. This finding may 
suggest that attentional bias can become decoupled from anticipation of reward in 
  
 
those who drink more heavily or more frequently (see also Hogarth et al
48
 for 
broader discussion of this issue). 
In a follow-up study, Jones et al
49
 used a similar methodology and replicated the 
basic demonstration of increased attentional bias for alcohol cues when alcohol was 
anticipated imminently. However, unlike in the Field et al
47
 study, these effects were 
apparent in all participants regardless of whether they were a relatively heavy or 
light drinker. In the same study, Jones et al
49
 also demonstrated that anticipation of 
chocolate reward led to increased attentional bias for chocolate-related cues, which 
suggests that the effects of reward anticipation on attentional bias are not limited to 
drugs of abuse, but are seen with all rewarding stimuli (however, see Werthmann et 
al,
50
 discussed below). Importantly, in the Jones et al
49
 study there was some 
crossover of these effects, because anticipation of alcohol led to increased attentional 
bias for chocolate cues and vice versa. This demonstration that the effects of reward 
anticipation on attentional bias are general rather than specific to the reward that is 
anticipated is problematic for conditioning-based accounts of this effect.
18
 However, 
methodological issues in this study may account for these findings and suggest an 
alternative explanation for the results, as discussed in Jones et al.
49
 
Finally, a recent study from Werthmann et al
50
 found no effect of perceived 
availability of chocolate on attentional biases for chocolate-related cues. However, in 
this study there was a fairly long interval (we estimate it at 15–20 minutes) between 
giving participants the availability information and the actual opportunity to 
consume chocolate. Therefore, the null effects may be attributed to the availability 
information losing its motivational impact because the reward was not available soon 
enough, as discussed in relation to the Field and Duka
34
 study in a previous section. 
The available studies suggest that the effects of anticipation of drugs (and other 
rewards) on attentional bias are readily detected when anticipation (expectancy) is 
manipulated on a within-subjects, trial-by-trial basis, which ensures that participants 
expect to receive the reward (or not receive it) at the exact moment that attentional 
bias is measured. 
The underlying neural circuitry of reward anticipation 
Research on patterns of brain activation during drug cue reactivity has identified an 
important role for drug anticipation. Wilson et al
51
 identified two regions of the 
prefrontal cortex – the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) – that were reliably activated by drug-related stimuli in current or 
  
 
continuing drug users, ie, those who were not receiving treatment at the time of 
testing. In drug users who were receiving treatment at the time of testing, the OFC 
and DLPFC were not activated during drug cue exposure. Wilson et 
al’s51 explanation was that these differential patterns of brain activity during drug 
cue exposure can be attributed to the greater expectancy of drug use in the current 
drug users compared to those seeking treatment, because, presumably, the former 
group were able to use drugs as soon as they finished taking part in the study 
whereas the latter group were not. Subsequent studies have manipulated the 
availability of smoking on a trial-by-trial basis while smokers (who are not 
attempting to quit) are exposed to smoking cues, and results have supported this 
account; activity in the OFC and DLPFC in response to smoking cues was increased 
when smokers perceived an opportunity to smoke, compared to when smoking was 
not available.
52–54
 Furthermore, deactivation of the DLPFC with transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) eliminated the effect of smoking expectancy on 
subjective craving. In addition, this deactivation of the DLPFC reduced the degree of 
activation in the OFC that was evoked by the anticipation of smoking.
54
 Hayashi et 
al
54
 concluded that the function of the DLPFC in this context is to increase the 
subjective value of the drug in response to availability information. This value 
information is then transmitted to other cortical (OFC, anterior cingulate cortex) and 
subcortical (eg, NAcc) regions of the brain. 
Other studies have confirmed the role of the DLPFC in anticipation of other types of 
reward. Anticipation of monetary reward directly increases activation of the DLPFC, 
and thereby indirectly increases activity in the NAcc and VTA,
55
 a similar pattern of 
activity to that reported in the Hayashi et al
54
 study on smoking availability. Other 
studies conducted with humans and primates have confirmed that the DLPFC is 
involved in intertemporal valuations, ie, the sensitivity to immediate versus delayed 
reinforcement.
56–58
 In summary, the DLPFC can be considered as one of the primary 
brain substrates involved in the response to drug expectancy. 
How does drug expectancy relate to loss of control in addiction? 
We have shown that drug expectancy has clear effects on subjective craving and 
attentional bias for drug cues, and we have identified the DLPFC as an important 
neural substrate of these effects. In this section, we show that the effects of drug 
expectancy are related to aspects of loss of control in addiction. Substance use 
disorders are characterized by elevated impulsivity. Arguably, impulsivity comprises 
  
 
two distinct components: temporal discounting (or cognitive impulsivity) and 
disinhibition (or motor impulsivity).
59
 Temporal discounting and disinhibition are 
well-established features of substance use disorders.
60,61
 Importantly, both 
components of impulsivity are related to the effects of drug expectancy on drug 
users. 
Temporal discounting (or delay discounting) refers to the tendency to devalue 
rewards as a function of the delay to their receipt; most people would prefer to 
receive $10 now than $11 next month, for example. This preference for immediate 
gratification is greatly exaggerated in those with substance use disorders.
60
 Bickel 
and Marsch
62
 argued that a high level of delay discounting could result in preference 
shifts that ultimately increase the risk of relapse to drug use after a period of 
abstinence. In a treatment setting, when an abstinent drug user is asked about their 
intentions to remain abstinent in the long-term, they may indicate that they prefer a 
life of abstinence (that carries long-term benefits to their health and general well-
being) instead of a life of drug use (that involves immediate gratification but is 
harmful in the long-term). However, this preference is (sincerely) expressed in a 
treatment setting in which there is no opportunity to use the drug in the near future. 
When the drug user leaves the treatment setting, it is only a matter of time before 
they encounter an opportunity to use the drug again. This time the choice is between 
immediate gratification versus maintaining the commitment to the longer-term goal 
of abstinence (which carries long-term but not immediate benefits). Elevated rates of 
delay discounting in drug users can explain why they are particularly vulnerable to 
such preference shifts and, therefore, likely to relapse after a period of 
abstinence.
60,63,64
 Most relevant to the current review paper, we have shown that the 
strong emotional and motivational response to drug availability information can 
explain why these preference shifts occur. 
Disinhibition is defined as the inability to suppress, delay, or change a response that 
is no longer required or is inappropriate. This inability to control behavior can be 
measured in the laboratory using computer tasks, such as the stop signal
65
 and go/no-
go
66
 tasks, both of which require participants to inhibit a dominant motor response. 
Participants with substance use disorders tend to perform poorly on these tasks, and 
when participants are in a disinhibited state they are more likely to drink alcohol to 
excess.
61
 One recent study suggests that individual differences in disinhibition may 
moderate the strength of cue reactivity when the drug is perceived as available. 
  
 
Papachristou et al
67
 reported that, amongst social drinkers, craving for alcohol was 
stronger in participants who expected to receive alcohol imminently compared to 
those who did not. Most importantly, individual differences in disinhibition 
moderated these effects. Participants who were highly disinhibited and expected to 
receive alcohol showed a much larger increase in cue-induced alcohol craving 
compared to disinhibited participants who did not expect to receive alcohol. Among 
participants who were not highly disinhibited, expectancy of receiving alcohol had 
no effect on cue-induced craving. Although this result awaits replication, it suggests 
that disinhibition may be an important individual difference that may moderate the 
strength of subjective cue reactivity when drugs are perceived as available. These 
findings are complemented by other studies that revealed an association between 
impulsivity and other aspects of cue reactivity, such as attentional bias.
68,69
 A recent 
meta-analysis demonstrated a small but robust association between impulsivity and 
attentional bias for drug cues.
70
 
Synthesis and theoretical implications 
We propose a theoretical framework that can incorporate much of the evidence 
described in this review. In common with the models discussed in the first section of 
this paper, we suggest that, in the addicted brain, there is an imbalance between the 
overestimation of the rewarding value of drugs, which is combined with decreased 
sensitivity to alternative forms of reinforcement. The first element of this imbalance 
(overvaluation of drug effects) is particularly sensitive to the anticipation of 
imminent drug availability, which results in the development of conditioned 
responses to drug cues and subsequently triggers a powerful emotional and 
motivational response. This response can be described as an increase in the value of 
the drug that is experienced as elevated subjective craving in response to drug-
related cues, and increased allocation of attention to those cues (attentional bias). 
The corresponding brain substrates are an increase in activity in the DLPFC in 
response to drug availability information, which innervates subcortical reward 
system structures such as the NAcc and VTA.
9
 
Other features of addiction, such as increased impulsivity and poor self-control, are 
closely linked to this response to imminent drug availability. The increased temporal 
discounting that is seen in drug users can be readily explained as a result of the 
psychological response to imminent drug availability. Furthermore, elevated 
disinhibition in substance users may have a direct effect on drug-seeking 
  
 
behavior,
61
 but it may also have a more indirect effect by causing an exaggerated 
response to information about imminent drug availability.
67
 However, we must be 
clear that the evidence described in this review cannot provide a complete account of 
addiction. Other processes such as opponent processes
71,72
 that may ultimately lead 
to hedonic homeostatic dysregulation are also likely to play an important role.
73
 
Practical and clinical implications 
People with substance use disorders who wish to reduce their drug use or abstain 
altogether may be helped by broad policy interventions that reduce the availability of 
drugs or at least reduce the likelihood that they will be reminded that drugs are 
available for purchase or consumption. One example of the latter is recent legislation 
introduced in the UK that ensures that cigarettes must be hidden from view in shops. 
This ensures that cigarettes are still available for purchase, but people are not 
constantly reminded that cigarettes are available every time they walk into a shop. 
We suggest that bans on smoking in public places introduced in many countries 
around the world in recent years are likely to have the same effect. Another 
development is the introduction of dry bars (eg, The 
Brink; http://thebrinkliverpool.com/about) where people can go to socialize in the 
evenings but alcohol is not available for purchase. A further example is restrictions 
on advertising; tobacco advertising has been banned in the UK for several years, and 
restrictions on alcohol advertising are likely to increase in the future. We suggest that 
one indirect effect of such restrictions may be to reduce awareness of the availability 
of those drugs and thereby bring about a subtle but important reduction in 
consumption of alcohol and tobacco in the population as a whole. 
Restrictions on where alcohol and tobacco can be purchased are an example of how 
governments can reduce the psychological impact of perceived availability of those 
drugs, but of course this will never be a complete solution. Illicit drugs such as 
heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and cannabis are completely illegal in most 
countries but they are still used by a substantial minority of the world population, 
despite the (il) legality of those drugs meaning that most people are rarely confronted 
with cues for the availability of those drugs (unless they are currently making an 
attempt to find somewhere to purchase them). 
This leads us to a more fundamental point about drug availability, which is that 
psychological representations of drug availability may be more important than the 
physical availability of that drug. For example, alcohol consumers could probably 
  
 
purchase alcohol whenever they want to. However, we tentatively suggest that they 
probably do not perceive alcohol as available all the time for a variety of reasons (eg, 
they are at work and they do not drink alcohol at work). It should be emphasized that 
further research is required in order to investigate this suggestion. We also suggest 
that psychological interventions for substance use disorders should attempt to target 
and boost representations of (un)availability of drugs. Arguably, some forms of 
psychological treatment, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, already do this, for 
example, by encouraging drug users to form a more realistic expectation of the 
immediate outcomes of drug use (eg, “it will not feel as good as you expect it to”). 
Alternatively, drug users may be encouraged to restrict their use by thinking of drugs 
as unavailable at certain times or in certain contexts, and gradually increase the 
number of situations at which drug use is considered unavailable.
2
 We speculate that 
recovered addicts who are able to achieve long-term (or permanent) abstinence are 
able to do so because they reach a point at which they consider drugs to be 
permanently unavailable (despite their obvious physical availability). The key to 
understanding recovery from addiction may be to understand how this occurs, and 
this awaits empirical testing in future research. 
The evidence discussed in this paper suggests some additional approaches to the 
treatment of substance use disorders that could be explored. Firstly, cue exposure 
therapy (CET) has arguably proved to be an ineffective treatment for addiction 
because it does not incorporate a role for perceived availability.
74
 In this therapy, 
substance users are exposed to drug-related cues in treatment settings until their 
responses to those cues (eg, craving and physiological arousal) are extinguished. The 
hope is that this will lead to a blunting of cue reactivity outside of the treatment 
context and relapse will be less likely to occur. However, meta-analysis indicates 
that CET does not reduce relapse rates.
74
 This may be because CET sessions always 
take place in treatment settings where drugs are not available, so the drug expectancy 
response is never evoked and therefore cannot be extinguished. One solution may be 
to try to selectively extinguish the drug expectancy response, perhaps by asking 
substance users to imagine that they will soon be consuming the drug, and allowing 
this particular response to extinguish. Secondly, if activity in the DLPFC in response 
to signals of drug availability could somehow be blunted, this may prevent the 
emotional and motivational response to drug expectancy from gathering strength and 
(in some cases) leading to relapse after a period of abstinence. Some methods for 
achieving this may include repeated sessions of transcranial magnetic stimulation 
  
 
applied to the area
75,76
 or some form of cognitive training that could lead to a 
blunting of activity in the DLPFC in response to availability information.
77
 Finally, 
existing psychological therapies, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, might be 
improved by incorporating additional elements that explicitly target the emotional 
response to imminent drug availability and focus on ways of preparing for and 
coping with the response when it occurs. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
Much of the experimental work on perceived substance availability and subjective 
craving has been conducted with tobacco smokers. However, when similar studies 
have been attempted with alcohol consumers, results have not always been 
consistent. There is, therefore, a risk that we may use this evidence to develop 
theoretical models of substance use disorders when those models may be more 
relevant for some substance use disorders than others. Further research is required to 
establish whether the findings reported here can be generalized to substance use 
disorders other than addiction to tobacco. 
Laboratory research has provided us with a good understanding of the psychological 
response to instructed drug availability and the brain mechanisms that underlie this 
response. However, it is unclear how this research translates to our understanding of 
the effects of perceived drug use opportunity in naturalistic settings outside of the 
laboratory. An important gap in our knowledge here is how substance users represent 
drug availability and what they can do to boost representations of drugs as 
unavailable. This is likely to lead to important insights into novel treatments for 
substance use disorders. 
Conclusion 
The psychological response to perceived drug availability is a very important piece 
of the addiction puzzle. Subjective craving and attentional biases for drug-related 
cues are elevated when substance users perceive drugs as available, and these effects 
are likely to reflect an increase in the subjective value of drugs that are anticipated 
imminently. The response to drug availability plays an important role in the 
development and maintenance of reactivity to drug-related cues, and individual 
differences in impulsivity may influence drug-seeking behavior precisely because 
they interact with, or even directly determine, the response to perceived drug 
availability. Innovations in treatment for substance use disorders are likely to follow 
  
 
from an improved understanding of why drug expectancy has such powerful and 
wide-ranging effects, and an understanding of what can be done to mitigate these 
effects. 
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